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Abstract 
The thesis is an analytical study of the structure and activities of the International 
Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) from 1945 to 1965. It gives particular attention 
to the nature of the ITF's membership, especially its expansion to the United States 
and to the Third World; to the ITF's political stance in a period of enormous 
international tension; and to the inter- relationsh ip of both those factors. 
The ITF was founded in 1896 and there are few substantial transport workers' unions 
which are not yet affiliated. It has long been recognized as the most effective of all 
the international trade union organizations. The ITF made a significant contdbution 
to the Allied war effort in the Second World War and its membership in every branch 
of the international transport industry took on great strategic importance during the 
Cold War. 
The thesis is based on original research, making special use of the ITF's extensive 
archives at the Modem Records Centre of the University of Warwick. There is a close 
and critical focus on the ITFs political engagement, exemplified by its controversial 
part in countering communist influence in European ports in the early 1950s at the 
time of the introduction of the European Recovery Programme (the Marshall Plan). 
This discussion is, however, set in the context of the ITF's structures and its broader 
social and industrial concerns, such as the defence of trade union and civil rights and 
assistance to transport workers' unions in the newly de-colonized developing 
countries. 
The conclusions draw out the main findings of the research and discuss the dearth of 
academic literature on the international trade union movement, and especially the 
almost total neglect of 'Internabonal Trade Secretariats', organizations such as the 
ITF which group together national trade unions in specific industdes and services. 
On this basis, it surveys a poorly served theoretical field and outlines implications for 
future theoretical analysis. 
v 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
i. The aim 
This thesis sets out to present an anatomy of the International Transport 
Workers' Federation (ITF) in the period from 1945 to 1965, that is a detailed 
analysis of its organization and structure, with particular reference to its politics in 
what was a period of unparalleled international tension and danger. It will be, as 
the dictionary would have it, 'an artificial separation of the parts ... in order to 
discover their position, structure and relations' 1 and will have as its general aim 
the shaping of an informed view of the form and nature of the ITF, of its political 
stance and of its development over the period. That view will then be the basis, 
in the final chapter's 'Conclusions', for some reflections which will concentrate on 
why and how the ITF changed as it did, on what arguments and forces drove the 
changes and on the successes and setbacks of the process. Finally, the writer 
will take a critical view, in the light of the ITF's history, of the theoretical 
treatment, such as it has been so far, of the international trade union movement 
and will suggest an agenda for any theoretician ready to do the essential 
empirical spade-work which has been so neglected in the past. 
ii. The iTF in its intemational context 
The ITF was founded in 1896, one of a number of international trade union 
organizations founded then or thereabouts, which became known as 
'International Trade Secretariats' (ITSs), a not very helpful descdption of 
international groupings of trade unions covering particular 'trades', that is 
indusbies or services: for example the metal or engineering industry, textiles, 
[2] 
public services and, of course, transport. In the case of the ITF, as Chapter 11 will 
show, it was bom out of the urgent and very practical need for international 
solidarity when port employers and shipowners in northern Europe set out to 
break a series of dockers' and seamen's strikes and to crush the unions which 
had organized them. Those were exceptional times and circumstances, 
however, and a more general, less dramatic case for international co-operation 
and alliances by unions in the same line of business will be made in Chapter V1. 
The ITSs (which have recently and provisionally been re-designated as'Global 
Union Federations') have always been autonomous organizations with their own 
rules, their own leaders and their own money. That autonomy was only once 
seriously threatened, with the creation of the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) in 1945, but the threat was fought off (see Chapter V). For much of their 
existence they have chosen to associate and collaborate with international 
organizations made up of national trade union centres: with the Intemational 
Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) before the Second World War and, after the 
war and after the WFTU episode, with the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU). The relationship between the ITSs and the ICFTU has 
sometimes prompted an analogy with that of a national union to its national 
centre but that would overstate it on at least two basic counts: firstly, the ICFTU 
has no authority of any kind in any area over an ITS; and, secondly, the 
relationship does not involve the ITSs in any kind of financial obligation. The 
'Milan Agreement', which set out the modus vivendi (see Chapter V), was a 
statement of voluntary intent, to which most (not quite all) of the ITSs sincerely 
PI 
and willingly subscribed. But the ITSs ceded not one jot of their autonomy and 
the ICFTU knew befter than to ask any such thing of them. 
There were in the period (and still are) clear affinities and common interests 
between these two wings of the international movement. The majodty of the 
member-unions of the ITSs belonged to nabonal centres which belonged to the 
ICFTU. It was something of a rhetorical clich6 for them to refer to themselves as 
part of a 'family' and there was some truth to it, with the qualificabon that families 
do not always agree among themselves and differences have to be respected. 
The Milan Agreement rested on that basis when it committed the ITSs to 
respecting the ICFTU's position on world affairs in general, and the ICFTU to 
leaving the ITSs to look after their own partcular territories. But this 
understanding was as far as the commitments went. The WFTU's bid to swallow 
the ITSs had choked, among other things, on the WFTUs insistence that the 
ITSs should be forbidden from considering anything outside their narrow'trade' 
agendas. The authors of the Milan Agreement were careful not to make the 
same mistake. 
The autonomy extended, as Chapter III shows, to the relationship among the 
ITSs themselves. The only form of association to which they all agreed was an 
'ITS General Conference', made up of General Secretades or their nominees and 
usually no more than annual, where the one immutable and binding rule was that 
nothing agreed there could be binding on any participant. Attempts to take their 
[4] 
collaboration further (Chapter III again) on regional activities eventually 
foundered acrimoniously. 
iii. The importance of the ITF w#hin the intemational movement 
Ask any'insider' what proportion of international trade union activity is accounted 
for by the ITSs and the answer will almost certainly be at least eighty per cent; if 
the question is refined and reduced to actions directly affecting the workplace, 
the estimate will be ninety per cent or even more. These are unscientific 
estimates to the last degree but it is unlikely that anyone with even the slightest 
first-hand knowledge of the international movement would find them 
unreasonable. And of the ITSs, the ITIF has been seen as'unique'in its ability'to 
exert enormous economic power'. Northrup and Rowan's judgment2was 
applied to the particularGase of the ITF's campaign against flags of convenience 
(f-o-c) but in a less spectacular way the ITF has had a real influence in securing 
many bread-and-butter improvements in the working conditions of transport 
workers through its sectional activities, which are all too briefly noted in this 
thesis for lack of space. It has the advantage, which no other ITS enjoys to 
anything like the same extent, of catering for an industry which has always been 
substantially international in its operations and, when not, has often followed 
international practices, using equipment and techniques - in ports, in the air, on 
the roads and railways and of course on ships - that vary little from one country 
to another and are often subject to internationally approved and applied 
standards. In this respect, the ITIF has operated largely in a'globalized' 
environment since its foundation. The intense loyalty to the ITF which was so 
[5] 
evident, for example, in the Congress discussions on 'integration' with the WFTU, 
owed much to the ITF's sectional activities, developed and embedded to an 
extent no other ITS could emulate and providing an earthy 'shop-floor basis to 
affiliation, a reason to belong which did not rely on purely theoretical notions of 
international solidarity. 
iv. The dearth of ITS literature 
The nature of the ITSs - that is, their form and functions and their free-standing 
autonomy - is more often than not misunderstood and their importance under- 
appreciated. Given its vintage, the international trade union movement has in 
general attracted very little attention from writers or commentators of real quality 
and expertise, and the ITSs in particular have attracted less still. If they are 
noticed at all, it is common for them to be relegated literally to some kind of 
supplementary status, a list of their names and addresses, perhaps, or at most a 
page or two of their history and main concerns. 3 Asked recently what had been 
written about them by independent authors or commentators (that is, excluding 
'in-house' or celebratory publications), the answers from almost all the ITSs 
ranged from 'nothing' to 'next to nothing. 4 The only ITS which can show rather 
more than the latter is the ITIF itself, but of the four substantial works to have 
been published, two of them - Dieter Nelles's Widerstand und Intemationale 
SofidaritcIt and The Intemational Transportworkers [sic] Federafion 1914-1945. 
the Edo Fimmen Era, edited by Bob Reinalda - concentrate on the inter-war 
years and the Second World War experience. The third, which came to the 
writer's notice much too late to be paid proper respect here, is Sigrid 
[61 
Koch-Baumgarten's Gewerkschaftsinternationafismus und die Herausforderung 
der Globalisierung: das Beispiel der Internationalen Transportarbeiterf6deration, 
a review of the ITF's activities from its foundation to the 1990s, which includes a 
surely peeress account of the reconstruction of the German trade unions after 
the war. The fourth, by Northrup and Rowan, is The International Transport 
Workers'Federation and Flag of Convenience Shipping, which is devoted 
exclusively to the ITF's campaign against flags-of-convenience (f-o-c). Produced 
in 1983 for the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, an ant-trade 
union institution in the eyes of the ITF's American affiliates at the time, its 
conclusion 5 was that though the campaign had its problems, it was well 
established and could become a real challenge to the f-o-c shipowners. 
That judgment was to prove correct (rewardingly so for its authors who in the 
years to come were to make many contributions as expert advisers to f-o-c 
shipowners in legal actions against the ITF), but as a tribute of a kind it was 
consistent with the authors' much briefer study of the ITF's activities in the 
'Ocean Transport Industry, a chapter in their Multinational Collective Bargaining 
Attempts of 1979. The ITF was given respectful treatment, notably at odds with 
the withering attacks on the claims of other ITSs to successes in multinational 
bargaining. Their most memorable and prime target was the ITS for factory and 
general workers, the ICEF, and its General Secretary, Charles Levinson, who 
had by then become something of a celebrity with his judgments and predictions 
of the economic consequences of the multinational era and the trade unions' 
multinational response. His impressively researched and persuasively argued 
[71 
International Trade Unionism of 1972 was for some time taken very seriously in 
the wider industrial and academic world. His novel views on 'inflation' in its 
economic sense had captured wide attention but there was more than a 
suspicion within the international movement, among his peers, that the greatest 
inflation might have been in his claims for the ICEF's - and his own - triumphs. 
Hard as it was to concede, Northrup and Rowan's dismissal of the ICIEF's 
achievements in the glass and tyre industries could not simply be shruggedoff. 6 
But whatever view is taken of Northrup's and Rowan's judgments and prejudices, 
there is no questioning the effort they devoted to their exercises. The book on 
the ITF's f-o-c campaign runs to some 250 thoroughly researched and 
referenced pages and their work on multinational bargaining to almost six 
hundred. This present thesis is an all too rare attempt to apply the same 
diligence to a critical and thematically focused study of a specific ITS. Perhaps 
the sheer number and variety of the ITSs has discouraged others. There were 
some seventeen ITSs for most of the thesis period and still ten, after various 
amalgamations, in 2003. At first sight, some of the smaller ITSs, with meagre 
resources and help - say, three or four people, or even fewer - may not look 
worth the effort. But the plantation and textile workers' ITSs, say, have much to 
tell the world and there is a lot to learn from their struggles and experiences. 
v. Texts and Iruth' 
The ITF's archives in the University of Warwick's Modem Records Centre (MRC) 
have been the indispensable resource in the creation of this thesis. The deposits 
include, firstly, 'Minutes and related papers', being the documents and reports of 
[81 
almost all the meetings convened by the ITF in the period and taking in the 
governing bodies (the Congress, the General Council, the Executive 
Committee/Board and the Management Committee), the industrial sections, and 
all manner of regional and ad hoc gatherings. There is a very big collection of 
7TF Correspondence and subject files'which includes a wealth of files organized, 
sometimes idiosyncratically, by their originators in the ITF Secretariat according 
to meetings, topics or issues of the time and often containing an assortment of 
letters, notes, cuttings, and various publications. There is a near-complete 
collection of 'ITF Publications, consisting of the ITF's two regular periodicals, the 
fortnightly Press Report and the monthly Journal, together with the less regular 
regional publications, such as Transporte in Latin America; and the even more 
spasmodic sectional or specialist brochures or newsletters, such as A Message 
to Flight Attendants (1955) or Air, Terre, Mer, which publicized the work of the 
ITF's anti-communist'Mediterranean Committee' in the early 1950s (see 
Chapter V). 
The MRC also holds the papers of Paul Tofahm, the Assistant General Secretary 
of the ITIF from 1938 to January 1956, and there are some valuable, though very 
subjective and largely supplemental, records to be found there of his increasingly 
marginalized and embittered career in the ITF (see Chapter 111). More important 
still, however, are the unpublished memoirs of A. E. ('Art') Lyon, who had a big 
say in the affiliation of the American railway 'brotherhoods' in the first place and 
became a very powerful member of the ITF's Executive Committee/Board until 
his retirement in 1962 (see Chapter IV). His unedited, uninhibited, unashamedly 
191 
partisan but patently un-dissembling account of his first-hand experiences in the 
ITF is asprimary' a source as any to be found, and an essential one. The 
unpublished memoirs of Stefan Nedzynski, former Assistant General Secretary of 
the ICFTU and then for many years General Secretary of the post and telegraph 
ITS, the PTTI, have been invaluable for his first-hand recollections and 
characterizations of Oldenbroek and Becu in their time at the ICFTU. 7 
It is the first section of the ITIF archives, the Minutes and related papers, which 
provides the skeleton of the ITF's history of the period, an account of 'what 
happened', or rather - of which a little more below - what these documents 
record as having happened. The form of the governing bodies' documentation 
was consistent throughout the period. The agendas had a number of standing 
items, most of which derived from constitutional requirements. Every governing 
body meeting expected a'Report on Activities'and a'Financial Report'of some 
kind. The activities of the industdal sections were normally reported, and 
certainly so when they had implications for the ITF as a whole (as was often the 
case, for example, with the flag-of-convenience campaign). 
With only rare lapses, the documents conformed to a consistent'house style', in 
the way they were numbered, headed, typed and laid out. The Constitution was 
generally silent throughout the period on the ITF's language requirements but the 
custom and practce, dating from the inter-war years and almost always 
observed, was for all governing body documents to be issued in English, French, 
[10] 
German, Spanish and Swedish. 8 From 1945, there was throughout the ITF an 
unspoken but unchallenged assumption by the members of the governing bodies 
that it was the English version of any published ITF document that was 
I authentic', even when it might first have been drafted in, say, French or German. 
The critical question is how much reliance Gan be placed on these documents. 
There is no comparable textual source against which to test them, nor, with the 
sole exception of the writer himself (of which more below), is there anyone left 
who worked for the ITIF at a reasonably high level at any time during the period 
and who could add to or question or elucidate the textual evidence. How good a 
path is it to that elusive (illusory? ) and unendingly contentious goal of historical 
'truth'? It is not necessary to dip a nervous toe into the stormy waters of 
postmodernist and anti-postmodernist and post-postmodemist historical theories, 
but the empirical side to the thesis is essentially 'historical' and the writer ought to 
feel confident that he can say, as one of the most distinguished of modem 
historians recommends, that'it really happened... and we really Gan, if we are 
very scrupulous and careful and self-critical, find out how it happened and reach 
some tenable though always less than final conclusions about what it meant-'9 
The key documents, the Minutes and related papers, were the work of a variety 
of hands but all were subject to and issued on the authority of the General 
Secretary, who was and remains constitutionally responsible for everything put 
out in the ITF's name. Great use has been made of the Congress Reports on 
Activities andthe published Proceedings or minutes. The ten printed and bound 
[11] 
volumes of these staple items for the ten Congresses within the period, some 
3,000 pages in all, amount to an 'authorized version' of the ITF's history over the 
period. The Reports on Activities to Congress were heavily edited compilations 
of reports made to the other governing bodies, the Executive Committee/Board 
most of all. The approval of the Congress Report on Activities was a standing 
item of the Congress agenda and was often its centrepiece, with something for 
everyone to hang a speech on. The 'Proceedings' of a Congress were always 
written in the form of attributed and summarized accounts - usually in indirect 
speech - of everything said at the Congress plenary sessions. Until the 1965 
Congress, the last of the period, the Proceedings were put together from daily 
Congress Press Reports, which gave Congress delegates the chance to see, 
and if necessary correct, what they were reported as having said the previous 
day. 10 This process of almost instant validation or amendment greatly increases 
the likelihood that the Proceedings accurately record either what they said or 
what they meant to say. 
Tofahm drafted the Executive Committee and General Council minutes until 
1955 11 and they too consisted largely of summaries of what the members said. 
They were made much more concise when he was relieved of any responsibility 
for them and though there was some inconsistency in its application, the new 
approach was to give priority to decisions, not to discussions, hours of which - 
especially on very sensitive or contentious matters - were habitually and, for 
historians, teasingly reduced to references toa long discussion in which most 
members took part'. In their most austere form, even the decisions were 
[12] 
recorded obliquely as agreement to act (or not) on proposals or 
recommendations, the substance of which had to be traced back to the relevant 
supporting document. 
There was a case for the leaner style: the 'executive' was there primarily to 
decide on action and debate was simply the process. It was the final decision 
which had to be noted, not what happened on the way to it. More mundanely, 
every page that was drafted meant five in print and more work for overworked 
translators and typists, a real concern in a secretariat under constant pressure as 
the ITF expanded. The needs of future historians would not have occurred to 
anyone and would have ranked the lowest priority if they had. 
The Executive Committee/Board minutes were drafted, then approved by the 
General Secretary, translated and sent out to the members as part of the 
documentation for the next meeting. They were rarely challenged seriously and 
there are reasons to regard them as being conscientiously objective. Firstly, as 
Chapter III will explain, the members of the Executive Committee/Board were, 
typically, senior trade unionists who would be quick to pick up, and would very 
likely resent, anything less than straight dealing in what was put to them. It 
would be foolish, and almost certainly counter-productive, for any General 
Secretary to take them lightly by misrepresenting what they said or had agreed 
on. Secondly, the 'long' minutes of the Tofahm variety, which were the standard 
practice until 1955, are so exhaustive and so frank, even at moments of great 
tension such as in the discussions of his own position, 12 that it is hard to imagine 
[131 
that they were anything less than full and fair. Th6r6se Asser, secretary to the 
General Secretary, Omer Becu, took over the minute-taking from Tofahm for 
some three years and began at once to slim the minutes down. The miter is in a 
position to vouch for the objectivity of the minutes of all the Executive 
Committee/Board and Management Committee meetings from December 1958 
onwards, excepting the very few (see Chapter 111) from which the staff were 
excluded, 13 because he wrote them. He was never put under any pressure to 
'spin' them in any way and never asked by either of the General Secretaries for 
whom he worked, Omer Becu and Pieter de Vries, to make any significant 
changes in his drafts. 
So much for the substance and nature of the bulk of the ITF archive material 
which underpins the thesis. It is very important, however, also to bear its 
provenance in mind. Since almost all the sources were created by and within 
the ITF Secretariat, they were bound willy-nilly to emanate from the ITF's London 
headquarters, for even in the very late years of the thesis period the regional 
offices were still too small to produce any substantial documentation on their own 
initiative and authority. As Chapters III and VI reveal and discuss, there were by 
then stirrings of regional demands for more say in the ITF's regional activities, 
especially in Asia, but ironically these were only recorded (though candidly 
enough) in reports of regional meetings which were drafted and distributed from 
headquarters. 
Yet whilst the archive sources may have originated overwhelmingly from'head 
[14] 
office', it would be wrong to assume that they go together to make up a united 
and idenbfiable 'headquarters' approach or ethos. Indeed, it will soon be seen in 
Chapter III that there were deep political differences and fierce clashes of 
personality at the very top of the Secretariat. What can faidy be acknowledged, 
however, is that the documentation is 'internal' in the sense that it covers 
agendas and meets concerns which were seen as relevant, productive or 
problematic within the headquarters -'headquarters', in this context, taking in 
not simply the Secretariat, but the governing bodies that watched over the ITF's 
general interests. 
What the thesis does not pretend to rely on to anything remotely like the same 
extent are sources reflecting the 'external' world's views of the ITF, though it was 
certainly an important enough organization to have engendered them. The ITF's 
leanings and activities were obviously of great and sometimes anxious interest to 
governments (it was the labour attach6s' heyday) at times of high Cold War 
tension and much of their concern was documented. The writer's earlier work 
(see the Bibliography) on the schism within the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU), for example, drew on British government archives. Carew's 
tireless and fertile cultivation of American union and CIA sources was essential 
for much of Chapter V. There are very substantial deposits of ITF and ITF- 
related material, some not replicated in the MRC, in Germany's Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation (FES) and the International Institute of Social History (IISG) in 
Amsterdam. ITF historians such as Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten, Dieter Nelles and 
Bob Reinalda have made distinguished use of them. The ITF affiliates, the 
[15] 
lCFTU and other ITSs must also over the decades have generated and 
accumulated no end of correspondence germane to this thesis. Much of it may 
have been kept, certainly by the better resourced and organized unions, but even 
a tentative step towards tracking it down, siffing it and putting it to use was more 
than the writer could contemplate if the thesis was ever to see the light of day. 
And so there is indeed another'extemal' view of the ITIF to be had and it would 
be a service to labour history and labour studies if someone were to research it 
more than has been possible in this thesis. But that is not in any way to 
apologize for the 'internal' emphasis of the present thesis. There has been a 
great wealth of internal material to explore and interpret and if space and time 
limits have imposed a priority, then the inner workings and decisions had to be 
given it. 
vi. The wr#er as an actor 
In the interests of 'transparency' the writer needs now to make clear his personal 
interest in the thesis as part actor. He joined the ITF in April 1955 as a junior 
assistant in its research and publications department. He began by writing 
pieces for the ITF publications but by 1957 was also being used by Becu to draft 
letters and statements. He began to take the notes at Executive Committee 
meetings and draft the minutes in December 1958 and soon afterwards became 
the ITF'sreporter-translatoe, drafting and editing much of the Executive 
Committee documentation. He became Personal Assistant to Pieter de Vries 
[161 
who succeeded Becu in 1960, a new and senior staff post which implied a trust 
and confidence that Becu had increasingly given him and De Vries extended 
much further, encouraging him to propose changes or initiatives in the ITF's 
policies and activities. He has therefore had a hand in some of the events and 
situations taken up in this thesis, in particular the radical changes in the ITF 
Consttution of 1962, many of which he conceived and drafted. 
It is very important, however, not to exaggerate his influence during the period. 
He had none before 1960: Becu never asked his advice and would have had no 
reason to take it from anyone still very young and inexperienced. De Vries had a 
very relaxed managerial style and was most relaxed of all with his Personal 
Assistant, giving him his head and encouraging him to speak his mind. But 
nothing was decided and nothing went to the governing bodies without De Vries's 
explicit approval (unlike Becu, he read the drafts of ITF documents carefully). 
Final approval may sometimes have been De Vries's only contribution, but it was 
the contribution which mattered most of all. 
The writer's previous status does not, therefore, put him in the position of passing 
judgment on his own decisions, even in those last five years of the period when, 
within the secretariat, he was effectively (see Chapter I 11) second only to the 
General Secretary in the ITF's general administration. Where his service with the 
ITIF has given him an advantage in writing the thesis is in knowing his way 
around the ITF's vast documentation, in having lived through some of the events 
and known some of the personalities who appear in the narrative (without ever 
[17] 
relying wholly on his uncorroborated memory of them), and in being able to bdng 
his eventual expedence as General Secretary to bear on the many judgments 
and characterizations which follow and are his, unless attributed otherwise. 
vii. The choice of period and some consequences 
The period to be covered by the thesis, from 1945 to 1965, was arrived at from a 
number of considerations. The first was purely sequential. The ITF's earliest 
years, to the start of the First World War, have been researched to great effect by 
Ken Golding (see Chapter 111). His draft history of that period remains, 
regrettably, unpublished but the page proofs are in the MRC14and edited 
extracts have appeared in special editions of the ITF Joumal on various 
anniversaries (see Chapter 11). The 1920s and 1930s and the years of the 
Second World War have had most attention of all, particularly with regard to the 
ITF's anti-fascist activities and its collaboration with the Allied intelligence 
services (Chapter 11 once more). To the extent that the post-war period has had 
far less attention, Koch-Baumgarten honourably excepted, 15the year of 1945 
was an obvious place to start, if only for chronological reasons. 
The second consideration was thematic. The twin, inter-related themes of the 
thesis, the ITIF's organization and its politics, could be explored most revealingly 
by concentrating on the immediate post-war years, when the ITF set its sights 
and aspirations on expanding from its historically euro-centric base at a time of 
unprecedented international tension. These were the years when patterns would 
be set and alignments made under great pressures of events and ideological 
[18] 
confrontation. By the mid-1960s, the ITIF was well on the road to a genuinely 
world-wide membership and the Cold War had largely congealed, the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962 perhaps the definitive proof that, when it came to it, the 
super-powers would rather not blow the world up, at least on purpose. 
The third and essential consideration, when the period was to end, depended to 
some extent on the fourth, the mandatory word-limit. How much of substance 
could the thesis accommodate? If justice was to be done to a complex 
international organization, twenty years looked to be the limit. Furthermore, 1965 
had something else to commend it as the point of closure. The election of Hans 
Imhof as General Secretary at the 1965 Congress marked the end of a lineage 
which stretched back to Edo Fimmen's arrival at the ITF in 1919. All three of 
Imhof's post-war predecessors had known and worked with Fimmen and, 
different though they were in many ways from him and from each other, they 
acknowledged him as a great influence and inspiration. To a degree, and 
perhaps unconsciously, they looked on the ITF through his eyes. Imhof had 
neither the advantage nor handicap of historical baggage: he was determined to 
change almost everything in and about the ITF, but that is another matter for 
another time. 
Two stylistic points arise from the choice of period. The first is that proper names 
have largely been kept as they were during the period. 'Rhodesia', for example, 
meant something then which is quite different from Zambia and Zimbabwe and 
so 'Rhodesia' it has to be. Secondly, no attempt has been made by the use 
[19] 
of gender-neutral pronouns to pretend that the ITF was anything but almost 
exclusively male at every level other than the secretariat staff, and there women 
were confined to secretarial, translating or bookkeeping functions. No woman 
had ever become an 'officer or been thought of as a candidate to be so. This 
state of affairs was as old as the ITF itself. A four-page chapter on 'ITF and 
Women during the Inter-war Period' in Reinalda's survey of that pedod was at 
least three and a half pages too long. Excruciating references to the part played 
by 'wives' and to the pioneer Charles Lindley's wife as a 'first lady of the ITF are 
best forgotten, as are occasional successes at spotting unidentified women in 
Congress photographs. 16The cherished wives, perhaps? Or, much more likely, 
they were members of the staff, as several women who appear in post-war 
Congress photographs through to 1965 definitely were. The affiliates were no 
better than the ITF itself. The only female delegate to attend any of the 
Congresses in the period was Alida de Jager, Edo Firnmen's partner. She was 
a remarkable person in her own right, but her presence at the 1946 Congress, 
the first after the war, as the only delegate from Mexico, where Fimmen had died, 
was in every respect exceptional. 
Two examples help to show that the ITF was no different in the immediate post- 
war years. Addressing the ITF's 1950 Congress, Arthur Deakin, General 
Secretary of the British TGWU and by far the most powerful trade union leader of 
his day, spoke of one grave drawback to the great blessing of full employment: 
'We have to do something we do not like doing ... except 
in the direst 
necessity, and that is to employ women in our transport industry. We 
[20] 
had them during the war ... but now we believe ... that the women ought 
in some measure to go back to their homes ... we do not believe - as 
they do in some of the slave states of Europe - in making woman [sic] 
another breadvAnner... ' 17 
The second example came in 1953 and in India, when Jo Soares, the ITF's Asian 
representative moved the ITF's regional office into the Bombay headquarters of 
the Indian Seafarers' Federation, from where he reported that it had been 
necessary to 'discontinue the services' of Mrs Kandar, his assistant, because the 
Federation's General Secretary had banned the employment of women in the 
office. This was simply noted by the ITF 'to our great regret (Mrs Kandar must 
have regretted it even more). 18 
viii. The structure of the thesis 
Chapter //: The Historical Background sketches the ITF's history from its 
beginnings in 1896 to its emergence at the end of the Second World War in very 
good shape, the only international trade union organization in full working order. 
Chapter 1/1. Stnictures provides a context for what follows, laying out the main 
features of the Constitution, the terms of membership, the Secretariat, the 
regional organization (still largely embryonic), its very important sectional 
activities (largely and unfortunately sacrificed in the thesis to the exigencies of 
space) and the ITF's finance. Much of the section on the Secretariat is taken up 
by the General Secretaries of the day, whose strengths and weaknesses had a 
[21] 
large, if not decisive, influence over the ITF's policies and activities. 
Chapter IV. Membership traces the important changes in the complexion of the 
ITF's affiliated membership, in particular the entry of the American transport 
workers' unions and some of the very severe problems they were to cause. It 
also considers the return of the German and Japanese unions and the loss of the 
most important unions in France and Italy for political reasons. 
Chapter V. Poffics looks at the development of the ITF's political stance following 
the abortive attempt by the WFTU to bury it iMthin a 'Trade Department, the 
ITF's reaction to the Marshall Plan and then its anti-communist activities during 
the Cold War, in particular the activities of its Mediterranean Vigilance Committee 
and its leader, Pierre Ferri-Pisani. 
Chapter VI: Conctusions considers what is to be learned from the thesis, in terms 
of its aims as set out in this introduction. It also considers once more the lack of 
empirical research into the ITSs, which make up by far the biggest sector of the 
international trade union movement. As a former practitioner, the writer offers 
some forthright criticism of aftempts to theorize international trade unionism from 
an ideologically unfriendly stance or on too flimsy an empirical base, and 
suggests points for a more productive theoretical agenda. 
q: Modem Records Centre (MRC) referencing 
The great majority of the endnote references in this thesis are to ITIF 
documents held in the ITF archives at the MRC in the University of 
[22] 
Warwick library. Almost all the documents cited are related to meetings 
of the ITF governing bodies, namely the Congress (Con. ); General 
Council (GC); Executive Committee (EC) and (from 1962) Executive 
Board (EB); and the Management Committee (MC). These documents 
are identified in the endnotes which follow each chapter by reference to 
the relevant meeting, for example 'Con. 62 and can be readily found 
in the catalogue of MRC holdings under Minutes and related papers. ITF 
documents that do not relate to meetings are referenced with the full 
MRC catalogue number, for example in note 14 below. 
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Chapter 11: The historical backwound 
i. 1896 to 1916 
The ITF had its origins in the great industrial unrest in the ports of northern Europe 
towards the end of the 19th century. The dockers had become conscious as never 
before of the degrading and exploitative nature of their working conditions. Strong, 
militant unions were formed and soon pressed hard their demands for rapid and 
substantial improvements. These moves were strongest of all in Great Britain but 
had their parallels elsewhere in Europe and especially in Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands. The founding in London of the International Federation of Ship, Dock 
and River Workers in June 1896 was the direct consequence of the intervention of 
the British seamen's leader, Joseph Havelock Wilson, in support of striking dockers 
in Rotterdam. His success had inspired him to join with Tom Mann and Ben Tilleft of 
the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers Union in leading an organizing 
campaign throughout Great Britain but'also upon the Continent, between the Elbe 
and Brest' of which the emergence of the new international was one outcome. i 
The first leaflet issued by the new international's Central Council in September 1896 
set out its claims and gave the flavour both of the times and of the federation's heady 
hopes: a 'steady general levelling-up' of pay in all the ports; 'a stop to this 
downwards tendency' (that is pay cuts) that were current for both seamen and 
dockers; a'fighting machinery' combining all'sectional organizations [unions] ... to 
effectually cope with the organized employers; and a general recognition that'the 
workers have every right to share in the increased prosperity of the world'. 2 
A dock strike in Hamburg in November 1896 earned financial support from the British 
[25] 
unions and their efforts to stop the sending of blackleg labour (a commonplace tactic 
by port employers at the time) added greatly to the credibility of international 
solidarity. The strike also encouraged the founding in December 1896 of a Hamburg 
railwaymen's union. In Britain itself, Mann was promising the international's support 
to railwaymen who were threatening to strike against the London and North Western 
Railway. 3 ShorUy afterwards, Charles Lindley, a Swedish-bom seaman who had 
sailed on British ships and was a leading activist in the British seamen's union, 
returned to Sweden to found what was to become the Swedish Transport Workers' 
Union. Here were clear pointers to wider horizons that prompted the decision of the 
international's conference in 1898 to change the organization's name to the 
'International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF)' 4and so radically broaden its 
jurisdiction. 5 Within four years, groups such as railwaymen and tramwaymen were 
heavily represented and the ITF ceased to be a preponderantly maritime 
organization. 
That change in the sectional complexion of the ITF was instrumental in the shifting of 
national pre-eminence which, in terms of membership, passed from Great Britain to 
an Austro-German combination within which the railwaymen's unions were the 
largest contingents. That in turn prompted a reassessment of the ITFs tactics and 
administration. The German view was that the early emphasis on militancy needed 
to be tempered by the more mundane concerns of building the ITF's organizational, 
administrative and financial bases. By 1903 the ITF had indeed run so short of funds 
that Tom Chambers, the British seamen's union official who succeeded Tom Mann 
[26] 
as the ITF's President and factotum in 1901, worked from his (or his mothers) home, 
and did so sometimes without pay. In October 1904 the ITF secretariat, such as it 
was, was moved to Germany, first to Hamburg and then to Berlin. The new, more 
orderly and better resourced administrabon, overseen by a wholly German Central 
Council, must have been gratified to see the affiliated membership rise steeply from 
150,000 at the most by 1905 to some 500,000 in 1907 and happier still to attract 
affiliates for the first time from Italy and the United States and to make contact with 
unions in Latin America. It must also have been pleased and relieved when the 
'International Railwaymen's Study Committee', a relatively inactive but latent rival for 
an increasingly large secfion of the ITF's membership, decided in 1906 on dissolubon 
and a transfer of its members and assets to the ITF 
A general economic downturn in 1908, with widespread unemployment in the 
transport industry, gave rise to demands from some of the maritime affiliates for more 
aggressive tactics but any possibility of defections on those grounds was headed off 
after a lively Congress in 1910 when the Central Council was opened up to include 
seafarers' representatives from France, Great Britain, Scandinavia and, very 
importantly, the USA. Their place in the ITF's vanguard restored, the seamen's 
unions, led by Havelock Wilson, laid plans for an 'international' seamen's strike (or, 
more modestly and accurately, a co-ordinated Belgian, British, Danish, Dutch and 
German strike) for higher wages and better working conditions. In the event, the 
Germans felt unable to take part and the Danes did not need to, having won their 
demands beforehand. But in Britain the strike did indeed secure worthwhile 
[27] 
advances and that success gave strong impetus to the efforts to bring together 
Britain's transport workers' unions. Though the German unions had withdrawn from 
the strike itself, they gave it their full and practical solidarity by boycotting strike- 
breaking ships and providing financial support. The relationship between the British 
and German affiliates became much closer and warmer as a result and the ITF's 
prestige was enhanced by the effective action it had organized to frustrate the 
shipowners' plans to introduce strike-breakers (the shipowners were already very 
well organized at international level). 
A summary of the ITF's history published by the ITF as part of its centenary 
celebrations6 has suggested that'debates within the ITF [at its 1913 Congress] 
reflected the growing international tensions on the eve of the First World War and 
cites attacks by the French delegates on the cautious, compromising and decidedly 
unrevolutionary Germanic leadership. That there were deep differences at that 
Congress between the French ('our unions are permeated by the revolutionary ideals 
of the French people... ) and the Germans and Austrians ('you don't achieve very 
much by union leaders togging themselves up in red shirts and ties') 7 is a matter of 
record but the French were not alone in their unhappiness at the Germans' 
phlegmatic, not to say stolid, approach. The British may not have been nearly as 
coherently or consistently set in their ideological ways as the French but they had 
also been moved from time to time (as has been noted with regard to the 1910 
Congress) to express a similar impatience. It was the Austrians, the Germans' allies, 
who nicknamed the leader of the German Railwaymen's Union and President of the 
[281 
ITF, Hermann Jochade, as'the slow train' (der Bummelzug). 
But the suggestion that these differences had anything to do with 'growing 
international tensions' remains both unsubstantiated and, given the existence of 
profound ideological divisions from the earliest days of the international movement, 
very improbable. 9 When those 'international tensions' overflowed in 1914 the ITFs 
internal politics were neither here nor there; it was simply engulfed. When the First 
World War came, the ITF's headquarters were in Germany and so beyond the reach 
of many important affiliates, not least the British and the French. Moving the office to 
Britain, as proposed by Robert Williams of the British National Transport Workers' 
Federation with French support, would have stood the problem on its head but not 
solved it. The Dutch suggested a move to the neutral Netherlands and when the 
Germans refused to go that far, a sub-secretariat was set up there to act as a 
postbox to facilitate contacts with the headquarters. There was never a realistic 
chance, however, of anything more than minimal and symbolic activities. Jochade 
himself joined the German army towards the end of 1915 and though ITF 
publications were occasionally issued from the Berlin office for some time afterwards, 
the ITF had ceased to function for all practical purposes by the end of 1916. 
ii. Between the wars: 1919 to 1939 
Within six months of the end of the war the ITF's affiliates in the neutral countries, led 
by the Dutch and Swedes, had brokered a conference in Amsterdam in April 1919 at 
which the British and the German affiliates would, so it was hoped and planned, 
[29] 
make their peace and revive the ITF. Dramatic but documented accounts by Ernest 
Bevin of the British National Transport Workers' Federation and Johann D6ring, the 
German dockers' leader, tell of the two delegations' chance encounter on a small 
bridge in Amsterdam as they made their ways to what was to be their first meeting 
since the war had begun. 10 The occasion is a much cherished part of the ITF's 
folklore. The reconciliation which began so emotionally that day was quickly 
formalized at the Amsterdam conference by decisions to 'reconstitute' the ITF and to 
transfer its headquarters to Amsterdam until a Congress could be held. A 
'Provisional Executive Committee', nominated by the Dutch affiliates, met some two 
weeks later and persuaded Edo Fimmen, general secretary of the Dutch Federation 
of Trade Unions, to step in as the ITF's 'provisional secretary'. He quickly 
organized the first post-war Congress in Christiania (Oslo) in March 1920 and by the 
time it convened, the ITFs affiliated membership stood at more than three millions, 
far bigger than in 1914.11 
The years between the two world wars have been described in ITF publications (and 
by many since) as the 'Fimmen era'. 12 It is wrong to personify the ITF's history in 
this period so sweepingly, for Fimmen neither instigated nor even personally 
approved of everything that the ITIF did in those times. There is no denying, 
however, the enormous and pervasive influence exerted by that remarkable 
personality from the day of his appointment, through his failing health from 1938 and 
almost to the moment of his death in Mexican exile in December 1942. By far too 
volatile and complex a man to be contained or categorized within any conventional 
[30] 
political definition, he was in his own entirely individual, not to say idiosyncratic, way 
absolutely unbending and messianic in his convicbon that capitalism was the 
workers' greatest enemy, that militarism and war were both capitalist causes and 
effects and that only by complete unity at international level could the trade union 
movement successfully 'take arms to defend the workers against all attacks of 
capitalistic society'. 13 
Under a very heavy bombardment, directed most fiercely by his countryman, 
Moltmaker, at the ITF's 1926 Congress in Pads, Fimmen recalled that when similar 
attacks had been made on him at the previous Congress he had 'claimed the right, 
outside the organization, to express my own opinions' and had begged the Congress 
to 'let me be myself, and try not to make a eunuch of me. ' It was a response that 
very few trade union General Secretaries would have dared to make, for their 
customary claim (not always to be taken too literally) is that they are nothing more, 
day and night, than the unconditional servant and mouthpiece of their governing 
bodies. Fewer still would have survived by making such a defence as Fimmeni s 
against an indictment of the nature and gravity of Moltmaker's. He had accused 
Fimmen of actively supporting communist groups within ITF affiliates which were 
advocating a kind of 'unity' that the leaderships; of those unions could not accept. No 
General Secretary of the ITF had the right, he said, to interfere in his spare time in an 
affiliate's internal affairs. How could such interference be 'outside the organization"? 
The answers in any other case but Fimmen's would assuredly have been a very 
ominous 'no' but after blowing very strongly, the Pads storm blew itself 
[31] 
out, to the relief of many at the Congress who thought it should be spending its time 
on other things. Fimmen, backed firmly by Ernest Bevin and the British affiliates, 
was re-elected together with the Assistant General Secretary, Nathan Nathans. 14 
Koch-Baumgarten has very concisely but very persuasively reviewed Fimmen's 
prodigious strengths and weaknesses. 15 His commitment to the pursuit of his 
socialist Utopia, she concludes, 'radicalised' international trade union demands so as 
to initiate and sustain in particular the ITF's fight against fascism but by the same 
token he could be unrealistic in 'valuing political possibilities within the existing 
structures'. 16 Certainly for Fimmen the huge threats of war and of dictatorships 
were the great priority. His Report on the International Sftuation17 to the ITF 
Congress in Vienna in October 1922 declared that'a new world war is impending as 
a result of the rivalry in the Near East between two capitalist and imperialist 
countries, Great Britain and France'. Wildly wrong about that, he was all too right 
about Italy -'now helpless in the grip of fascism I- and about Hungary where, 
despite a boycott operated by the ITF and the International Federation of Trade 
Unions (IFTU) (Fimmen was then and for a little longer the secretary of both) 'the 
officers' camarilla ... is still a standing menace of murder and martyrdom to all and 
sundry in the ranks of the workers'. By then even Soviet Russia, which had once held 
such promise for him and other socialists of all kinds, had become 'a dictatorship 
over the proletariat' in which 'the position of socialists and independent trade 
unionists ... is not any safer ... than it used to be when Czarism held sway. ' (He 
was soon to seek understandings with the Soviet trade unions, however, and so 
[32] 
badly upset the IFTU and many ITF affiliates. ) He introduced and commended a 
resolution on 'Militarism and War' which 'pledges itself [i. e. the Congress] again [! ] to 
use the whole industrial power of the transportworkers [sic], railwaymen and seamen 
to prevent a fresh war'. 
Both the style and content of his report set a pattern for the next seventeen years of 
his office, a period which varied only in the ever widening extent and ever more 
depraved depths of the political and social horrors which he confronted and defied. 
Much of Central Europe had succumbed by the time he fell seriously ill in 1938. By 
1939, the ITF had lost all its active affiliates in Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain. If 
there was indeed a Timmen Era' it was of a nature that he would not have wished on 
anyone. 
He will be remembered above all for his leadership of the ITF's campaign against 
'fascism' of every kind, starting as early as the summer of 1920 with his attempt, as 
secretary of both the IFTU and the ITF, to organize an international boycott of the 
Hungarian counter-revolutionary regime, headed by the self-appointed 'Regent', 
Admiral Horthy. 18 The effort was as heroic, as principled and, ultimately, as 
unavailing as the various boycotts and other actions which he proposed and 
promoted against the even greater evils that followed. No aspect of the ITFs 
activities (excepting, as always, flags-of-convenience) has been so assiduously 
researched as the ITF Is support, in various forms, of 'resistance' to fascism and 
nazism and it naturally holds a very special interest for German writers such as 
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Dieter Nelles. 19 The ITF's publication Fascism, very much Fimmen's inspiration, 
appeared fortnightly and multilingually from 1936. It was, Nelles maintains, greatly 
esteemed by intelligence services at the time and by historians since. 20 
The life of the ITF in the inter-war period was bound to be dominated by the huge 
political pressures and crises which threatened its survival and that of the trade union 
movement itself in much of Europe. It is surprising that any time at all was found for 
the more day-to-day problems in the various branches of the transport industry, but 
in fact the ITF's 'sectional' activities developed substantially in the inter-war years. 
They had been formally acknowledged in the new ITF Constitution adopted at the 
Christiania Congress in 1920 which envisaged three'sectional departments': 
'Transportworkers [sic] by water'; 'Railway staffs ... and other passenger vehicle 
workers... '; and 'Dockers, waterside workers and other transportWorkers [sicl... '. 21 
The 1922 Congress made room for sectional conferences for both the railwaymen 
and the dockers. The1924 Congress included similar sessions and added a'First 
International Motor Drivers Conference'. 22 By 1932, six sections were operating 
(railwaymen, motor drivers, tramwaymen, seamen, dockers and inland waterways) 
and conferences of the larger sections were taking place between, and not solely 
within, the ITF Congresses. 23 
The founding of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1919 would certainly 
have contributed to the growing significance of this area of the ITIF activifies (but not 
so much as to be a touchstone of its 'success and failure', as one commentator 
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thinkS24). Here for the first time trade unions were to have a statutory right, not 
simply an opportunity, to take part in the setting and (or so it was hoped and 
intended) the implementation of international standards in the transport industry 
which in many ways had always been intemabonal in its scope and pracbces, and 
was rapidly becoming more so. Shipping was only the most obvious example of that 
trend and seafarers claimed a share in the ILO's early legislative efforts out of all 
proportion to the relatively small numbers of workers involved in comparison, say, 
with railwaymen. For the ITF's affiliates to make any concerted impression within 
the ILO, however, they had of course first to agree among themselves, at least in 
general terms, on what they should demand or could accept. Exhaustive efforts to 
arrýive by consensus at joint programmes or positions - for example the 'International 
Programme for Motor Drivers' adopted in 193225and the railwaymen's attempts in 
1939 to decide what should go into the international regulation of their working 
hours26- became a feature of the sections'work even when the international 
political situation was at its most unpromising. 
X. The Second World War 1939-1945 
Most of the ITF secretariat, with an ailing Fimmen still at its head, came to Great 
Britain when the ITF's headquarters were transferred from Amsterdam towards the 
end of August 1939, a matter of days before the Second World War began. (A small 
office was also opened in Paris in September 1939 but was closed early in 1940, just 
before Paris fell. ) Housed first in offices provided by the British National Union of 
Railwaymen near London, the secretariat was moved progressively into offices in 
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London itself in 1942. Fimmen had been incapacitated by a stroke in November 
1938 and though he made partial recoveries, the relapses always followed quickly. 
He put in appearances at the office until late 1941 but had then to admit defeat. Sent 
to Mexico, where the ITIF had hoped he could convalesce, he died there in December 
1942 at the age of sixty-one. J. H. (Jaap) Oldenbroek, the Assistant General 
Secretary since 1938, had functioned virtually as General Secretary throughout this 
period and the Management Committee confirmed him as Acting General Secretary 
and Paul Tofahm as Acting Assistant General Secretary with effect from July 1943. 
(As Chapter III will reveal, the path to that decision was not as smooth as the formal 
reports have made it look. 2ý 
The ITF's participation in the Second World War was unequivocal, unlimited and 
absolutely unapologetic: 'It goes without saying that during this period [the war] the 
ITF had to devote itself preponderantly to supporting the war effort of the Allied 
nations and everything directly or indirectly connected therewith. Its task was to note 
and record the contributions made by organized transport labour ... to encourage the 
sabotage which everywhere harassed the enemy, ... to strengthen the morale of our 
own people and undermine that of the enemy... ' 28 Equally forthright, but at the 
same time cryptic, was the sentence in the half-page of the Report on Activibes to 
the first post-war Congress in ZOrich in 1946 concerning Relations with underground 
organizations: 'The ITF has been associated with clandestine acbvities and has 
financed some of them. ' 29 
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The mechanics of the 'clandestine activities' have been dissected and assessed by 
any number of writers since the relevant records became available. They are of 
legitimate historical interest but it is the context, more than the content, which best 
explains and jusfifies the ITF's conduct. Here, the ITF declared, it was engaged in a 
fight to the death against 'the Nazi and Fascist regimes which had crushed the free 
labour movements within their own frontiers, which had persecuted, imprisoned and 
murdered so many of its [the ITF's] friends, and which aimed to enslave the workers 
of the world. ' 30 Nothing less than total war could overcome such enemies. 
The outcome of that war was, of course, a huge victory for the Allied cause on which 
the ITF had pinned all its hopes of survival, but the ITF had more particular reasons 
to be happy with the good condition in which it found itself at the war's end. Its 
membership, for example, had grown with thirty-two new affiliations from nineteen 
countries - something 'of which the ITF need not have been ashamed in normal 
times'. 31 Furthermore the merchant marine officers' unions which for many years 
had had their own international organization, the International Mercantile Marine 
Officers' Association (IMMOA) declared their readiness in December 1944 to 
become assimilated into the ITF's Seafarers' Section as soon as the constitutional 
arrangements could be made. The bringing together of officers' and ratings' unions, 
of 'white collar' and 'blue-collar' seafarers, had great symbolic and practical 
significance. Symbolically, it illustrated how the war had shaken and reshaped some 
of the old class distinctions; practically, it reduced greatly the shipowners' ability to 
play one group off against the other. 
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The ITF claimed that it had taken full advantage of the fact that the ILO, like the ITF, 
had continued to function during the war and pointed to its success in pressing the 
ILO to set up specific Industrial Committees, including one for inland transport. Its 
conclusion in 1946 was that'there is today more occasion than ever to regard it [the 
ILO] as an instrument at the service of the industrial labour movement'. 32 
But perhaps in the longer term the most significant gain of all for the ITF from its war- 
time commitments was the affiliation for the first time of an organization representing 
American railwaymen. American seafarers' and dockers' organizations had come 
and gone in the past, but though they were unions of substance in the USA they had 
rarely been more than a marginal presence within the ITF. The American 
railwaymen's unions were altogether bigger, weightier in almost every sense, 
serious, venerable organizations, at the heart of the American trade union movement 
(most of them were affiliated to the AFL). Never previously interested to any major or 
consistent degree in the international movement, the railway 'brotherhoods' were 
persuaded by their government to become so and thus serve the patriotic cause, 
taking the first step on a path to affiliation with the ITF (though it was far from 
straight, as Chapter IV will show). 33 The ITF had put itself in good standing with the 
American authorities at the height of the war when it set up an office in New York in 
May 1941 to look after the interests of Allied merchant seafarers. The relationship 
had then flourished once the United States entered the war and the ITF began to 
assist the American intelligence services in their 'clandestine activities 
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And so, in 1945, the ITF's future looked at first sight to be secure and, in any number 
of ways, very promising. There was, however, one great question which had already 
been the subject of intense discussion within the ITF and the wider international 
movement even before the war ended, namely what shape should the international 
trade union movement take after the war? Plans were being laid for a new, all- 
embracing world-wide federation. What would be the place of the ITF (or the other 
ITSs) in such a body? Would it survive as an autonomous entity? It was, in every 
sense, the first question to face the ITIF in 1945. The putting of the question and the 
answer it was given are referred to in many places, but most of all in Chapter V. 
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Chapter III: Structures 
i. Eliqibilitv, obiects and-o0qations 
From its foundation the ITF was structured as a federation of unions, and not of 
individual transport workers. In the early, heady days of solidarity actions on the 
European waterfronts the workers were encouraged to proclaim their individual 
identification with the international cause by'at all times ... wear[ing] the 
Federation badge ýI but membership of the ITF was limited to transport workers' 
unions and has remained so, with one very conditional and restricted exception, 
which will be explained when this chapter deals with the industrial sections. 
The first post-war Congress, in May 1946, reviewed the ITF Constitution2and 
defined the ITF (Rule ll: 'Composition') as being open to'All trade unions and 
associations of trade unions catering for persons engaged, in any capacity, in 
any transport industry, whether publicly or privately owned or operated. ' They 
were required to 'subscribe to the objects of the Federation', to have a 
I constitution and practice [which] ensures democratic administration and conduct 
of [their] affairs' and (rather pompously to modern ears) to 'undertake to acquit 
themselves of the obligations deriving from affiliation. I 
The ITF's 'objects', set out in the Preamble to the Constitution, 3were to protect 
transport workers' interests at national and international level against exploitation 
and oppression by making 'international working class solidarity effective'. The 
ITF further required its affiliates to co-operate in establishing a 'world order 
[42] 
within which 'all peoples' would work 'in freedom and equality' towards the 'joint 
use of the world's resources'. The 'obligations' 4made three major demands of 
affiliates: firstly, to pay the appropriate affiliation fee; secondly, 'to co-operate in 
the carrying out of the decisions of the governing and executive bodies'; and 
thirdly, 'to propagate among their members the principles, policy and decisions of 
the Federation and to report to their governing bodies on ... [its] ... activities. ' 
Congress alone could set the 'standard rate' of affiliation feeS5but affiliates 'in 
underdeveloped countries'could pay 'a lesser affiliation fee commensurate with 
the standard of living and the rate of wages prevailing in the country concerned'. 
These constitutional provisions on eligibility, I objects' and 'obligations' were 
essentially to hold good throughout the twenty years of the period, fleshed out 
from time to time, however, with specific conditions and declarations. In 1952, 
the ITF was to aim 'to embrace transport workers of all countries, irrespective of 
their colour, race and creed'. Furthermore, it 'stands for the defence of 
democracy and freedom and is opposed to totalitarianism and aggression in all 
their forms. ' 6 
ii. Theqovemin-. q bodies, the President and Vice President 
The 1946 Constitution preserved the ITFs governing bodies as they had been for 
most of its history: a Congress every two years (two world wars and fascist 
disruption in the 1930s permitting), which was given 'supreme authority'; a 
General Council (GC), which exercised that authority between Congresses; an 
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Executive Committee (EC), which was to look after the'general management'of 
the ITF, carry out the Congress and GC decisions and 'control' the Secretariat 
and a Management Committee (MC), charged with 'supervising' the Secretariat's 
handling of 'administrative, financial and staff matters'. Every affiliated 
organization was entitled to be represented at Congress by a delegation of one 
or more, with limits on the numbers set by the size of the affiliated membership. 
The GC was elected by the Congress from nominations by national and regional 
groups, with a general requirement that the membership should be 
representative of the ITF geographically and sectionally. The much smaller EC 
was elected by the whole Congress from among the members of the GC. The 
IVIC consisted of four nominees from the affiliates of the country where the ITF 
had its headquarters. 7 
In its form, it was a structure made in the image of that of a typical west 
European union, ultimate power vested in a representative assembly and a 
clutch of executive and administrative bodies, elected by the membership directly 
or at the assembly and given specific powers and responsibilities. The structure 
held its general shape to the end of the period, but within it the particular forms 
and functions of the GC, EC and MC, and their relative authority, were changed 
radically in 196ý, when the frequency of the Congress became triennial. 
The GC, once important in its own dght, had by the mid 1950s become an 
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expensive and largely superfluous adjunct of the EC, itself made up of leading 
GC members but meeting more often, more cheaply and, being far smaller, more 
productively. The GC's last meeting of any substance was in 1955 and a 
revision of the Constitution in 1956 removed a requirement that it should meet 
once a year. From then on it was required to meet only immediately after a 
Congress to elect the President and Vice President (see below) and to perform a 
few specific and rare (but important) functions, such as considering the expulsion 
of an affiliate or appeals against suspension. 8 
The EC had long been the most select and high-powered of the governing 
bodies, and the body on which the big national groupings of affiliates would think 
it was their absolute due to have a member. (The British affiliates' masochistic 
failure to achieve that in 1960 is discussed in Chapter IV. ) The 1956 Congress 
agreed on the EC's recommendation to empower the elected members 'to co-opt 
up to four additional members, at their discretion, with the object of ensudng 
appropriate representation of geographical regions'. 9 The 1960 Congress, 
preoccupied with the need to find a new General Secretary (see below), had 
great difficulty in deciding on an RLEA proposal to allow countries with more than 
500,000 affiliated members (the USA, Germany and Great Britain) to have two 
seats each on the EC and finally agreed instead to allow for a further four co- 
opted places. It was by any reckoning a bizarre response to the RLEA's 
proposal but the exhausted delegates were by then only one day from 
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the end of a fractious and dispiriting Congress and were ready to vote for any 
consensus on offer, however far removed from the original proposition. 10 
When the incoming EC met on 29 July 1960, immediately after the Congress, it 
again co-opted Nishimaki (Japan) for Asia and Curran of the American NMU for 
North America and brought in two newcomers, M. Hellal (Tunisia) for Africa and 
Herminio Alonso (Argentina) for Latin America. 11 But those four were as far as it 
ever took co-option and at its next meeting, in November 1960, the EC set up a 
'special sub-committee ... to review the 
ITF Constitution 
I 
12starting the progress 
towards what'amounted almost to a complete re-writing of the ITF's 
Constitution'. 13 
The Constitution adopted by the 1962 Congress on the EC's proposal brought 
particularly radical changes to the governing bodies. The General Council's main 
function in future was to be as a 'panel' or, in the American manner, a 'primary' 
electorate, for the new Executive Board (EB). Anyone wishing to stand for the 
EB had therefore to make sure of election to the GC first. Both the GC and EB 
were to be'a reasonable reflection of the geographical and industrial composition 
of the Federation' and would be elected from 'nominations I made by national or 
regional electoral groups (in the case of the EB, regional meant continental). 
Congress would decide, on the EBs recommendation, how many seats each 
group should have in order to provide the mandatory 'reasonable reflection I. 
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Only two general limits were constitutionally applied: no more than one-half of the 
EB members were to be'connected exclusively I, with any one section and no 
organization could have more than one member of the EB. Effectively released 
from paying for GC meetings, which in future would be held only in conjunction 
with Congresses to which delegates paid their own way, the ITF could afford to 
expand the membership of the new EB from the EC's fifteen (four co-opted) to 
twenty-two. For the first time, the exceptionally large national memberships in 
Germany and Great Britain were allowed two seats (thus solving the British 
problem - see Chapter IV), and the four seats allocated to North America were 
divided two apiece between the USA and Canada, not quite the generous 
American gesture it might appear, since one of the seats was earmarked for the 
Canadian RLEA, representing the Canadian membership of the American 
'international' railwaymen's unions. 14 
The Management Committee (MC) ceased to be reserved for the 'host country' 
and became a sub-committee of the EB from which it drew its nine members, 
both ex officio (the President, Vice President and General Secretary) and by 
nomination of the EB itself. The EB could delegate its'functions and authority' to 
the MC 'as may be necessary', but anxieties that the MC might be given more 
power than was good for such a small group were met by providing for the EB to 
meet twice a year, not the once that was first proposed. 15 
The 1946 Congress was presided over by 'Ch. Lindley (President of the ITF)' but 
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the Constitution it adopted mentioned no such office. The omission was repaired 
in 1948 with a new rule under which a President would be elected by the General 
Council 'from among the members of the Executive Committee'. The President's 
term ran from one Congress to the next, but he was eligible for re-election. The 
specific presidential duty was to preside over the governing bodies. A Vice 
President to act for the President 'in his absence' was added in 1952.16 
The President was the first among equals of the EC members, all of whom had to 
find time for international activities among their very heavy national 
commitments. A President's impact and influence (especially over the General 
Secretary) would depend very much on how much time and interest he could 
spare for the ITF business, but those who took the position during the period 
were always ready to make a special effort in that respect. For his part, a 
General Secretary would always hope for a supportive President and would not 
think it wise to fall out with him. There were no great tensions between the two in 
the ITF throughout the period, including Becu's time as President in harness with 
Oldenbroek as General Secretary, though the partnership foundered (see below) 
when the Americans attempted to replicate it in the ICFTU. 
iii. Degrees of equality: 'membership, 'paid-up membership', fees and dghts 
The effect of these provisions (which drew heavily on the lCFTU precedent) was 
to delegate the election of the Executive Board (and of the General Council 
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before it) to the electoral groups. Formally, the Congress as a whole still had the 
last word and could reject any group 'nomination', but it was strictly a reserve 
power (and was never used). In an international organization that was rapidly 
and substantially moving beyond its traditional European homeland, it was a 
timely and calculated concession to its new, heterogeneous reality. But it also 
went some way to confronting issues of the definition of 'membership' which had 
very practical and (though rarely identified or conceded as such) distinctly moral 
implications. 
At the 1950 Congress, the Credentials Committee reported 'some difficulty' in 
deciding the 'voting strength' of affiliates which were entitled to pay fees at IM 
than the standard rate. There could be undesirable 'repercussions' and the 
constitution should be changed 'with a view to ensuring that voting rights are 
related in some way or other to the affiliation fees paid to the ITF. ' 17The 
Credentials Committee's concern was added to the business of a Congress 
'Rules and Elections Committee', 18which lived on after the Congress and 
initiated the adoption by the 1952 Congress of a specific concept of 'paid-up' 
membership. 
This was defined as the number of 'members for whom affiliation fees at the 
standard rate have been paid' and it would be the number determining an 
affiliate's entitlement to delegates and votes at an ITIF Congress. If an affiliate 
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paid 'only a part of the standard affiliation fees' then its entitlement would be 
reduced proportionately: an affiliate paying fees at, say, ten percent of the 
standard rate would have only ten percent of its votes. Introducing the proposal 
on behalf of the Executive Committee, Deakin was 'perfectly sure' that it was 'the 
very essence of democracy, that representation and voting should be on the 
basis of effective affiliation... ' Congress agreed and nodded it through. 19 
But some consciences were evidently troubled. The Credentials Committee at 
the next Congress, in 1954, still thought that the principle of reduced voting rights 
was fair but its 'rigid application' was 'incompatible with the principles of 
international solidarity'for regions suffering a 'low level of wages and working 
conditions'. The Executive Committee was recommended to 'reconsider' the rule 
and report back to the next Congress. 20 When the Executive Committee came 
to do so in 1956 it could report only that it had tried and failed to find a 
'practicable alternative'. It agreed unanimously to leave things as they were, but 
to continue the search for a 'realistic solution'. 21 The 'solution' was still to be 
found by the end of the period, eluding the authors of the otherwise radical 
revision of the constitution in 1962. They confirmed that'paid-up membership'of 
an affiliate paying at a reduced rate would be its declared membership 'reduced 
to the extent that the rate of affiliation fees has been reduced'. 22 
But ifthe formula was retained, its effects were at least mitigated by the changes 
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made in the electoral processes in 1962. Co-option to the EC had been 
introduced in 1956 partly because affiliates in the 'under-developedwodd (the 
Japanese always an exception on several counts) could never have mustered 
the Congress delegates or votes to come even close to a seat. In 1962 the new, 
delegated electoral procedure and the prerequisite of 'reasonable reflection' - 
which was not tied to 'paid-up' membership - gave Africa, Asia and Latin 
America two EB seats each, together some 27% of the twenty-two elected seats, 
almost exactly equal to the proportion of the total affiliated membership (again, 
not the 'paid-up' variety) that the three had registered in 1962 (see Table 1). 
There were more general aspects of this issue that raised difficult questions for 
the ITF and these will be picked up in Chapter VI. 
iv. General Secretaries and (or versusý. Assistant General Secretaries 
The ITF had a two-tier secretariat: its 'officers' were elected or appointed by a 
governing body to positions specified by the Constitution and its 'staff (of which 
more in the next section) were appointed by the General Secretary (with the 
nominal and usually tacit approval of the Management Committee). Chief among 
the officers was (and still is) its General Secretary, elected by Congress for one 
Congress term and eligible for re-election. His sweeping responsibilities 
throughout the period, essentially unchanged from Fimmen's day, were 
summadzed in the 1962 Constitution: 'the general administration of the 
Federation's affairs ... the implementation of decisions taken by the 
Federation's 
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governing bodies' and anything else specified in the Constitution. He was a 
member ex-officio of the General Council, the Executive Committee/Board - to 
which he was formally answerable for his actions - and the Management 
Committee. 23 Ultimately, of course, he needed also to satisfy Congress if he 
wished to be re-elected. 
I The 1946 Constitution allowed for'an Assistant General Secretary , elected by 
Congress, who would act'generally' under the'orders'of the EC and the General 
Secretary, whom he would assist'as required. The EC proposed to the 1952 
Congress that the Assistant General Secretary should no longer be elected by 
Congress but should be appointed by the General Council. The proposal won a 
majority on a card vote but not the two-thirds margin required to carry a 
constitutional amendment. 24 In 1956 the EC decided that'the resignation of the 
Assistant General Secretary [Paul Tofahrn]... [gave] ... occasion to reconsider 
the matter. The ITF 'may in future need a team of Assistant General 
Secretaries' and the EC's proposal to the 1956 Congress was that'the Assistant 
General Secretary/Secretaries shall be appointed by the Executive Committeel. 25 
It was approved with just one (anonymous) vote against. 26 
The reference in 1956 to Tofahm is an indication of the way the constitutional 
relationship between the General Secretary and the Assistant General Secretary 
had become personalized. The bitter debate at the 1952 Congress on the first 
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attempt to change the relevant rule had already left no room for doubt about that. 
Deakin, proposing the amendment in the name of the EC, had tried to 
characterize the change as a practical measure'to make the organization work', 
a simple tidying-up of status and responsibilities, but once it was on the 
Congress floor the proposal was seen almost exclusively as an attempt - 
welcome and urgent to some, authoritarian and undeserved to others - to 
relegate and, in his supporters' eyes, humiliate Tofahm. 27 
v. JaaD Oldenbroek 
The tensions between the General Secretary, Omer Becu, and Tofahrn which 
were laid bare in that debate had been presaged many years eadier when 
Fimmen died. As Becu was to put it, his predecessor '[had] warned me [about 
Tofahrn] ... but I decided to find out for myself. 28 That predecessor, 'Jaap' 
(Jacobus H. ) Oldenbroek was born in Amsterdam in 1897, son of a Dutch trades 
unionist. He left school at fourteen to become an office boy and in 1915 went to 
work for the Dutch national centre, where Fimmen noticed his 'quick intelligence 
and linguistic abilities' and recruited him in 1921 to the ITIF office in Amsterdam. 
In 1938 he became Assistant General Secretary and when Fimmen fell seriously 
ill soon afterwards he acted as General Secretary with the tacit (or, as Paul 
Tofahrn saw it, complicit) approval of the Management Committee. He was 
formally appointed Acting General Secretary by the Management Committee in 
May 1943, some five months after Pimmen died. 29 Koch-Baumgarten has drawn 
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attention to the attempts by Tofahrn, then the Secretary to the Railwaymen's and 
'Land Transport' Sections, and Max Zwalf, who was the ITFs research and 
publications specialist, to stave off Oldenbroek's appointment on the grounds that 
he 'lacked Fimmen's charisma and political and socialist vigour'. 30 But Tofahm 
had to settle for second place as Acting Assistant General Secretary, for by the 
end of the war Oldenbroek's position was unassailable. 31 The ITF emerged into 
peacetime stronger in almost every way than in 1939, and for that Oldenbroek 
could take the most credit. He had led the ITF's total commitment to the Allied 
war effort, whilst safeguarding its autonomy by refusing to take a penny from the 
Allied intelligence services, to whose operations the ITF had given invaluable 
help. 32 
Oldenbroek was unanimously elected (effectively confirmed) as General 
Secretary by the 1946 Congress as General Secretary and Tofahrn, also 
unanimously, as Assistant General Secretary. 33The Congress could never have 
guessed that Oldenbroek's General Secretaryship had only some three more 
years to run, that he would be pre-occupied for all three with the ITF's resistance 
to absorption within the WFTU (see Chapter V), and that his triumph in that 
struggle would bring about his departure. 
There are no surviving witnesses of his time in the ITF and the written evidence, 
other than the official records, does not pretend to be objective. Tofahm's 
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contemporary view of him from 1941 through to Oldenbroek's departure in 1950 
is spread thickly over countless private notes, memos and letters and is rarely 
less than hostile and contemptuous. 34 Th6r6se Asser (see below), who had 
known Oldenbroek better and for longer than anyone in the ITF, paid tribute to 
him shortly after he died in 1970 but her contribution was positive and respectful, 
as the valedictory circumstances dictated, and concentrated very much on his 
pre-war career. She wrote of his 'remarkable intelligence ... marvellous memory 
... strong personality'. The one reference to a possible shortcoming in his 
personality was oblique, to 'the softer side of his personality' which 'he used to 
cover up (especially in later years)'. Stefan Nedzynski, who worked under 
Oldenbroek at the ICFTU's Brussels headquarters for almost six years in the 
1950s, was more blunt. Oldenbroek, he wdtes, 'showed little heart and made few 
friends ... was respected but not loved'. 35 
Oldenbroek seems never to have indicated at all precisely where he would place 
himself in the political spectrum. For what it is worth, Asser saw him as'a 
convinced socialist'. 36 But w6ting in 1942, Tofahm was sure that, given the 
chance, Oldenbroek would 'convert it [the ITF] into a business' which he would 
run 'not according to a class policy but according to the unprincipled methods 
and advertisement stunts of the commercial traveller'. 37 
But however sour Tofahm's view of Oldenbroek on almost every count, very few 
[55] 
in the ITF seem to have shared it. If there was a crowning moment in 
Oldenbroek's career in the ITF, it was the defeat of the attempt to transform the 
autonomous ITF into a subsidiary arm of the WFTU (see Chapter V) and if he 
had stayed with the ITF, he would most probably have ended his working life 
there, much honoured and contented. But that triumph marked him out as the 
obvious, unrivalled candidate for the General Secretaryship of the new 
international for'free' national centres. Fulsomely nominated by Deakin and 
seconded, with 'great pleasure', by George Meany, President of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), Oldenbroek was unanimously elected General 
Secretary of the ICFTU on the first day (7 December 1949) of its First Congress, 
which was held in London. 38 
As its meeting in October 1949, the EC 'encouraged Mr. Oldenbroek to accept 
nomination of the new Trade Union International and wished him success'. 39 
Once that 'success' was achieved, Oldenbroek made it clear to Tofahm, firstly, 
that the Executive Committee had the authority, and would use it, to appoint an 
Acting General Secretary of the ITF; and, secondly, that Tofahm would not be 
their choice, because he was simply not up to the job. Tofahrn replied that, on 
the contrary, he would make a good General Secretary - but was ready to give 
way to Omer Becu, the ITF's President. It was his way to dignify what he already 
knew was to be yet another rebuff. Becu's succession as General Secretary was 
already as good as decided and he accepted it, I as I accept the rain and the 
[56] 
sunshine'. They had chosen Omer Becu and 'if as General Secretary he 
continues to be the good comrade he is as President, he will have in me a 
devoted assistant'. 40 
Oldenbroek advised the Executive Committee meeting from 6 to 8 February 1950 
that he intended to leave the ITF in one week's time. Becu left the chair, which 
Yates took over and confirmed that Becu was the Executive Committee's choice 
for Acting General Secretary. Tofahrn was asked by Yates to be 'big-hearted 
enough' not to stand against Becu at the 1950 Congress and to 'share the 
conviction that Mr. Becu's intellectual standing was so high that only ... 
[Oldenbroek] 
... could equal it'. Becu made the appropriate humble but resolute 
pledges to do his best and Tofahrn, tactfully swallowing Yates's extraordinary 
estimate of Becu's intellectual powers, welcomed his new boss and assured him 
of his determination to make their future co-operation work. 41 
Oldenbroek was gone almost as soon as the meeting ended. The ITF's records 
bear out time and again how skilled and persistent he was in debate and how 
indifferent he was, bolstered by what Lyon Galled his 'belief in his sublime 
authority 1 42 tothe 
high status or reputation of anyone who disagreed with him. 
His unshakable self-confidence (or, to some on the receiving end, arrogance) 
meant that he bowed to no-one, seeing off the mighty Deakin in the ITF debates 
on the WFTU at the ITF's 1948 Congress. 43 Later, in the ICFTU, he would face 
[57] 
down the apoplectic Meany, whose 'strident [anti-communist] rhetoric' 
Oldenbroek 'detested', with 'coolly reasoned, detailed arguments... [which] 
ensured that in the end decisions always went his and not Meany's way'. 44 
It was the vengeful Meany, abetted for quite different reasons by the British TUC, 
who finally drove Oldenbroek from the ICFTU in 1960, a persecution and 
prosecution authoritatively described and discussed by Carew45and stdctly 
relevant here only in its direct repercussions on the ITF, of which more very 
shortly. The last words on Oldenbroek have to be, first, that in Nedzynski's 
informed judgment his record as General Secretary of the ICFTU was 'truly 
great II 46and secondly that he walked away from the ICFTU in his early sixties 
with barely a backward glance. No recriminations, no memoirs and, most likely, 
not a scratch on his armour-plated self-confidence. 
vi. Omer Becu 
Omer Becu was bom in 1900 in Ostende, Belgium, the son of a schoolteacher. 
He went to sea in 1919 as a radio operator and before long was a militant leader 
of the Belgian radio telegraphists' union. His entry into the international 
movement came in 1929 with his appointment as Assistant General Secretary of 
the International Merchant Marine Officers' Association (IMMOA), which-ied to 
his first encounter with Edo Fimmen, his 'spiritual father', at an ILO conference. 
He became General Secretary of the IMMOA in 1932 and guided it Mto ever 
[58] 
closer collaboration with the ITF until 1946 when the IMMOA was happy to be 
absorbed within the ITF. By then Becu had narrowly escaped a prison term in 
1936 for attempted gun-running to republican Spain and in 1940 he reached 
England from occupied Belgium. He managed the ITF New York office from 
1941 to 1943 and was closely involved in the ITF's support for the Allied 
intelligence services during the war, returning to Belgium in late 1944 to help 
rebuild the Belgian transport workers' movement. 47When he appeared at the 
ITF's ZOrich Congress in 1946 it was as President of the Belgian Transport 
Workers' Union (BTB), to which the Belgian merchant marine officers now 
belonged. That Congress elected him to the Executive Committee and when the 
President of the ITF, John Benstead of the British NUR, left his union and the ITF 
in September 1947, Becu succeeded him. 48 
Becu took an uncomplicated view of the trade union cause. Unions were there to 
protect what their members had and to get them more whenever they could. If 
that meant a fight, then fight with everything you had, He was a merchant navy 
officer (though radio operators were only just so), yet was never so happy as 
when he-was addressing a mass meeting of Antwerp dockers, the core of the 
BTB and for him the salt of the earth. He would have called himself a 'socialist', 
by which he would have meant that he belonged to the Belgian Socialist Party, 
His reactions to people and issues were habitually instinctive, which is not to say 
that he had no m04 and political principles, but that they were almost 
unconscious givens and in no need of intellectual examination or justification. 49 
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Nedzynski, reflecting on his service under Becu at the ICFTU in the 1960s and 
writing of 'a fine man and a good friend', commented on Becu's aversion to 
'details'which made him a poor administrator. 50 Becu's lack of interest in the 
nuts and bolts of administration was certainly very evident in his ITF days but he 
had the good sense to leave them to an able and dedicated staff. His indifference 
to detail, however, went beyond house-keeping. He had a General Secretary's 
responsibility for whatever documents went to the governing bodies but drafts 
were often approved unread and he sometimes failed to read the final versions 
too. It was never a great surprise to the staff when Becu spoke and argued at, 
say, the Executive Committee against the sense, or even explicit 
recommendations, of a document he had put to it. From time to time members 
would let him know that they had noticed the inconsistency but he had a 
presence and force about him which brushed aside any such pedantry, or so it 
seemed at the time. 51 
He was a favourite of the American affiliates, 'the great Belgian'to Lyon, 52and to 
the seafarers' and dockers' affiliates he was their inspirational champion as they 
built their campaign against flags-of-convenience (see below). He was also 
committed to the ITF's regional ambitions, the first General Secretary ever to 
make an extended visit to Africa (see below). Altogether, he was just the man, 
the Americans decided, to be President of the lCFTU and to put some backbone 
into what they saw as Oldenbroek's over-cautious response to the Cold War. 
[60] 
Carew describes how the ICFTU's rules were changed at the ICFTU's Congress 
in 1953 to facilitate Becu's election and how Oldenbroek then kept the new 
President'at arm's length I, failed to consult him or to inform him of what he was 
doing, and so disappointed the Americans' hope of 'cutting ... [him]... down to 
size'. Though re-elected in 1955, Becu tried to resign in August 1956, only to be 
prevailed upon by the ICFTU's Executive Board to bear his bruised feelings until 
the ICFTU Congress in July 1957.53 
It was an experience which Carew believes 'cooled' Becu's once 'friendly' 
relationship with Oldenbroek 54 but, if Tofahrn's notes are to be believed, the 
relationship had never been very close. Tofahrn recorded that at a private 
meeting in January 1950 Becu told him that he had never taken up offers to work 
at the ITF immediately after the war'because, knowing Oldenbroek, I couldnit 
have worked with him. ' 55 
They had, indeed, very different personalities and mindsets. Oldenbroek was 
rational, self-confident and self-possessed to a fault, or so (see above) the 
admiring but critical Nedzynski saw him (and Asser implied). In contrast, Becu's 
colleagues and staff within the ITF knew how highly strung he was, how quick to 
take offence, how ready to suspect disloyalty and how slow then to be dissuaded 
or reassured. They would also have seen how warm and generous he could be 
to those he liked and trusted and how he gave everything to his job, with a 
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Belgian's appreciation of good food and drink but absolutely no interest in high- 
living on the ITF's account. His brittle temperament was perhaps the cause of 
the severe migraines which would leave him in his flat over the ITF offices for 
days on end, during which he could only be contacted through Th6r6se Asser, 
his personal secretary. 
By early 1959, Meany had made up his mind that Oldenbroek had to be ditched 
from the ICFTU and Becu was his man to replace him. Becu was not ready, 
however, to stand against Oldenbroek at the ICFTU's Congress in December 
1959. Oldenbroek was therefore re-elected by default, but the Congress 
appointed a high-powered committee to consider re-organizing inter alia the 
'structures' including the 'officers', in other words ways to get rid of Oldenbroek. 
They were given six months for the job and 'finally ascertained in May [1960] that 
Omer Becu was now willing to take the job'. An ICFTU Executive Board meeting 
at the end of June 1960 decided that the General Secretary's post should be 
'declared vacant'. Over the protests of many members and to the distressed 
consciences of others, Oldenbroek's resignabon was prised from him by an 
alliance of Meany and the ICFTUs President, Arne Geijer of the Swedish LO. 
Becu replaced him. m 
Within a very few years, Becu's move to the ICFTU was to prove a personal and 
professional calamity which Carew has traced and descdbed with evident 
sympathy. 57 But Becu's decline and eventual eclipse are not as relevant to this 
[621 
thesis as the messy mismanagement of his departure from the ITF and of the 
choice of his successor, which was to leave a mark on the life and direction of 
the ITF through to the 1965 Congress. 
The ITF Executive Committee meeting in London on 5 and 6 April 1960 was 
given a document on the ICFTU's 'problems' arising from its Congress in 
December 1959, the biggest being how to dig out the entrenched Oldenbroek. 
The Congress had asked a committee to come up with a solution and Yates 
opened the EC's discussion with a report on 'developments within the ICFTU 
which had indirectly involved [Becu]'. This coy minute was taken to mean that 
the I CFTU wished Becu to replace Olden broek and 'several members' then said 
that Becu should stay with the ITF. Becu responded that after listening to the 
members, he 'now felt free to say that he did not envisage leaving the ITF. 58 
That declaration, Becu was later to insist, had no bearing on his proposal to the 
same meeting, put perhaps an hour previously without prior notice and not even 
in writing, that the ITF headquarters should be moved to Brussels. He launched 
the idea on the back of a letter from the absent Art Lyon calling for the expansion 
of the ITF's regional activities, which would necessitate the recruitment of more 
staff. Becu argued that it would be easier to recruit the extra staff in Brussels 
and it was anyway 'increasingly desirable to be within easy reach of the ICFTU 
The EC, probably sensing that this might be the price of keeping him wim th6 
ITF, approved his proposal in principle but asked the Management Committee 'to 
[63] 
consider the administrative implications'. If the MC found no 'insurmountable 
difficulties', the proposal would become a formal motion from the Executive 
Committee to the Congress in July 1960.59 
It is impossible to be sure why Becu sprang the proposition on the EC. He would 
have known that his staff argument was nonsense; the ITF had no recruitment 
problems. The need to be'within easy reach'of the ICFTU was no more 
convincing. Brussels was only a couple of hours away by air and, even in those 
days, immediately accessible by telephone or cable. Could he possibly have 
been thinking of keeping everyone happy by heading both the ITF and the ICFTU 
from Brussels? (His great hero, Fimmen, had done something of the kind in 
Amsterdam in the early 1920s, but briefly and disastrously. ) 
The MC, at that point still made up exclusively of British6O nominees, Becu apart, 
then had a series of meetings at which the members gave Becu only very 
grudging ground, for example agreeing that they would not themselves speak 
against the proposal at the 1960 Congress, only a few weeks away, though the 
British unions might nevertheless oppose it. But the IVIC meeting on 24 June 
1960 was told by Yates from the chair that it was 'generally known' that Becu 
was going to the ICFTU anyway, at which the MC decided it was now free openly 
to oppose the move to Brussels. 61 The EC too had had enough of it when it met 
immediately before the 1960 Congress. It decided to withdraw the proposal, thus 
[64] 
confirming (but not admitting) that the idea had always been tied to Becu's 
future. 62 
Becu's appointment to the ICFTU came barely two weeks before the ITF's 1960 
Congress from 20 to 30 July in Berne. For the whole of the long first day of its 
pre-Congress meeting on 18 and 19 July, the EC wrestled with the problem of 
how Congress could be expected to replace a General Secretary at almost no 
notice at all. It decided finally, by seven to four, that the task would be beyond it. 
With the acquiescence of the four dissenters, it would unanimously recommend 
Congress, 'to waive its right ... to elect the General Secretary ... and instead 
authorize the new Executive Committee ... to be elected at 
Congress to appoint 
an Acting General Secretary ... [to serve until] ... the next 
Congress. 63 
Cousins, as President, put the proposal to Congress but it had almost no 
support. Greene, on behalf of the British delegation, sank it by insisting that 
Congress elect a General Secretary and that the ITF also needed an Assistant 
General Secretary who might be 'suitable to become General Secretary later'. 64 
Congress agreed that the EC should think again, 65which it then did late into the 
night of 22 July. It agreed that the Congress should after ail elect a General 
Secretary and that the EC's recommendation 'should be a person willing to fill the 
post only for the period until the next Congress'. It also discussed the 
appointment of 'Assistant General Secretaries' [sic] but 'without ... coming to any 
[651 
final conclusion'. A further late-night session, on 25 July, took a vote on the three 
potential candidates for the EC's nomination as General Secretary, which Pieter 
de Vries won by six votes to Lawrie White's four and Hans Imhof s one (more on 
White and Imhof below). It was then agreed that Congress should be advised to 
recommend the incoming EC to appoint Imhof and White as Assistant General 
Secretaries at its first meeting immediately after Congress. 66 
The EC's package was not put to Congress by its spokesman, Fernand Laurent, 
until the morning of 29 July, the last session of a tired and fractious Congress 
already in a procedural mess over the bitter fight between Greene and Cousins 
for the British seat on the EC (see Chapter IV). The Scandinavian group wanted 
Congress to go straight into an election of a General Secretary and preferred 
Hans Imhof 'as a temporary caretaker' but time was fast running out and 
Cousins, from the chair, hurried the delegates along, adding that imhof was in 
favour of the EC's recommendation. The EC's proposal, and with it the election 
of Pieter de Vries, was carried in a card vote easily enough by 3,492,400 to 
575,200. A flurry of section and committee business was disposed of and 
Cousins closed Congress with some acid and defiant comments on the arrogant 
conduct of the Amedcan group (see Chapter IV). He forgot, as almost everyone 
else did, to mention Becu's departure or to thank him and wish himWell. 67 
[66] 
vii. Pieter de Vries (and Hans lmhoO 
Pieter de Vries had managed, in the last hour or so of the 1960 Congress, to say 
a few words: modest concern at his ability to measure up to the great demands 
of the job, an appeal to the staff for their support, and a promise to do his best. 68 
He made no mention of any 'caretaker' status and in a sense he had no need to: 
the General Secretary's term ran constitutionally only from one Congress to the 
next. Nor did he refer to his age, which Johan Thore of the Swedish Seamen's 
Union had seized on (should be enabled to enjoy his later years in peace') in the 
Congress debate on the General Secretaryship, only a few days after Cousins 
had publicly wished De Vries a happy sixty-third birthday on 25 July. 69No-one is 
to know, of course, whether his age went for or against him. Thore implied that 
he was too old for the job, but others might have thought he had the stability and 
experience needed to tide the ITF over the disruption of Becu's hasty departure. 
Others still, might simply have been grateful for a 'caretaker, acknowledged or 
not as such, and for the opportunity to find someone of high calibre for the longer 
term. 
De Vries had certainly been Becd's option for the General Secretaryship in the 
very limited choices and time left to him once he decided to go to the lCFTU. 
They were old comrades from the IMMOA days and when De Vries retired at 
sixty from the presidency of the Dutch Seafarers' and Fishermen's Federation, 
Becu had been happylo, bring him to London as Director of Regional Affairs 
[671 
(see below). It is very doubtful that he had anything else in mind for him at that 
point, but in the weeks leading up to the 1960 Congress Becu's nightmare was 
that Hans Imhof, the Section Secretary for the Railwaymen's and Road Transport 
Sectons, would fall into the General Secretaryship for want of any credible 
alternative. Imhof will be discussed again below, but at this point it is enough to 
note that Becu seems to have taken against him from his aMval in late 1956 and 
had fought off ever more determined attempts by Imhof s supporters (all 
railwaymen) on the EC to have him promoted to Assistant General Secretary. 
The last occasion, in April 1960, had left Becu with the slim lead of six to four. 70 
De Vries was not widely known beyond the Seafarers' Section, was no orator 
and was very unexciting in almost every way. But he had no enemies and was 
all Becu could offer as a stop-gap whilst those distrustful of Imhof looked for 
someone able to beat him the next time around. In retrospect, De Vries's 
election was Becu's last and, given the material, very considerable achievement 
at the ITF, but it came at a price, for De Vries was saddled with Imhof as one of 
two Assistant General Secretaries. (The other, Lawrence White, the Section 
Secretary responsible for the flag-of-convenience campaign, was of much less 
account - see below). 
De Vries was to prove anything but the amiable pensioner happy to help the ITF 
out of its temporary difficulties, a persona he cultivated and exploited vvith great 
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intelligence to disarm and charm. He was a shrewd and steely operator of the 
General Secretary's authority and influence, from the outset winning (no doubt 
with Becu's help) Lyon's absolute support and eventually the general approval of 
Frank Cousins. Within the office he solved all his problems with Imhof and White 
by leaving them very free to do their sectional duties and by ensuring they had 
nothing whatever to do with anything else. They had the title and salary of an 
Assistant General Secretary but remained for all practical purposes Section 
Secretaries. The ITF Constitution was radically rethought and reshaped in De 
Vries's first term and neither of them was ever encouraged to offer a suggestion 
or opinion. The arTival of the Dutch dockers' leader, Reint Laan Jr, as Director of 
Regional Affairs in April 1961 -his salary and conditions being those of an 
Assistant General Secretary - put another large and growing area of ITF activity 
beyond their intervention. 71 
There is no first-hand evidence that they ever complained about their treatment. 
They were apparently ready - Imhof in his mid-forties probably more so than 
White in his eady sixties - to sit De Vdes out. But according to Lyon, Imhof was 
far from acquiescent: 'troublesome and always complaining ... 
disloyal ... he 
should never be the General Secretary. ' These judgments, delivered to the EC 
in November 1961, were backed by De Vries. It would indeed be a'sad day'if 
Imhof succeeded him, disqualified as he was by'poor judgment and being 
'easily impressed by weak arguments'. The meeting was made the occasion to 
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discuss how the 1962 Congress might go about electing a General Secretary and 
gave De Vries the cue to announce that he was ready to serve another term 'if 
that was generally, if not unanimously, acceptable' in the hope that a 'suitable 
successor' could be found in 'two or three years time. Caught off-guard by this 
proposition, only Imhof s most committed supporters, DOby and Seibert of the 
Swiss and German railwaymen, gathered themselves in time to register their 
dissent to the 'conclusions' of the discussion which proposed the issuing of a 
circular from the EC to all the affiliates supporting a second term for De Vries. 72 
Those conclusions were to be confirmed by the next EC meeting in April 1962 
some three months before the 1962 Congress in Helsinki, and so they were, 
without any discussion, on the basis of a two-line reminder in a document 
devoted to Congress arrangements. The result was a statement in the EC's 
name pointing to De Vries's 'ability' and 'evident capacity' to carry on 'for a 
further period' which 'would also provide more opportunity to assess the qualities' 
of potential successors. He was willing to serve another term if that had 'the 
obvious consent of a considerable majority. 73 
It was a daring move on De Vries's part, a head start on the Imhof camp which 
had so consistently underestimated him. When Curran from the American NMU 
asked at the EC meeting immediately before the Congress whether the circular 
was meant to bind the EC members' organizations, he was assured by the 
[70] 
President, Roger Dekeyzer, that it could not do so and by De Vries that it was an 
I expression of the EC's views ... not a recommendation'. 74 DOby and Seibert, 
outmanoeuvred and ambushed within the EC, cut their losses and reserved their 
forces and votes for the Congress itself, where Imhof had already been 
nominated by Alphonse Tonneaux, the Belgian railwaymen's leader. Tonneaux's 
first move was to try to add an age limit of sixty-five for the General Secretary to 
the proposals for constitutional amendments -'nothing to do with personalities', 
of course - but that was defeated narrowly and De Vries survived to fight the 
election proper at the last session of the last day. 75 
Dekeyzer opened the election by reading out the EC's statement, but he dropped 
the last sentence, which made De Vries's candidature conditional on 'the obvious 
consent of a considerable majority'. No-one questioned the omission, nor 
Dekeyzer's claim that the statement was indeed a 'recommendation. Imhof 
formally accepted the Belgian railwaymen's nomination and Hogarth of the British 
seamen nominated White, who could have had no hope of winning but was not 
yet ready to be written off. At this point Reint Laan strode dramatically down the 
aisle, bent over Hussein of the Tanganyika Railway African Union and then 
pointed him to the platform, from where he nominated Laan. For Laan (of whom 
a little more below), his nomination was a way to get to the microphone for the 
one memorable speech in a very short debate. He denouncedthe repetition -'a 
cause for shame'- of what he termed the 'circus' at the previous Congress. If the 
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EC statement were accepted 'the battle of succession would start up 
immediately' and the incoming EB should 'fix a date' for the end of De Vries's 
term. Whatever that meant, his contribution provoked some angry catcalls. 76 
De Vries scraped home by 1,622,600 to Imhof s 1,588,100. The vote of one 
relatively small affiliate could have overturned him and the 34,000 'abstentions' 
were only 500 shy of his winning margin. White attracted a hefty 523,800, but 
Laan's 26,600 was so low that even his former union could not have voted for 
him. De Vries acknowledged that he had not received the 'obvious consent' 
which he had seemed so recently to require, but re-election was a remarkable 
feat by any reckoning for the 'caretaker', and even more so because his biggest 
supporter, the American RLEA, had had serious internal problems which lost it 
some 390,000 votes from its strength just three years previously. He gave the 
Congress his 'solemn undertaking' that this really would be his last term but his 
declaration that he 'would do his utmost' to find a successor'to whom the ITF 
could be safely entrusted' confirmed his unrelenting determination to block 
Imhof s way. 77 
The last 'term' on which he then set out, was a year longer as a result of the 
constitutional move to a triennial Congress, giving him three years to find the 
'white knight'who would save the ITIF from Imhof. Had he once believed that 
Laan might be his man? Surely the president of the Dutch NBV's dockers I 
[72] 
section would not have left Rotterdam, where he was leader of the dominant 
Labour Party on the city council, for anything less than a clear run at the top job? 
But whatever, if anything, De Vries had led Laan to expect, the two never got on, 
As Laan's performance at the 1962 Congress demonstrated, he was by then 
bitterly disappointed and no longer cared to conceal it. 
De Vries, however, thought he had seen the ITF's salvation in Fernando Azaha, 
the director of the ITF's Latin American activities. Lyon had significantly 
mentioned his name when musing on 'young people' who might be General 
Secretary material at the EC in November 1961 and Azaha made a huge impact 
at the 1962 Congress. 78But he fell spectacularly from grace early in 1964 (see 
below) and the best De Vries could do in the short time left to him was to make 
desultory overtures to Lester Zosel, the international representative of BRAC, a 
desperate last resort which came to nothing when Zosel withdrew his 
candidature 'for personal reasons', those being either that he knew he had no 
chance or, much less likely, that he knew he was unfit. 79 Imhof, meanwhile, 
bided his time, concerned firstly to retain the very substantial support base 
revealed in the 1962 vote and then to persudde those he had still to win over that 
they really had nothing to fear. He was elected unopposed and unanimously at 
the 1965 Congress on the EC's recommendation. 80 
The thesis period effectively ends with the 1965 Congress for reasons explained 
[73] 
in the Introduction and a large measure of hindsight needs to be applied to the 
first four months or so of Imhof s tenure to the end of 1965 before they yield up 
evidence of the coming disaster he was to suffer (and the ITIF escape). When 
the 1968 Congress declined to re-elect him, it vindicated the instincts and 
judgments of Becu and De Vries more quickly and fully than they could ever have 
anticipated. 
viii. Tofahm, Imhof and White 
Paul Tofahrn has already featured in this chapter in the pages on Oldenbroek 
and Becu. Oldenbroek simply told Tofahrn he was not General Secretary 
material, swatted him aside and then paid him next to no mind. The altogether 
more insecure and explosive Becu saw Tofahrn as a threat to his own authority 
which he tried at the 1952 Congress to buttress by removing the Assistant 
General Secretary's privilege of election by Congress (see above). There was 
indeed more than procedure at issue in that proposal. Election by Congress did 
confer a symbolic status, as Tofahrn's supporters never denied, even when 
protesting that he had always acknowledged the General Secretary's 
precedence. 
But, at bottom, the formalities of their relationship were incidental to their 
inflammatory incompatibility in almost every respect. For Tofahrn the final, 
decisive humiliation came in a clash, not over high policy or any matter of great 
F4] 
international importance but over airline tickets for their return to London from a 
General Council meeting in Helsinki in June 1955. Tofahm's flight was via 
Amsterdam and Becu's via Copenhagen. Becu demanded that they exchange 
tickets. Tofahm 'mildly protested. Becu shouted back, 'You shut your trap and 
give me your ticket. I did both', Tofahm noted. 
The Helsinki meeting had already upset him when, 'without a word ... before or 
after' he was replaced as the minute-taker by 'a member of the staff specially 
brought from London. Two weeks after the ticket incident a meeting of the IVIC 
was held ('only three doors away') without any notification to him, though the 
rules provided for him to attend. Becu, he concluded, was determined'to depose 
me in fact if not constitutionally'. 81 The International Federation of Public and 
Civil Service Unions (soon to become the Public Services International (PSI) and 
referred to as such from now on) was in urgent need of a full-time General 
Secretary who would put new life and purpose into a rudderless and apathetic 
body. Kummemuss (see p158), a powerful influence in the PSI, gave Tofahrn 
his backing and he became General Secretary of the PSI in December 1955.82 
Tofahrn left the ITF some six months before the 1956 Congress. Becu somehow 
forgot a promise he had made to the Railwaymen's Section Conference held 
during the Congress that a tribute to Tofahrn's services would be paid before the 
full Congress in plenary session. When the time came, he did not mention 
[75] 
Tofahrn and Congress quickly moved on. 83 
It was an ungrateful end to a long and devoted career in the ITF By then fifty- 
five, Tofahrn had been born in Malm6dy, just the Belgian side of the frontier with 
Germany. His first jobs were on the German and Belgian railways and his first 
trade union positions (from 1921 to 1927) were with the largely autonomous 
railwaymen's section of the Belgian public service workers' federation (Centrale 
G&6rale des Services Publics - CGSP). He spent from 1928 to 1931 with the 
ITIF in Amsterdam helping in the Railwaymen's Section and was elected its 
Section Secretary at the ITF's 1938 Congress. 84 
The Tofahrn papers85are very revealing. He wrote compulsively: hundreds of 
pages, mostly handwritten, of diary entries, notes of meetings, impressions of 
people he had just met or of books he had just read, or of ideas (usually political 
or philosophical) which had just come to his mind or notice. He was born in 
Belgium's small German-speaking area but rarely wrote in German. During the 
war and well into the 1940s his private language of preference was clearly 
French but he was using English more and more by the 1950s, and wrote both 
with care and elegance. 
Tofahm and his friend Max Zwalf, the research officer (see below), were seen as 
the ITF's 'egg-heads'. That indeed was what Zwalf was paid to be. An 
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Assistant General Secretary was expected, however, to be more than that. For 
all his many outstanding intellectual qualities, he was widely seen as indecisive, 
as all talk and no action, and so aware of the many sides to most questions that 
he could never see which one to take. There is no way now to test these 
judgments, or prejudices, but the PSI was happy to have him, he served them 
well, retiring fulfilled as he would never have been if he had clung on in the ITF. 
Tofahrn's functions as Section Secretary for the railwaymen and road transport 
workers were given to Hans Imhof by the EC immediately after the 1956 
Congress. A former railwayman, he had been nominated by the Swiss 
Railwaymen's Federation (SEV), though his experience as a trade union official 
had been as Basle secretary for the Swiss Public Service Workers' Union 
(VPOD) for some nine years. German was his first language, his French was 
fluent and he had very good English. 86 The EC added a rider to his 
appointment. He was succeeding Tofahm in his Section Secretary functions but 
no more: 'the question of the Assistant General Secretaryship will be 
reconsidered at a later date in the light of experience'. 87 
That 'later date' came when the EC meeting in November 1959 considered a 
letter from the Railwaymen's Section Chairman, the Austrian Richard Freund, 
asking the EC, on behalf of the Raiwaymen's Section Committee, to consider 
making Imhof an Assistant General Secretary. After a 'general discussion' it was 
[77] 
agreed to put the matter off until the next meeting, "I which took place in April 
1960 and was the occasion for Becu's commitment to resist the ICFTU's 
overtures (see above). Perhaps it was the uncertainty which that discussion 
unexpectedly attached to the ITF's future leadership which made it much harder 
to resist the railwaymen's proposal and it was only by six votes to four that it was 
agreed after a 'considerable' discussion (of which not even a summary was put 
on record), to postpone 'further consideration of the appointment of one or more 
Assistant General Secretaries until after the 1960 Congress'. 89 
Imhof's progress from then on has already been sketched in the sections of this 
chapter on Becu and De Vries. There is no clue on paper to what Becu's 
objections to Imhof's advancement really were. Perhaps he simply saw him as 
another Tofahrn. Imhof s main promoters were indeed the European 
railwaymen's unions, which had historically formed a distinct and sometimes 
awkward bloc within the ITF and had stood by Tofahm. Becu wanted Imhof to 
get on with his sectional duties and bother him only when necessary, but 
Freund's letter would have shattered any hope that Imhof had purely sectional 
ambitions. On a personal level, Becu and Imhof had little in common. Becu, a 
fine raconteur, loved to chew the fat, especially with his old seafarer chums (such 
as De Vries). Imhof socialized with members of the staff and was a generous 
host, but he had to work at personal relationships, whereas Becu managed them 
quite effortlessly with people he liked and trusted. 90 Their working habits too 
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could not have been more different. Imhof relished the detail from which Becu 
recoiled and his reports were often so long that they created real capacity 
problems within the ITF's typing and translation services. The railwaymen in 
particular liked Imhof s methodical, exhaustive treatment of their often 
complicated but unexciting concerns. 
As for De Vries, his opinion of Imhof would certainly have been influenced initially 
by Becu but by 1960 he had his own reason to thwart him when he emerged as a 
potential rival. He had more reason still in 1962 when, as an actual contender, 
Imhof ran him so close. The contrasts in their personalities were as marked as 
those between Becu and Imhof but of a different kind. Imhof was as intense as 
De Vries was relaxed, as dogmatic as De Vries was open-minded. But time was 
always on Imhof s side. De Vries's first impressions of him may have been 
second-hand but by the time he knew Imhof better, and had what he believed 
was some basis for his low regard of him, Imhof was the only candidate left. 
De Vries refired with a sigh. 
Whatever the now unanswerable questions about the Imhof episode, his politics 
cannot at that time have been a factor. He may have belonged to the Swiss 
Social Democratic Party and voted for it, as most leading officials of the 
mainstream Swiss movement did, but he never seemed to be politically engaged, 
other than to be vigorously anti-communist. And even that conviction might have 
[79] 
had a personal edge to it. He had left his position Wth the Basle district of the 
VPOID'at his own requesf in September 1953 and had been self-employed, 
mostly as a machine-tool salesman, until he joined the ITF almost three years 
later. 91 The President of the VPOD at the time, and for many more years, was 
Max Arnold, a greatly respected figure and a phenomenon, being a Swiss 
Communist. It is possible that Imhof and Arnold had been on bad terms and that 
his departure from the VPOD had not been as voluntary as he claimed. 
The last and least important of the Assistant General Secretaries was Lawrence 
White, who was seconded to the ITF in October 1952 from the British Navigators' 
and Engineer Officers' Union (NEOU) as a'Special Officer' with responsibility for 
the conduct of the ITF's campaign against flags-of-convenience (f-o-c). That 
temporary arrangement lasted for almost seven years until August 1959 when 
the EC agreed that he should fill a vacancy as Section Secretary of the Civil 
Aviation Section, whilst keeping his Special Officer duties. 92 
White had been to sea with the modest rank of radio officer but he had a very 
grand, senatorial manner, more the bearing of a ship's master, even an admiral. 
It often proved very effective when applied to f-o-c shipowners but was not 
always appreciated by his colleagues. He knew very little about the ITF beyond 
his immediate responsibilities and showed little interest in it, an ignorance and 
indifference that he carried over to his position as an Assistant General 
[80] 
Secretary when he became part of the 1960 Congress package deal (see above) 
on the General Secretaryship. He would have known that he had no serious 
chance of being elected General Secretary but also that he had enough support 
among the maritime unions never to make a fool of himself if he ran. It was his 
way of reminding the ITF, and General Secretaries particularly, that he was not to 
be taken lightly. He retired at sixty-five in 1966. 
ix. Section Secretaries and 'staff 
The six persons who, with Oldenbroek and Tofahm, made up the secretariat in 
1945 had all come over to England from Amsterdam. Max (Meyer) Zwalf, the 
ITF's research officer, was brought to the ITF by Fimmen in 1931. A Dutch 
political economist and historian by training and vocation, he was firmly left-wing 
by conviction and a thinker, theoretician and writer of real depth and force. He 
died suddenly in November 1954 at the age of fifty-three. 93 Th6r6se Asser 
joined the ITF in 1923 as a translator-interpreter. Her native Dutch was used 
less than her almost faultless English, French, German and Spanish, with less 
frequent call made on her very good Italian and Swedish. By 1950 she was the 
General Secretary's private and (very) confidential secretary, working often on 
her own initiative and acting as his gate-keeper and secret-keeper. Until 1953, 
she was simultaneously the secretariat's travel arranger and 'bookkeeper'. Tiny, 
positively fragile and worn but ageless, she had the last word, if she wanted it, on 
just about every aspect of the ITF's headquarters' administration but 
[81] 
assiduously avoided any intervention in policy issues, keeping her views (which 
she certainly had) strictly to herself. She retired in October 1959. Lina Kant had 
studied Arabic at university and came to the ITF from Germany in 1926 as an 
interpreter/translator. Very blunt, combative and quite fearless, she smuggled ITF 
anti-Nazi propaganda into Hitler's Germany in the 1930s. Legend had it that she 
hid the contraband in her underwear. The Nazi SS department devoted to 
researching and combating resistance paid her the tribute of inclusion in their 
'Black Book', a list of British residents to be given priority in the rounding up and 
disposal of opponents when the Germans invaded Great Britain. 94 She ended 
her forty-two years with the ITF in 1968 as the 'chief shorthand-typist'. 
These and the other members of the ex-Amsterdam group gave a homogeneity 
to the staff that was a source of great strength in the immediate post-war years. 
They had all been committed to the ITF's anti-Fascist campaign of the 1930s 
(several of them even earlier) and so had a heightened sense of what the war 
was about, of the rightness of the ITF's part in it and of the necessity for the ITF 
to play a leading part in building on the victory. They were also very conscious of 
their personal and extraordinary good fortune at having escaped the horrors of 
Nazi occupation and at being able durling the war to make their contributions in 
relative safety and comfort - and all the while paid respectably for their efforts. 
The Czech Vojcek (or Adalbert) Klatil had come to the ITF in 1930 as a Slavonic 
language specialist and went on to retire in 1964 as office manager, as handy 
[82] 
with a hammer or screwdriver as at organizing ITF Congresses. The Irish-Dutch 
Robert (Bob) Santley had the longest service of all, joining the ITIF at the age of 
nineteen in 1924 and retiring at sixty-five in 1970. He had become Oldenbroek's 
personal assistant in 1939 and was subsequently a 'section assistant' to the 
maritime sections from 1946 until July 1958 when belated recognition came with 
his appointment as Section Secretary to the Seafarers' Section. 95Modest, kind 
and gentle, with deep interests in chess, higher mathematics and the Roman 
Catholic church (which rebuffed him as a re-married divorcee until the last rites), 
he was an unlikely actor on the often rough and sometimes bloody stage of the 
ITIF Seafarers' and Dockers' Sections. But he was liked and trusted by everyone, 
just the man to find that elusive consensus or a modus vivendi when things 
seemed likely to fall apart. He died in 1972. 
The Amsterdam generation was bound over time to fade away and the ITF's staff 
numbers were set to grow as its membership and activities expanded. By the 
end of 1953, the ex-Amsterdamers accounted for just six of the twenty-four 
staff. 96 The first senior newcomer was Fr6d6ric Strauss, who arrived in October 
1946 as Technical Officer for the Railwaymen's Section. He came with 
Oldenbroek's strong backing and joined him at the lCFTU in 1951. There is 
almost nothing in the ITF archives about the man or his antecedents but two 
members of the lCFTU staff in the early 1950s, John Vanderveken (later General 
Secretary) and Andr6 Dewil (later Head of Finance), remember him well as 
[83] 
operating a reign of terror, Oldenbroek's 'eyes and ears ... unconditionally loyal 
to the boss and disloyal to all others' (Vanderveken) and a 'cursing, shouting 
bastard' (Dewil). Dewil understands that he had emigrated from Vienna to 
Britain before the war and had worked as a railway technician of some kind in 
Scotland. What no-one recalls is any claim to trade union experience or any 
evident interest in trade unionism as such. He gave Ken Golding to believe that 
he had been an officer in the British army, specializing in railway operations, but 
there is always the possibility that his original contact with Oldenbroek came 
through Oldenbroek's links with Allied intelligence. It is interesting that Becu, 
who had also been very active in those circles, used him as his personal 
representative at the outset of the Mediterranean Vigilance Committee activities 
(see Chapter V). No doubt to widespread delight, Strauss came to a bad end in 
1965 when he was dismissed from the ICFTU as its Finance Control Officer after 
it was discovered that he was a founder and shareholder of a surveyors firm 
which did work for the ICFTU. He became a consultant of some kind and then 
disappeared as mysteriously as he had arrived. 97 
A second and much more positive arrival from the post-war generation was Ken 
Golding, who joined the ITF in 1948 at the age of twenty-four as a 'research 
assistant' to Zwalf. Like all but a tiny proportion of lower middle-class 
Englishmen of his generation, he had not been to university but he came with 
fluent Spanish, French and German. Within a very few years he added 
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proficiency in just about every other language that was used to any extent in the 
ITF and a good knowledge of others (Finnish for example) which were very 
marginal indeed. He turned out documents, articles, speeches, memos and 
letters at dizzy speed, always lucidly and always on time. But his greatest asset 
was his quick mastery of almost any brief and he became the indispensable 
specialist in the unforeseen and the out of the ordinary, for example standing in 
at no notice at all as temporary secretary to the Civil Aviation Section, looking 
after Becu on the ITF's first exploratory sortie into Africa and effectively leading 
an on-the-spot enquiry into the scandalous goings-on in the ITF's Lima Office in 
1964 (see below). He became the'research and publications officer' in 1955, 
succeeding Zwalf, but was not given the formal status of an 'officer' until late 
1960.98 He left the ITF in 1967 to become the chief industrial officer of the 
International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA) but returned as 
head of publications in 1968. Perhaps the best measure of the very high quality 
of his output is to be gained from his historical writings on the ITF's early years. 
They may lack some academic formality in referencing but in every other way are 
unrivalled. 99 
x. Rggional oManization 
The early stages of the ITF's activities in the 'regions, - Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, or what was then known as the 'undeveloped' world - will be sketched 
in Chapter IV and again very briefly in Chapter V, with the observation that 
[85] 
the scene of the most intense East-West international trade union rivalry moved 
in the early 1950s from Europe to the rapidly de-colonized 'regions'. The early 
perception among the ITSs of regional activities as being 'political', potentially 
vast in their demands on personnel and money and strictly long-term in their 
return in terms of affiliates (and fees), led them initially to look to the lCFTU for a 
lead. 
Oldenbroek gave it within months of his election as the ICFTU's first General 
Secretary, reporting to the ITIF Congress in July 1950 that the ICFTU already had 
a mission visiting Asia and was planning its first conference in 'the Americas'. 100 
But building on the prospect of a concerted advance by the international 
movement into the 'undeveloped' world - deciding who should do what, who 
should pay and how much, the mechanics of 'co-ord i nation', the degree of 
autonomy of the various executants - proved to be a very long, difficult and often 
disputatious process, which illustrates some of the general tensions and 
competing priorities inherent in the structure of the international trade union 
movement. (The relationship between the ICFTU and the ITSs and other aspects 
of the international movement's structures are also discussed in Chapter V1. ) 
Oldenbroek told an ICFTU-ITS meeting in October 1950 that the ITSs 'should 
contribute one third of the cost'of the 1CFTU's work to develop a regional 
machinery and an ITS General Conference in December 1950 responded by 
[86] 
recommending each ITS to contribute El to the ICFTU for every thousand 
of the ITS's affiliated membership. The ITF's GC reacted in October 1951 by 
appealing to its affiliates for voluntary contributions of that order, but also decided 
that only half should go to the lCFTU and half should be 'retained for the ITF's 
own very considerable work in this [regional] field'. 101 Less than two years later, 
in July 1953, the GC decided that even a half was too much and on the EC's 
recommendation ceased payments to the ICFTU altogether. Harry Lundeberg of 
the American SIU strongly supported that move: the ITIF 'was independent and 
should do its own work'. 102 The two elements - of money and of what 
Lundeberg characterized as independence - were to be salient in all the false 
starts, fierce arguments, reconciliations, and any number of stalled initiatives 
which were to follow in the vain search for a tidy and workable co-ordination of 
the ICFTU's and the ITS's regional efforts. 
When its regional activities started in earnest, in the early 1950s, the ITF relied at 
first for funds on voluntary contributions, the heaviest by far being from the 
RLEA. The 1958 Congress, however, adopted a new affiliation fee structure that 
would include substantial allocations to the Edo Fimmen Free Trade Union Fund 
(the 'Edo Fimmen Fund'), which the EC fixed in December 1958 at 25% of the 
annual affiliation fee income. 103The allocation fell to 20% for 1962-64 when 
problems within the ITF's American affiliates (see Chapter IV) put the General 
Fund's income under unforeseen pressure, but the commitment to the 
[87] 
ring-fencing of regional funds was maintained to the end of the period (and long 
after it). 
Two further sources of funding emerged towards the end of the period. The 
introduction and extraordinary growth of the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund 
(ISF) from 1956 to its peaks in 1963 (income of some E955,806) and 1964 
(expenditure of some E882,163) 104transformed the ITS-ICFTU relationship and 
helped provoke the controversies (see below) over the 'ITS Liaison Office' in 
Geneva. For the ITF, however, the ISF was a very congenial source of 
substantial funding. The ITF argued, and the ICFTU implicitly conceded, that 
since the ISF's money came from national centres which invariably included a 
strong contingent of transport workers' unions, the ITF had a claim to the ISF's 
support for its regional projects. By the end of the period a second source of 
funding had emerged in the shape of assistance from national centres, the first 
benefit to the ITF being the Ell 7,945 which Game from Sweden over the period 
from 1962 to 1964 at the behest of its Swedish affiliates. None of that money 
was earmarked by the donors and the ITF was free to apply it as it thought best. 
The'challenge of bilateralism', as Carew termed it, when national donors would 
expect to have the final say in how their money was used, had still to come. 105 
The income, expenditure and sources of the ITF's regional activities funds are 
set out in Table 9. 
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The ITF was to find that coming to an arrangement directly with the ICFTU over 
funding was far easier than agreeing with the other ITSs on how they all, as a 
body, should deal with the ICFTU on ISF funds and their distribution, The ITSs 
based in Geneva (the great majority) promoted the establishment of an 'ITS 
Liaison Committee' in 1961 which wanted the ISF to give the ITSs a bloc 
allocation and then leave them to divide it up among themselves at an ITS 
General Conference. An 'ITS Liaison Office' was set up to administer that and 
other co-ordination efforts. Nedzynski recalls that the idea of a bloc allocation 
had once appealed to Becu as General Secretary of the ITF but, as General 
Secretary of the ICFTU, he yielded to Nedzynski's insistence that the ISF deal 
with applications from individual ITSs on their merits. Becu convinced himself 
that the Geneva group had broader intentions to set up some kind of rival force to 
the ICFTU. True or not, Nedzynski's judgment is that the ICFTU's relations with 
the Geneva-based ITSs were 'poisoned' and De Vries backed Becu by 
persuading the ITF EC in April 1962 to withdraw all support from the ITS Liaison 
Committee. It was a heavy blow to the Geneva group and the ITS Liaison Office 
was eventually wound up in September 1965, having long lost any real influence 
or purpose. 106 
For all the efforts directed to co-ordination and divisions of labour, the ITF in 
practice ploughed its own regional furrows. The 1956 Congress asked the EC to 
set up a special sub-committee 'to work out a basic programme of activities' 
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and it did so in January 1957. What then became a 'standing' committee of the 
EC, was mandated to 'apply itself systematically to ... intensifying and extending 
the regional activibes'. In December 1958, the EC designated it as the Regional 
Affairs Committee (RAC) and scheduled R to meet immediately before every EC 
meeting. Its'main tasks'were toexamine requests for [financial] assistance' 
and 'to direct the acbvities; of the regional office and sub-offices', including 'the 
setting up [of] fully fledged regional organizations. ' 107 
That last objective was probably no more than warm words at the time, without 
much thought given either to its structural implications for the ITF as a whole or 
to what exactly was on offer. As will be seen below (p99), when it came to taking 
tentative steps towards 'regional organization' in Asia, 'fully fledged' was not to 
be countenanced. Nor did the membership of the RAC in its early years signify 
any great faith in those who actually represented the regions. The likes of Lyon 
and Cousins gave the RAC a lot of weight, but it was not until late 1960 that the 
EC agreed to give the co-opted members of the EC from the regions (see above) 
the right to sit in on RAC meetings where they could observe, but not vote. By 
then, however, the RAC had only two years to run. The first full meeting of the 
new and far more representative Executive Board decided in November 1962 
that the RAC was no longer needed. 108 
The first'Director of Regional Affairs', Ray Coutts, was appointed in September 
1957 with a general brief to promote and look after the ITF's regional activities. 
[90] 
Seconded from the American Train Dispatchers' Association (ATDA) and Lyon's 
nominee, he was recalled to the USA within months to take over his union when 
its President died suddenly. 10 His two successors, Pieter de Vries and Reint 
Laan Jr, have both been discussed above in other contexts and neither served 
for any length of time in this particular post. When De Vries became General 
Secretary he decided he would cover regional affairs himself. 
The ITF's standard procedure, taking a lead from the ICFTU, was to establish a 
physical presence in a region by basing a representative there, usually backed 
by a very modest office. The first examples, however, had specific sectoral 
objectives. George Reed of the British NUS arrived in Singapore in March 1948 
to help Asian seafarers' unions secure recruitment and engagement systems that 
were clean of corruption. Seafarers' interests also prompted the opening of a 
Regional Information Office in Bombay early in 1949, directed part-time by 
D. Mungat, General Secretary of the MUI, the Indian seafaring officers'union. 110 
The first attempt to establish a general regional presence followed a visit by Becu 
and the Spanish (exiled) member of the EC, Trif6n G6mez, to Cuba in August 
1951, when they arranged the opening of aLatin American Subsecretariat' in 
Havana eady in 1952. The timing was not good. Very soon afterwards, the 
dictator, Fulgencio Batista, seized power and his regime quickly made the office's 
work impossible. The EC decided in February 1953 to close it. M 
[91J 
As the funds increased and the organizational and political imperatives became 
more pressing, the ITF's regional effort became more strategic and lost its 
sectoral emphasis. It had a sad setback, however, in Latin America when 
G6mez collapsed and died in October 1955 a few days before the start of an ITF 
Latin American Conference in Mexico City. As the ITF's first regional 
representative, he had opened an ITIF office there six months previously. 
Lorenzo Martinez, the ITF secretariat's Spanish translator/interpreter was left in 
Mexico City to direct the office 'temporarily' and the conference approved the 
setting up of a 'Regional Office Consultative Council'. 112 
Meanwhile, the first ITF Asian Regional Conference had been held in Tokyo in 
April 1955, mustering representatives from twenty-six unions (mostly non- 
affiliates). The conference called for'the establishment of an Asian office with a 
view to creating an Asian regional organization' and the EC approved the 
proposal within weeks, helped by an offer of furnished accommodation in the 
Tokyo headquarters of the Japanese National Railway Workers' Union (Kokuro). 
The ITIF Asian Regional Office was opened in Tokyo in November 1955, in the 
charge of Joviano (Joe) Soares, a former official of the Indian MUI who had 
succeeded Mungat at the ITIF Bombay office. 113 
Africa, where the ITF was most weakly represented, was the last of the regions 
to have attention. It began with a mission to West, Central and Southern Africa 
[921 
by Becu, with Ken Golding as his aide, early in 1957 - the first time an ITF 
General Secretary had made an official visit to the continent. The experience, 
particularly his first-hand encounters with Rhodesian and South African racism, 
clearly made a very deep impression on him. The EC approved the 
establishment of an ITF African Office in Lagos, under the 'honorary' direction of 
Michael Labinjo, the Nigerian who represented Africa as a co-opted member of 
the EC. It opened for business early in 1959.114 
And so by 1960, the ITF had bases in all three regions, albeit very small, 
commonly of just the one regional representative with minimal office help. The 
representatives' first duty was to seek out the transport workers' unions in their 
region and to make contact with as many of them as possible. Those that 
measured up generally to the ITF's ideas of what constituted a genuine and free 
union (many did not) would be offered its help and guidance if they wanted it. 
Though affiliation was not a priority, applications were welcomed. The regional 
offices and the representatives became part listen ing-stations, part clinics, part 
facilitators and part filters. By the end of the period they were increasingly 
engaged in devising and organizing trade union training programmes and 
seminars, nationally and regionally. 
The location of the offices and the personnel were to change periodically as 
circumstances or convenience dictated. The Asian regional office was moved 
[93] 
from Tokyo, expensive and geographically inconvenient, to Singapore in July 
1959, leaving Tokyo with a purely Japanese Office. Soares, who had also 
directed the ICFTUs Singapore Office, left in 1963 and was succeeded by 
Donald U'ren, the General Secretary of the Railwaymen's Union of Malaya 
(RUM), at which point the regional office was taken to Kuala Lumpur. 115 
De Vries visited Lagos in November 1959 and 'investigated certain events 
involving Brother Labinjo and the Nigerian TUC'. The'events'were never 
elucidated, but were serious enough for Labinjo to be asked to resign 
immediately as ITF representative and from the EC. It was not until February 
1961 that a new representative was found in Emile Laflamme, a local official of 
the American sheet metal workers' union (which had members in the railroad 
workshops and belonged to the RLEA). Born and brought up in a small French- 
speaking community in New England, he was expected to cover the hitherto 
largely neglected Francophone Africa as well as 'West Africa. 116A young 
African-American, Walter Townsend, a member of the American Brotherhood of 
Railway Clerks, was asked in September 1961 to carry out an 'extended tourof 
East and Central Africa, Aden, Somalia and Liberia. His appointment as the 
ITF's representative for East and Central Africa was confirmed in July 1962 and 
he worked out of Nairobi without office help until he decided to return to the 
United States in May 1965.117 
[941 
Lorenzo Martinez endured his 'temporary' posting in Mexico City for four years, 
but it was literally a life-threatening place for a middle-aged man with a heart 
condition. Much loved and respected by his colleagues in the Secretariat, the 
Socialist veteran of the Spanish civil war returned to London at the end of 1959 
and retired. He had been given some relief with the appointment in November 
1958 of a young American, Bob Houke, as a representative in 'southern' Latin 
America, working from Montevideo (but without an office). But Houke decided he 
did not want to succeed Martinez and gave notice of his resignation in August 
1960.118 
De Vries proposed, and the MC agreed, that Francisco (Fernando) Azaha 
Zugazagoitia, the ITF's Spanish translator-interpreter should go to Lima, Peru, as 
the ITFs representative and set up a regional office there. When exactly 
Fernando Azaha came to the ITF remains, appropriately, a mystery. His 
appointment escapes mention (almost certainly a simple oversight) in the listings 
of the Secretariat in the Congress Reports on Activities and routine staff 
appointments were not always reported to the MC, though formally they should 
have been. However, he did not arrive before February 1959 (as will shortly be 
confirmed) and he is named as a member of the Secretariat team at the 1960 
Congress. Even at the earlier end of that range, his time in London before his 
departure to Lima was short, but long enough for his colleagues to be won over 
by the warmth of his huge personality and to be astounded at the speed, 
[95] 
accuracy and elegance of his translations. All that was first known of him was 
that he had been working as a translator for the British govemment's Central 
Office of Information but he soon filled in the background. He was a nephew of 
Manuel Azafia, the last President of the Spanish Republic, had escaped from 
Spain in 1939, had joined the South African Air Force and had become almost 
the personal pilot of the American 'Vinegar Joe' General Stillwell in the Burma 
campaign of 1942-43. He always insisted he would spurn Spanish citizenship 
and never return to Spain until democracy was restored. His war service had 
earned him the right to live in Great Britain as a stateless person and to travel on 
a British Home Office travel document. He had earned his living as a test pilot of 
military aircraft for Latin American governments after the war until his girth (which 
was immense) made it impossible to squeeze him into cockpits. 119 
Within three months of his arrival in Lima he had organized in March 1961 a very 
successful regional conference, hyperbolically reported one month later in the 
ITF Joumal, together with an extraordinarily gushing 'Profile' ('... easy to use 
superlatives about Fernando, because so many of them are justified'). 120 
The Report on Activities to the 1962 Congress claimed 'an unprecedented 
expansion' in the ITF's Latin American activities and 'the greater part' of it was 'to 
be ascribed to [his] untiring efforts'. At the Congress itself, he spoke four times, 
extraordinary prominence for a member of the secretariat and even more 
extraordinary for his having actually moved an emergency resolution on behalf of 
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the EC. He was a Congress hero, defying the golpistas, the Latin American 
military coup-makers, to do their worst. 121 
De Vries had begun to think of him as a possible solution to his Imhof problem 
and the idea had already survived a serious and unexpected test. On 
8 February 1962, the Argentinian Ambassador in London had a letter delivered 
by hand to De Vries, asking whether the ITF's Fernando Azaha was the same 
Fernando Azaha whom the embassy 'Office of the Air Attach6' had dismissed in 
February 1959 'for fraud and falsification'. The question, he explained, was 
relevant since the ITF was currently involved in an industrial action against an 
Argentinian ship. De Vries asked Azaha for his comments and, though it took 
him weeks to give them, they so satisfied De Vries that he wrote to the 
Ambassador on 10 April 1962 to say that he stood by him: Azaha may have 
been foolish but had been punished enough by the effect and shame of his 
dismissal. Azaha's defence is nowhere on record and it is impossible to judge 
whether it justified De Vries's response. No more was ever heard from the 
embassy. The military coup which deposed President Frondizi at the end of 
March 1962 would anyway have given them other priorities. 122 
Az5na's Congress triumph would subsequently have turned De Vries's mind 
once more to Az5na's advancement, but the only written reference to the 
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possibility came when it was again in doubt. If you want to reach 'the very top', 
De Vries wrote to Azaha on 1 August 1963, 'the point of no return [agreeing to 
run for General Secretary in 19651 is getting closer. But if De Vries was to help 
him, he needed to know what was going on in Latin America and 
communications had almost completely broken down: one letter and six cables in 
three months, no report on activities since December 1962 and no accounts for 
the first quarter of 1963. They would have to move the office if that was the only 
way to improve communications. 123 
But communications did not improve at all and by the end of the year'rumours of 
financial mismanagement' in Lima had reached De Vries, who puta list of 
questions'to Azaha. He was still waiting for an answer when, on 7 February 
1964, Azaha was expelled from Peru on the general allegation of creating 
'disruption'. De Vries hastily organized an ITF mission, consisting of Hans Daby, 
the ITF's Vice President; Rudy Faupl, the International Representative of the 
American Machinists (IAM) and a member of the ILO Governing Body; Herminio 
Alonso, the Argentinian member of the EB; and Ken Golding as secretary and 
interpreter. A first stop in Washington DC allowed for consultations with the 
American State Department and a meeting with the Peruvian ambassador, both 
confirming that the expulsion by the ruling junta was a political act (the 
ambassador thought it was 'probably' because Azaha was a 'communist'). 
Azaha, whom the mission met in Panama City, was convinced that his 
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expulsion was in reprisal for his denunciation of the military coup which had 
annulled the result of the 1962 elections. (By 1964, Peru in fact had an elected 
President, BelaOnde Terry, but military influence could never be discounted. ) The 
mission's general conclusion, confirmed by the Peruvian affiliates, was that there 
were no justifiable political reasons for Azaha's expulsion. But it also established 
that Azaha had indeed recklessly used and misappropriated ITF funds, dabbling 
in a variety of private enterprises and indulgences (bull-fighting especially) at the 
ITF's expense or financed from loans taken on the strength of its name. It also 
discovered incidentally that he had travelled on a Spanish passport and was on 
good terms with the Spanish ambassador. 124 
Azaha resigned before De Vries could use the authority he had from the MC to 
dismiss him. He was not heard of again for several years until the ITIF was 
advised that he had died in a run-down London hotel, where he had worked as 
the night manager. The Lima office was taken over by Joaquin (Jack) Otero, a 
young and very energetic Hispanic American, a member of the American railway 
clerks (BRAC) who had been working for the ITIF in Brazil. He was confirmed as 
Azaha's successor by the EB in June 1964, but only after 'considerable 
discussion' in which Alonso was also proposed, presumably by the second Latin 
American member, Humberto Hernandez of Venezuela. Alonso and Hernandez 
would have accounted for the two votes against Otero and, though they did not 
say so, they would have shared the deep regret of most Latin American affiliates 
[991 
that the EB had not recognized that Azaha's fecklessness was a small price to 
pay for his inspirational leadership. 125 
One general question remains in this inevitably concise review of regional 
structures, namely the progress made during the period towards the creation of 
the 'fully-fledged regional organizations' envisaged by the EC in December 1958 
(see p89). Two years later, the ITF's second Asian regional conference, held in 
Kuala Lumpur in November 1960, decided that'creating consultative and 
advisory bodies at regional or sub-regional level' would be one way to 'intensify' 
the ITF's Asian activities and asked the EC 'urgently' to consider that step. The 
EC meeting in April 1961 saw the'obvious merit'of asking for no more than an 
'advisory' body, noting that the ICFTU had had 'considerable' problems setting 
the terms of reference of its regional bodies, with demands for regional autonomy 
from one side and the 'insistence' of the ICFTU governing bodies from the other 
on retaining their 'ultimate authority' over regional 'actions or decisions. More 
positively, an 'Asian Advisory Committee (AAC)'could be seen as giving the 
Asian affiliates a say in the ITF's affairs that better reflected the significance of 
their actual, rather than 'paid-up' membership (see above). Here was a way to 
satisfy the Asian affiliates' desire for some kind of formal regional voice, whilst 
keeping the process under the control of the EC, which would appoint the AAC's 
six 'ordinary' members from among the Asian affiliates' nominations. 
Furthermore, the ITF's Asian representative would be the AACs secretary and 
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the Asian member of the EC would be a member of the AAC ex officio. The 
AAC's terms of reference would simply be 'to advise or make recommendations 
to the Executive Committee on any matters concerning the ITF's Asian affiliates, 
either individually or collectively'. 126 
The AAC met twice before the end of the period: in Tokyo in April 1962 and in 
Manila in February 1964. The Asian representatives at the ITF's 1965 Congress 
demanded a meeting with the Secretariat to discuss 'ways and means of making 
the Asian Advisory Committee a more effective body' but they are recorded only 
as having put forward nominations for consideration in the impending review of 
the membership. They were given no warning of what the new EB would have in 
mind in November 1965: that the Asian affiliates should make 'special payments' 
towards the expenses of the AAC's 'ordinary' members - and should make them 
retroactively towards the Manila meeting. It was an approach hard to square with 
the assurance circuladzed a few weeks previously to the Asian affiliates, few of 
which could afford to pay affiliation fees at the standard rate, that the ITF's 'aim' 
was 'to gradually increase its [the AAC's] importance to the point where it can 
become a true regional organization similar, for example, in function and scope 
to the regional organizations of the ICFTU'. Perhaps the assumption was that 
the Japanese would pick up the bill. The Asians at least had no reason to feel 
singled out for belt-tightening. The same EB meeting authorized the General 
Secretary to prepare the introduction of a Latin American advisory committee, 
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one half of the costs of which were to be borne by the region's affiliates. 127 
A Industrial Sections 
The 1946 Constitution laid down (Rule X11 (1)) that'matters affecting the workers 
of particular branches of transport shall be dealt with in the first instance by the 
industrial sections' and then named seven of them: seafarers, fishermen, inland 
navigation workers, I waterside workers' (thereafter 'dockers'), railwaymen, road 
transport workers and 'civil aviation personnel'. The list held good to the end of 
the period, though the inclusion of a civil aviation section was premature, as it 
was not formally established until May 1949, and the seafarers and dockers 
produced an off-spring, the 'Special Seafarers' Section', to cover flag-of- 
convenience (f-o-c) activities. 128 
Few changes of any substance were made in the constitutional treatment of the 
sections to the end of the period. They were always given great leeway in the 
way they managed themselves. Section conferences had to be convened during 
a Congress and those conferences could elect section chairmen, vice chairmen 
and section committees. They all did so, but constitutionally even those 
formalities were a 'may' not a 'shall'. 129 They could set up other committees or 
bodies as they felt fit and plan other conferences or meetings of all kinds, though 
meetings needed EC/EB approval because of their budgetary and staffing 
implications. The sections also had a very large measure of autonomy in 
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deciding on their various activities and policies. They had specialized expertise 
and expedence to meet specialized needs, whilst the ITF's general interests 
were met by the governing bodies. There were bound, however, to be areas and 
occasions where or when both the sectional and general interests were in play. 
There could also be conflicts of policy among the sections themselves: for 
example, there might be disagreements over issues of general transport policy. 
Or sections could decide on actions, say, in the course of the seafarers' and 
dockers' campaign against flags-of-convenience, which carried great financial or 
legal consequences for the ITF. A provision of the revised Constitution of 1962 
(Rule XV (5)) was intended to remove any doubt about who had the last word in 
such instances, prescribing that any section decision 'which affects, directly or 
indirectly, the affairs of the Federation as a whole or of any other section or 
sections shall be given effect only after endorsement by the Executive Board. ' 130 
The largest and busiest of the sections, such as the seafarers, dockers, 
railwaymen and civil aviation workers, were larger and busier than many an ITS 
of the period. For a large proportion of the affiliates, the section activities were 
their strongest reason for belonging to the ITF and the strongest justification of 
the expense of affiliation that they could make to their members. The issues 
discussed in the sections were of direct and often critical interest, to the rank- 
and-file. The Seafarers' Section was bound always to come first to mind in 
contemplating international action because it had always been the case, and was 
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bound always to be so, that national unions of seafarers were impotent without 
strong international alliances. The flag-of-convenience phenomenon was only 
the most spectacular instance of how international the shipping industry would 
always be. But even in sectors as nominally national as railways, the managerial 
policies, working practices and technological developments were remarkably 
uniform across frontiers and the railwaymen's unions needed to consult closely 
and often if they were not to be caught off their guard. In the ports, 
mechanization was being rapidly introduced and towards the end of the pedod 
widespread containerization, with its enormous potential impact on dockers'jobs, 
was close to general introduction. These were internabonal innovations with 
international repercussions to which national dockers' unions had to present a 
united international front. If it did nothing else, the ITF provided the international 
machinery for the transport workers' unions to know exactly what was happening 
in their industry and how other unions were coping with identical challenges. 
xii. Finance 
The ITF's finances over the period were simply structured and transparent. A 
professionally audited Financial Report was attached to the Report on Activities 
made to each Congress. Financial reports were made meanwhile to each 
meeting of the EC/EB and to most MC meetings. Almost all the ITFs basic costs 
and activities were financed by affiliation fees. The standard rate of fee was fixed 
at each Congress in sterling pence per affiliated member, for example, 6d. per 
member as the period ended but rising to 8d. from January 1966.131 
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Chapter IV: Membership 
i. More than European: enter the American railwayme 
Oldenbroek put a paper to the ITF Executive Committee in November 1944 on The 
General Situation and the Future Programme and Policy of the ITF. I The ITF, he 
observed, had 'never at any moment succeeded in becoming an organization world- 
wide in the real sense of the term ... the task has so far been beyond its powers'. 
But 'it would seem a justifiable assumption' that after the war 'there will be a forward 
surge in international trade union organization and that throughout the world trade 
unionism will gain in influence and power'. The ITF would have to concentrate its 
efforts 'to embrace the whole of the transport workers in its ranks'. 2 'During the 
whole of its existence, ' he continued, 'the international trade union movement has 
based its activity on European conceptions'. 3 Oldenbroek saw that as a deterrent, 
for example to 'the American organizations' which 'would never be prepared to join 
the ITF if they were required to subscribe to socialist principles ... What matters is 
that the organizations affiliated with the ITF should be prepared to act together for 
the realization of a common programme, whilst retaining their autonomy... '. 4 
Oldenbroek's reference to the 'American' unions provides the best starting point for 
an examination of the particular elements and events which shaped the general 
post-war complexion of the ITF's membership, for none was more significant than the 
arrival of the Americans. On 1 January 1946 the ITIF had only one affiliate in the 
USA, the Seafarers' International Union of North America (SIU), with a substantial, 
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but in ITF terms unremarkable, affiliated membership of 40,000. Its affiliation in 1942 
had been the first and, for some six years, the only gain to be had from a sustained 
effort by the ITF to win a sizeable and committed American membership. 5 The ITF 
had opened its New York office in May 1941 to provide trade union services and 
general welfare assistance to Allied merchant seafarers who found themselves in the 
USA. It was managed until the end of 1943 by an ITF envoy, Omer Becu, a former 
merchant marine radio officer and leader of the Belgian maritime officers' 
organization within the Belgian Transport Workers' Union. Both he and his cause 
soon won the SIU's moral and financial Support 6 and the SIU's affiliation was always 
a possibility. The USA's entry into the war in December 1941 made it a certainty. 
But it was the affiliation of the American railwaymen's unions that Becu, with 
Oldenbroek's clear encouragement, made the ITF's principal aim when the New York 
office's brief was extended beyond simply seafarers' interests. The 'railroad 
brotherhoods', Becu wrote, were among the'oldest and strongest' unions in the 
American movement, with a membership in the region of 420,000. All of them were 
autonomous but they negotiated jointly. Some of them, for example the powerful 
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, were affiliated with the AFL, but the brotherhoods 
were a 'solid group in no way involved in the controversy between the AFL and CIO', 
the two competing national centres. 7AImost all of them for almost all of the period 
(there were periodic comings and goings) belonged to the Railway Labor 
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Executives' Association (RLEA) with which Becu and Oldenbroek had first had a 
meeting when Oldenbroek visited the USA in October 1941 for an ILO International 
Labour Conference. The RLEA was in almost every way an unusual body (of which 
more below) but it was the nearest anything came to providing joint representation of 
the numerous craft unions in which American railwaymen were exclusively 
organized. 
The official version of the events which later led to the 'effective', that is, real, 
affiliation of the RLEA in March 1947, as against its initially 'token' membership, is a 
tale of dogged persuasion, told over three pages of report to the ITF's Oslo Congress 
in July 1948.8 The RLEA, it explained, had been accepted as a'token' affiliate'at 
the end of 19469 on payment of a 'nominal' $1,000.10 A meeting of the RLEA in 
September 1946 had received three ITF emissaries - Godart Joustra, President of 
the Netherlands Railwaymen's Union and a member of the ITF Executive Board; 
Paul Tofahrn, the ITF Assistant General Secretary; and Willy Dorchain, Becu's 
successor as Manager of the ITF's New York office - who had gone on to visit 
'several organizations affiliated with the RLEA'. The outcome of all that activity 
(cause and effect are clearly assumed) was the RLEA's 'effective' entry. 
Nothing in this account is untrue, but it is a very pallid and incomplete record of a 
much longer and more complicated process, largely driven by motives and 
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interventions that Oldenbroek most certainly knew of but evidently thought it best to 
suppress from the public account (or indeed from reports to his own governing 
bodies). 
There was, fortunately, one key actor who was uniquely placed to witness at first- 
hand, and later to record, what really happened. A. E. ('Art') Lyon, Vice Chairman of 
the RLEA at the time, remembered clearly 11 the'young lawyer from Oregon'who 
sought out some of the RLEA officers at one of their regular meetings in 'the winter of 
1942-1943', identified himself as representing the government's Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), later to become the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and asked 
their help for the war effort. He explained that'the European counterparts of 
American labor organizations, especially those engaged in transportation and in such 
international commerce as still existed', would be valuable sources for intelligence 
gathering. The RLEA could help the OSS by finding 'suitably qualified persons from 
the ranks of its organizations who could be sent to several points in war-torn Europe, 
ostensibly as goodwill ambassadors but in reality as OSS observers, reporters or 
agents'. All the expenses would be met from anonymous deposits by the OSS into a 
special RLEA account. The RLEA's officers agreed 'off the record' (that is, secretly) 
to do their patriotic best. And so it was that Frank K. Switzer, a crew despatcher on 
the Wabash Railroad in Missouri went to London 'after three weeks of training' in 
May 1943 and 'got an office with the ITF'. 12 Switzer himself told Lyon many years 
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later that his 'contacts' included 'of course' Oldenbroek (as well as King Haakon of 
Norway and Ernest Bevin) but he seems not to have explained their relationship in 
any detail. 13Exact/y who knew what about Switzer's operations (or about a similar 
exercise in Stockholm from August 1943 to the end of the war carded out by a 
Swedish-born American railroad conductor from Montana, Victor Sjaholm14) it is 
impossible now to prove, but Lyon's surmise that Switzer's contacts knew what he 
was really up to, 'that he was, in reality, an agent for the US government', 15 is almost 
certainly correct in the case of Ernest Bevin; is perhaps less certain in the case of 
King Haakon; but is absolutely correct, surely, in the case of Oldenbroek. By May 
1943 the ITF secretariat was only a dozen strong, most of them housed in a London 
office which was too small to hide an unknown American at work in it. It is very 
unlikely anyway that the OSS, which valued Oldenbroek's and the ITF's co-operation 
highly, would have kept him completely in the dark - or that, if they had tried to, he 
would not very quickly have seen through the'cover' (and connived at it). But, 
whether by ignorance or design, the only mention of Switzer in the ITF's public 
records is his attendance at an ITF Railwaymen's Conference in London on 28 and 
29 September 1943 where, together with 'J. A. Phillips ', he represented the RLEA. 16 
('J. A. Phillips'was President of the Order of Conductors and a member of the small 
'liaison committee' within the RLEA which had sanctioned collaboration with the 
OSS. )17 
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Switzer's assignment was brief. He was recalled in December 1943 and the RLEA 
was not asked to replace him. Lyon admits ruefully that the RLEA promptly 'closed 
the book' on international involvement and 'to a considerable degree we returned to 
the traditional indifference concerning world labor affairs which had prevailed before 
the war. ' 18 
But for the intervention of George Harrison, International President of the 
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks and a very powerful figure within the AFL, the 
'indifference' would have been prolonged, for all the lobbying of Willy Dorchain, who 
had succeeded his compatriot, Becu, as head of the ITF New York office. He was, 
writes Lyon, 'familiar with what was going on in the European labor movement, 
especially with the efforts of international communism, with the help of the British 
Trades Union Congress and the foolish and status-seeking CIO, to dominate labor 
organizations in all parts of the world. 19 On Harrison's recommendation the RLEA 
gave the ITF a 'contribution' of $1,000 to stiffen its resolve. The rigorously 
parsimonious Harrison ('as tight [with RLEA funds] as the paint on a billiard ball') was 
certainly not proposing affiliation which would have involved paying fees calculated 
on the RLEA's huge membership. 'General Secretary Jacobus H. Oldenbroek of the 
ITF and his Executive Committee', wrote Lyon, 'saw fit to record this $1,000 per year 
contribution as a "token affiliation" of the RLEA. We thought of it as a donation to a 
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good cause and not in any way obligating us or giving us the benefits (if any) of 
affiliation. 120 
Oldenbroek made the most of the misapprehension. 'In spite of its unusual name, ' 
he explained to the ITF Executive Committee meeting on 14 and 15 January 1946, 
'this organization [the RLEA] is a federation. Nevertheless, the autonomy of the 
component unions is complete... ' The Executive Committee was told that the ITF 
Management Committee had accepted this 'application' and 'also the token 
payment ... but expected to negotiate further about the amount ... for 1946. ' The 
21 Executive Committee then 'confirmed'the Management Committee's decision. 
Asked by Charles Garcias, the left-wing leader of the French Road Transport 
Workers' Union (F6d6ration des Moyens de Transport), whether the RLEA could 
attend and vote at the forthcoming ZOrich Congress, Oldenbroek replied that it could 
attend and vote 'in proportion' to the $1,000 it had paid. 22 
Oldenbroek almost certainly knew that he was on the shakiest of constitutional 
ground but was spared any challenge from the likes of Garcias because the RLEA 
sent no-one to Zurich. There would anyway have been no problem if the RLEA had 
yielded to the desperate pleas of the AFL to a RLEA meeting in April 1946 to affiliate 
fully and formally in time to go to Zurich and help the ITF resist a 'swing to the left' 
and absorption 'by the WFTU'. If affiliation fees were'the final element', then 
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President Green and Secretary-Treasurer Meany of the AFL were ready to'discuss' 
them. 23 But even the AFL's pressure and inducements were not enough. Nor 
were further visits to the USA from Oldenbroek himself soon after the Zbrich 
Congress, followed by the Joustra, Tofahrn and Dorchain 'delegation' in September 
1946, which was not at all as productive as the ITF reports implied. 24 
Lyon declared it 'a failure'. The 'inept' Tofahrn was 'too much of a theorist and 
intellectual muddler' to deal with 'our pragmatic and hard-headed American trade 
union leaders' and 'his performance ... had the result of delaying the RLEA's affiliation 
to the ITF for some six months'. 25 (Lyon's distaste for Tofahrn's manner and politics 
was, if anything, to grow with closer acquaintance. 26) As Lyon had shrewdly 
guessed, however, Oldenbroek had 'asked for and got a promise of [the AFL's] co- 
operation'. 27The Cold War had begun and the game was now for far higher stakes. 
Even the austere Lyon describes with some feeling the stirring message brought to 
the RLEA meeting on 25 February 1947 by Mathew Woll, a Vice President of the 
AFL and head of its Free Trade Union Committee. The ITF had to be supported in 
standing up to 'bloody Joe Stalin's' plan to 'dominate or communize' Europe. Some 
of the ITF's affiliates were 'weak and indecisive' in' the face of the threatened 
absorption of the ITF within the WFTU (see Chapter V) and 'it was vitally important 
for the American railwaymen's unions to get into the action and help see that such 
decision [on the ITF's autonomy] was on the side of freedom'. 28 
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The very next day the meeting decided to affiliate with the ITF for 705,882 members, 
'taking advantage of an existing "non-European" per capita tax [affiliation fee] rate' 
and so paying some $15,000 per year. 29 There was in fact no such thing as a "non- 
European" rate, only a lower rate of fee for 'organizations in underdeveloped 
countries ... commensurate with the standard of living and rates of wages' 30 the latter 
measure being the very last thing Harrison would have had in mind. He explained to 
Dorchain instead how cut-price fees would ease the RLEA's path to the ITF. 31 But 
the prize was anyway too big for the Executive Committee to haggle, the Constitution 
notwithstanding. It was decided even before the application arrived that it should be 
accepted "at half-rate", and so it was, with effect from 1 April 1947.32 
The profound and pervasive significance and consequences of the RLEA's affiliation 
will be apparent at many points in this thesis. The RLEA's protracted, wary (not to 
say suspicious), self-absorbed and un ashamed Iy 'patriotic' approach to affiliation 
needs to be borne in mind when it comes later to judgments of the American 
railwaymen's motives and actions over the period. But two points need to be made 
here to put the many references to the RLEA and its representatives in context. The 
first concerns the very nature of the RLEA as an organization. It simply and 
comprehensively was not, in any sense, the 'federation' that Oldenbroek had led the 
EC to believe it was in January 1946 (see p1 19). In reality, as Lyon explained almost 
two years later, 33the 'unusual name'described the RLEA very well. It consisted not 
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of the 'participating' unions (a revealingly vague status) but of their'chief executive 
officers' (in the American tradition, 'Presidents', some prefixed Masonically as 
'Grand'), of which he had previously been one himself. Perhaps aware that if he left 
it there the RLEA might seem no more than a club, he added that'it was much more 
than a personal association of these individuals' because the executives acted with 
their unions' backing. With one qualification, the RLEA's agenda was whatever the 
executives wanted it to be and 'the twenty organizations34 acted on many important 
matters' as 'a unit'. The one area which it never entered was collective bargaining. 
When it came to negotiations with the railroads, the brotherhoods did not look to the 
RLEA but formed their own 'co-operative groups or organizations'. In everyday 
reality the RLEA's preoccupation, and what its 'participating unions' would have seen 
as its real raison d'dtre, was what Lyon described as 'our relations with the Federal 
Government and its many agencies' and the 'numerous issues always before us 
requiring the services of aftorneys'. 35 The most important of those 'relations' and 
'issues' almost always involved the application or interpretation of the Railway Labor 
Act of 1934 or the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, the two great legislative 
foundations on which American railwaymen and their unions had built a body of 
rights and benefits, well in advance of those applied to the great majority of American 
workers. 36 The RLEA 'participating unions' were 'craft) unions and proud of it, and 
hypersensitive defenders of their territory and autonomy. 
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By keeping the RLEA's budget and its staff to the bare minimum they made sure that 
the RLEA as an organization (if that is what it was) was never given the means to 
assert itself autonomously even if it had wished to. The Executive Secretary was its 
only full-time officer, helped by a typist and sometimes by a clerk borrowed from one 
of the unions. 
The RLEA's structure (or lack of it) prompts the second general point to be made 
about its later r6le within the ITF, namely the degree to which its influence became 
personified for some twelve important years by Art Lyon. He had had to neglect 
'vastly more important work', he wrote, in making 'more than thirty trips abroad' and 
the RLEA's failure to appoint an International Representative was 'one of the worst' 
of 'many major mistakes'the RLEA made in his time. 37They had had such an 
officer very briefly from November 1947 to June 1948 when Bert Jewell, a retired 
President of the AFL Railway Employees Department - liked, respected, very keen 
and (best of all? ) ready to work just for his expenses - became the RLEA's member 
on the ITF Executive Committee. But his RLEA appointment was initially for six 
months only and in June 1948 the government made him a co-director (essentially 
the AFL's man) in the labour division of the Economic Co-operation Administration 
which oversaw the Marshall Plan (see Chapter V). An RLEA meeting shortly before 
the ITF's Oslo Congress in July 1948 'ordered' Lyon, by then Executive Secretary, to 
take over Jewell's functions in the ITF and he had them until he retired in 1962. 
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Lyon, as revealed in his memoirs, was a man of great diligence and deep 
seriousness. He disapproved scathingly of any kind of over-indulgence, especially 
when it involved breaches of his very tight moral boundaries. International activities 
may not have had priority in his idea of the Brotherhoods' agenda but they were far 
more than an opportunity to see and enjoy the world on Brotherhood expenses. He 
certainly had no wish to cut a dash on the international stage, for though his views on 
ITF business are often expressed vehemently in his memoirs, they were otherwise 
conveyed only in the small forum of the Executive Committee or in private exchanges 
with the ITF's General Secretary. He attended six consecutive ITF Congresses from 
1948 to 1958 but spoke only once, at Stuttgart in 1950, and then only to thank the 
German hosts for their hospitality. 38 Public, on-the-record, statements from the 
RLEA were rare and were often left to Harrison, who was added to the RLEA 
delegation (or added himself? ) if the business was thought to be worthy of his 
sonorous gravitas. 39 
Very few of even the leading lights of the ITF would have been aware of these 
realities of the RLEA's nature and operations. To the wider ITF world the 
technicalities were incidental: the RLEA was indeed for all practical purposes a 
'federation', as Oldenbroek had first presented it. The'agreed' initial membership of 
705,882 was, Lyon conceded, 'much too low'; the true total membership'was 
approximately a million and a quarter in 1947'. 40 By 1952 the total membership 
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(including 95,000 now identified as Canadian) rose to 928,777. In 1956 the RLEA 
became the first ITF affiliate ever to exceed one million members. In 1958 it reached 
a peak of 1,146,500 (125,000 in Canada). And then, in 1960, came a collapse to 
744,500, the loss being entirely from the United States membership (reduced from 
1,007,800 to 619,500). 41 
It was the first proof the ITF was to have of the RLEA's inherent fragility. Its existence 
had always depended on constitutional informality, on a consensus among 'chiefs' 
with very few enforceable procedures and obligations. That informality came 
at the high price of vulnerability to internal, often personal and destructive tensions 
when the chiefs fell out. 42 
ii. The American delinquents: the ILA, the Teamsters and ALPA 
The International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) was to provide the ITF's 
initiation into the seamier areas of American trade union life. The ILA had twice 
belonged to the ITIF for brief and unremarkable spells before the Second World War. 
Its heart and its headquarters were in New York and its greatest stronghold was in 
that city's turbulent port. At one time it had organized dockers on both the Atlantic 
and PacifiG coasts, but in the 1930s it had lost its membership on the Pacific coast to 
the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), a surely 
unique example of an Arnedcan union as far to the left as the ILA was to the right 
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(and associated with the WFTU throughout the period, of which more below). Yet 
even a truncated ILA was a very powerful force, the exclusive union for dockers in 
the Atlantic and Gulf ports and with a strong membership on the east coast of 
Canada. 
The membership of 75,000 for which the ILA affiliated in May 1950 was almost 
certainly well short of the real number but the ILA was a large and affluent affiliate of 
the AFL and the ITF would have taken it at its word. More importantly, there is no 
record of the ITF's knowing or worrying about the investigations, starting in 1948, of 
the New York Sun's Malcolm Johnson into the ILA's involvement in gangsterism on 
the New York waterfront. The AFL itself was slow off the mark but Johnson and 
others were exploring some very rich ground and in January 1953 the AFL Executive 
Council felt bound to take the unprecedented step of ordering the ILA to remove all 
officials who were corrupt or had criminal records. When the ILA refused to comply 
(other considerations aside, the order would probably have emptied many of its 
offices) the AFL Convention later in the year effectively expelled the ILA and set up a 
rival dockers' union, the 'International Brotherhood of Longshoremen (IBL)'. 43The 
President of the SIU, Paul Hall, no stranger himself to the more violent side of 
American industrial relations (see below), was deputed by the AFL to give the IBL 
(often literally) some muscle. 44 The approach of its London Congress in July 1954 
and the prospect of a by now embarrassing ILA presence there prodded the ITF 
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Executive Committee at its meeting on 14 and 15 July 1954, immediately before the 
Congress, into a suspension of the ILA's affiliation because it had failed the test of 
'democratic conduct of its affairs' required by Rule V (3) of the ITF Constitution. 45(l n 
1954 a classic film, On the Waterfront, provided a more dramatic indictment. ) 
In the event, the ILA's departure was quite short-lived. By 1955 the IBL was claiming 
it had won over a majority of the ILA's members46 but the truth was that the great 
majority of the ILA's members remained loyal to it and the removal of the most 
notoriously corrupt of its leaders, headed by its President Joseph P. Ryan, blunted 
any urge to replace the union itself. The new President, Thomas ('Teddy) W. 
Gleason, made conciliatory approaches to the ITF as an observer at its 1958 
Congress in Amsterdam and succeeded in rehabilitating the ILA within the AFL-CIO 
(as it had then become) in September 1959. By then he had negotiated a cease-fire 
with Hall and as part of the peace treaty the IBL (and Hall) saved some face by 
agreeing to'merge'with the ILA. The ITF Executive Committee agreed in November 
1959 that the ILA could be re-affiliated. 47 
Whatever was gained in membership and fees from the ILA's return had been offset 
exponentially some seven months previously with the departure of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IB7) or, as it was known throughout the USA and 
beyond, the 'Teamsters'. The Minutes of the Executive Committee meeting from 
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27 to 29 April 1959 record that the meeting considered a letter from the IBT 
announcing that it did not intend to pay any further affiliation fees 'until its difficulties 
with the AFL-CIO were resolved'. The Executive Committee 'accepted [the letter] as 
a notice of withdrawal by the IBT from membership [of the ITFI'. 48 The ILA hadGOme 
back with 80,000 members; the Teamsters had gone with the 500,000 on which it 
had last paid fees. (It had offered a very tempting 1,444,577 - so precise! - with 
effect from January 1959.49) 
There are other links that could have been made between the ILA and the IBT. 
When the AFL failed to wrest the dockers away from the ILA in December 1953, the 
Teamsters had suggested that they should be given jurisdiction in the ports. The 
AFL saw the danger (if not the irony) of the offer and set up the IBL instead. By early 
in 1956, the AFL-CIO, anxious to cleanse the movement before the United States 
Congress decided on further anti-trade union measures, was ordering the Teamsters 
to'sever' its unspecified but inevitably suspect 'financial relations'with the ILA. 50 But 
a much bigger chase was already on and in January 1957 the Senate gave Senator 
John L. McClellan the chairmanship of a special committee to investigate corruption 
in American industrial relations. The Senator and the committee's chief counsel, 
Robert Kennedy, had reputations to make and there could be no more dramatic way 
to make them than to flush out and slay that overweening monster of the labour 
movement, the Teamsters. The IBT was by far the biggest union in North America 
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and like most American unions (the railway brotherhoods were a notable exception), 
it recognized no bounds to its potential jurisdiction. It was a constant and voracious 
raider of other unions' territories, but to the general public the Teamsters meant truck 
drivers: stereotypical ly, the tough pilots of the huge road rigs which criss-crossed the 
country and had become the nation's primary carrier, but the drivers of almost 
everything else too. Robert Kennedy knew how the American people saw them and 
how, on the back of that perception, to raise the stakes: 
'At birth, it is a Teamster who drives the ambulance to the hospital. At 
death, a Teamster who drives the hearse to the grave. Between birth and 
death, it is the Teamsters who ... perform many other essential 
services ... 
[The Teamsters] are completely under the control and domination 
of corrupt officials at the top... ' 51 
His prime target by then was James Hoffa, the former Teamsters' Vice President 
who, late in 1957, had succeeded Dave Beck, the union's President since 1952. 
Beck had been the Senate Committee's and Kennedy's first big prize. Forced from 
office in November 1957 under a barrage of accusations that he had misappropriated 
hundreds of thousands of dollars of Teamsters money for his own use and comfort, 
Beck was found guilty of embezzlement in December 1957 and, all appeals 
exhausted, began a five-year term in prison in 1962.52 
[130] 
It was Beck, not Hoffa, who featured in the ITIF's involvement in the Teamsters 
imbroglio. Beck had attended the ITIF Congresses in 1954 and 1956. He said not a 
word at either, but his views on the ITIF and the American labour movement's mission 
in world affairs were set down in a Teamsters pamphlet, Beck Reports on Europe, in 
1954.53 He was given a real opportunity to make his international mark when he 
became one of four'co-opted' members of the ITIF Executive Committee in January 
1957 (see Chapter 111) but McClellan and Kennedy pursued him so persistently that 
he could attend only the one EC meeting, in June 1957. His decision 'not [to] seek 
re-election to office in his union' was noted in the report to the Amsterdam Congress 
in 1958.54 
His departure did not end the ITFs problem. The Teamsters' convention in the 
autumn of 1957 elected Hoffa - already marked out as the Teamster villain - as 
Beck's successor and in doing so theatrically snubbed the AFL-CIO Executive 
Council which had shortly beforehand ordered the Teamsters (and two other unions 
that were under suspicion) to clean up their house or face expulsion. A few weeks 
later, in December 1957, the AFL-CIO convention voted by five to one to expel the 
Teamsters. 55 
Despite the excitement in the USA, the Teamsters question was not so much as 
mentioned in- the ITF Executive Committee or Management Committee agendas of 
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1958 until the imminent arrival of a six-man delegation to the 1958 Congress, led by 
the influential Secretary-Treasurer, Harold J. Gibbons, gave the ITF's exposed 
situation some urgency. Often portrayed as an 'intellectual' or the Teamster's 
I respectable face', Gibbons perhaps had something to do behind the scenes with an 
extraordinary 'Statement' adopted unanimously by the Executive Committee meeting 
on 21 and 22 July, immediately before the Congress. 
It was, in fact, a non-Statement in the sense that it is headed 'Not for Publication' and 
is to be found only in the Executive Committee minutes. It left it to the'incoming' 
Executive Committee, yet to be elected at the Congress, to form an 'independent 
opinion'of thecontinued eligibility'of the Teamsters' affiliation. Any discussion of 
the Teamsters case should be 'excluded' from the Congress floor, if possible by 
agreement, but otherwise by an appropriate ruling from the President or the Standing 
Orders Committee. Gibbons would have savoured the 'Statement' all the more for its 
having been made in response to a cable from the President of the AFL-CIO 
confirming that the Teamsters had been expelled from the AFL-CIO and that 
(consequently unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO could not be associated in any 
organizational relationship with the [Teamsters]'. The Executive Committee 
members would also have seen a copy of a statement from the AFL-CIO on 
'Relations with ITSs'which recognized the ITSs' autonomy but urged them 'to act 
[132] 
speedily to rid themselves of these [Teamster] anti-union elements' . 56 
After more or less standing up to the AFL-CIO, however, the Executive Committee 
agreed that'no further payments should be accepted [from the Teamsters]... 
pending the inquiry to be made' and that'the IBT should not be eligible for a seat on 
the General Council ... until their status had been cleared Up'. 57 The incoming 
Executive Committee evidently 58 agreed immediately after the Congress that an ITF 
delegation made up of the (newly elected) President, Frank Cousins, the Chairman 
of the Management Committee, Tom Yates, and the General Secretary, Omer Becu, 
should visit the USA 'to study the present position of the Teamsters within the 
American trade union movement and to have preliminary discussions on the union's 
future relationship with the ITR The mission was carried out from 30 October to 
5 November 1958 59 and its members made their 'verbal' [sic] reports to the 
Executive Committee meeting in December 1958. It was a poorly attended meeting 
with only eight members present and with four apologies for absence, most notably 
from Lyon. It was agreed that the mission fell short of the status of the 'investigative 
body' originally envisaged (apparently) by the Executive Committee and that the 
reports made at the meeting were therefore no more than 'preliminary'. Discussion 
was put off until the next meeting, when it was hoped 'all members would be 
present'. 60 
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Why did the ITF find it so hard to decide what to do about the Teamsters? It was not 
a matter of asserting its autonomy: the AFL-CIO had explicitly recognized it. Money, 
even the big money the Teamsters were paying, 61 can have played no part: the ECs 
decision to accept no Teamster fees from mid-1 958 was calculated to prove that the 
ITF's reputation was not open to offers. Were there constitutional inhibitions? The 
ILA case did not amount to a convincing precedent. The corruption within the ILA, so 
the argument had run, had meant that its members had to grease the palms of ILA 
officials in order to get work. No real internal 'democracy' was possible within such a 
system. Was the undoubted corruption within the Teamsters of that kind or degree? 
While many of the very top people at the Teamsters' headquarters were guilty of the 
grandest of grand larcenies, thousands of Teamster officials and activists in the 
'locals', where most of the work and the bargaining were done, were pillars of their 
communities, as 'ethical'and 'democratic'as any to be found in the USA. If the 
Teamsters' bosses had stolen the union's money, then surely it was for the courts, 
not for the AFL-CIO and certainly not for the ITF, to deal with them? As for the 
Teamsters' members, the great majority had remained genuinely and voluntarily loyal 
to a union which they believed had delivered them just about the best pay, benefits 
and job security that a blue-collar worker could wish for. What provision exactly in 
the ITF Constitution had the Teamsters violated? 
Did Frank Cousins take that sceptical approach? General Secretary of the biggest 
union in Great Britain, Vice President of the ITF in 1956 and 1957 and its President 
[134] 
since the Amsterdam Congress in 1958, he was (and very much liked to be seen as) 
an unapologetic champion of the left. 62He would have had no time for the AFL-CIO 
and its unions which, as a species, he would have regarded as being politically and 
morally impoverished. Of the ITF's three investigators, Cousins looks the most likely 
to have wondered whether the Teamsters were a sacrificial offering to the anti-union 
forces in Congress and whether other AFL-CIO affiliates were really that much 
'cleaner'. Had he dared (no-one ever doubted his courage) to float those questions 
out loud during his encounter with the equally forthright George Meany, President of 
the AFL-CIO? It would have been a very dramatic event. 
As General Secretary, Becu may also have wondered about the constitutional 
position, but not for long, because Meany and Hall would have told him, in very short 
words that allowed no misunderstanding, that the ITF's hesitations were intolerable. 
Everything had by then come down to a matter of credibility. Who was to have it, the 
AFL-CIO or the Teamsters? How could the ITF allow the Teamsters to flaunt at 
international level the trade union credentials of which a massive majority of the 
American movement had stripped them? The Teamsters would not have disagreed 
with that assessment of the stakes but would have been much more relaxed about 
the outcome. If the ITF was ready to take their bait - the fees were petty cash to the 
Teamsters - all well and good; if not, tant pis! International standing mattered far 
less to the Teamsters than it did to the AFL-CIO. The Teamsters' anticlimacfic letter 
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of withdrawal from the ITF amounted to their recognition that if it came to a 
showdown the ITF would not dare risk the disaffection, under AFL-CIO pressure, of 
the rest of its American membership. There was still just enough time for the 
Teamsters to leave the ITF before they were shown the door. And so they did. 
As if the problems with the ILA and the Teamsters were not troublesome enough, the 
ITF Executive Committee had to find time, between contemplating the return of the 
one and the departure of the other, to suspend the American Air Line Pilots' 
Association (ALPA) and to recommend its expulsion to the General Council. These 
sanctions, the heaviest in the ITF's armoury, were imposed 'unanimously' at the EC 
meeting in December 1958 because ALPA'had not given any assurances regarding 
its acceptance of the ITF [cockpit] crew complement policies ... which it had 
consistently and flagrantly violated... ' 63 There was no comparison here with the ILA 
and the Teamsters cases, nothing to do with corruption or racketeering or with 
anything more 'unethical' than 'violation' of the Civil Aviation Section's policy on the 
composition of the crew in the cockpit of the new generation of jet airliners. 
ALPA unsuccessfully appealed to the General Council against its suspension on 
29 July 1960, immediately after the Berne Congress, and was expelled. 64 The ITF 
thus threw out the biggest and richest airline pilots' union in the world and one of its 
older American affiliates (from 1949). ALPA had also been one of the very few 
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pilots' organizations (they tended not to call themselves 'unions) to have associated 
itself internationally with other (inferior? ) categories. Almost all ALPA's peers 
preferred to keep their own company within the International Federation of Airline 
Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), in which ALPA was also the biggest member and a 
dominant influence. 
iii. The SIU saga: Hal Banks, Paul Hall, Ed Wilson and many more 
The ITFs next confrontation with an American affiliate, the last in the period and by 
far the most serious of all, began on 18 August 1960 when De Vries cabled the 
President of the Seafarers' International Union of North America (SIU), Paul Hall, and 
the President of the SIU's Canadian District, Hal Banks, 'expressing ... [the ITFsJ... 
concern at press reports that the Canadian District had promised financial and moral 
support to a group of British seamen who had taken unofficial strike action. ' Banks 
responded at once: the Canadian District was indeed 'giving financial and moral 
support to leaders and members of the National Union of Seamen [NUS] reform 
committee' and 'they are using our facilities'. He was convinced that the strike was 
'supported by [a] majority of members of [the N US]'. De Vries reacted to this 
broadside in a cable the next day (19 August 1960) to Hall, with a copy to Banks, 
pointing out that the Canadian District was part of the ITF by virtue of the SIU's 
affiliation and its actions were an 'unwarranted interference in internal domestic 
dispute of non-Canadian union'. Hall was urged to use his Muence'to dissuade 
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Banks from present action'. Hall waited four days before advising De Vries that the 
Canadian District was 'completely autonomous'. De Vries should therefore have a 
meeting with Banks in Montreal 'to settle the issue' and Hall would be ready to sit in 
on it. The Canadian District's 'autonomy' within the SlU was neither here nor there, 
De Vries, replied. Hall was President of the affiliated organization and the'man we 
must approach'. Further exchanges included a proposal from Hall for a meeting, if 
not in New York then in 'London, Liverpool or any other British port', comprising NUS 
officers and Banks - and such British seamen as cared to come. The proposal came 
on the day (20 September 1960) that the British Daily Telegraph carried Banks's 
declaration that the Canadian SlU would continue its support for the unofficial strikers 
because British seamen were badly served by an 'undemocratic' union. Yates 'is not 
a bad old guy, but he earned a knighthood and now he has to justify it by looking 
after the interests of the British shipowners, ' 65 
The Management Committee was advised of all these exchanges at its meeting on 
29 September 196066and, in what it probably regarded as very conciliatory 
response, invited Hall to a meeting early in October with the NUS, the Chairman of 
the Seafarers' Section (Doug Tennant of the British Merchant Navy and Airline 
Officers' Association - MNAOA), and De Vries. The ITF President 
(Roger Dekeyzer) 
was to take the chair. But Hall, who had been elected Vice Chairman of the ITF 
Seafarers' Section only some two months previously, was never likely to accept an 
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invitation which so pointedly omitted Banks or to accept an agenda which had as 'the 
only issue' the question of whether the Canadian District's acbons constituted 
'interference' in the NUS's 'domestic affairs'. 67The ITF was not ready, as Banks so 
insistently was, to discuss the causes of the unofficial strike and the meebng was 
therefore still-born. Banks's account to the Daily Telegraph of the cause of the 
unofficial NUS dispute was essentially a fair, if colourful, summary: the dissidents 
wanted the NUS rank-and-file to be served by elected 'shipboard representatives' 
(shop stewards) and to have the final say in collective bargaining. They were also 
demanding fair and open union elections. Yates was resisting their demands and the 
ITF was taking the position that the NUS's internal affairs were neither the ITF's 
business, nor that of any affiliate but the NUS itself. As will become evident, the 
longer the SlU affair lasted, the farther it moved on from its NUS and Canadian 
District beginnings, but two points can be made about those early days. 
Firstly, the Canadian District's attachment to the democratic process was to seem 
more and more cynical as time went by. Other, much more self-serving motives 
may have applied. Yates's successor as General Secretary of the NUS, Jim Scott, 
later alleged that the Canadian SIU's real motive was 'to use the 1960 strike ... to 
force the Canadian Pacific [shipping company] to use the Canadian rather than 
British flagged ships, thus creating more jobs for Canadian seamen'. 68 
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Secondly, perhaps the SIU should have asked the ITF formally why it had declined 
jurisdiction so readily. The NUS dissidents'case was that their union was a 
fundamentally undemocratic organization. The ITF had quickly put the ILA to a 
'democratic' test and, less directly and perhaps less convincingly, had only narrowly 
escaped having to make a similar judgment of the Teamsters. The NUS case 
differed from those, of course, in some very important respects: the national centre, 
the British TUC, was sternly supportive of Sir Tom whose very knighthood celebrated 
his term as Chairman of the TUC General Council; and neither the ILA nor the 
Teamsters had been able to call on anyone as influential within the ITF as Yates to 
protect their interests. He was a very substantial fixture indeed within the ITF: 
Chairman, seemingly in perpetuity, of the ITF Management Committee and so a 
member ex offilcio of the Executive Committee, sometime Chairman of the Seafarers' 
Section, and (though surely of no significance) the ITF's landlord. Yet, whatever the 
strength of his standing within the ITF, thousands of NUS members were in open and 
very effective rebellion against what they judged to be a denial of democracy within 
their own union. It was not just the SIU among the ITF affiliates that challenged the 
NUS's democratic credentials or marvelled at the very impressive life-style that its 
top officials somehow managed to enjoy. Some might simply have envied Sir Tom 
his splendid Bentley limousine and chauffeur but many others would like to have 
known how he, or the union, came to afford them. 
[1401 
Ought not the ITF to have looked at the NUS dissidents' demands and grievances 
with the same stem eye to the ITF's very clear constitutional requirements that had 
been cast on the ILA? Instead, the Executive Committee decided in November 1960 
to convey to the SIU its 'deep concern' at the Canadian District's conduct and to seek 
recommendations from an emergency Conference of the ITF Seafarers' Section on 
what to do next. 69 Looking to the Seafarers' Section for guidance made no 
constitutional sense, for the SIU's actions were culpable (or not) regardless of the 
sectional context, but under great pressure the Executive Committee was probably 
desperate, firstly to buy some time and, secondly, to spread the responsibility for 
what were bound to be hotly contested judgments. Some members (Yates for 
example? ) 70may also have calculated that notwithstanding Hall's fearsome 
reputation (and Section Vice-Chairmanship), the Section Conference would rally 
round the NUS and stiffen the Executive Committee's resolve. 
Any such 'hawks' would have been very pleased with the recommendations agreed 
'unanimously' by the Seafarers' Section at a conference in Antwerp on 26 January 
1961. (At the last minute, the SlU had pleaded urgent business in New York and 
were not represented. ) The report records rather sanctimoniously the conference's 
anxiety to give the SlU time to mend its ways before the Executive Committee next 
met, in April 1961. The SlU could find salvation by ceasing immediately to 
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misbehave, by pledging its good and constitutional behaviour in the future and by 
I express[ing] and publish[ing] apologies for its breach of good trade union practice'. 71 
The Executive Committee meeting in Tel Aviv in April 1961 'agreed to suspend the 
SIU' and to send a delegation (the General Secretary, the Chairman of the 
Management Committee and Lyon) to 'North America ... to explain the Executive 
Committee's decision ... [and] also explore various possibilities of solving present 
difficulties'. 72The subsequent and very terse references to the suspension in the 
Report on Activities to the Helsinki Congress in 196273do not reveal what 
consideration the Executive Committee gave to the conditions the Seafarers' Section 
attached to the SIU's rehabilitation or whether they were ever formally passed on to 
the SIU. (Hall's reaction to the demand for a public apology would have been 
interesting. ) 
The ITF's troubles with the SlU were to last for more than four years and fell into two 
distinct phases. The first was a period of both deep mutual hostility and, off-stage, 
stuttering moves towards reconciliation. The Executive Committee's plan for a 
delegation to'North America'was almost immediately aborted. Lyon, who had not 
been at the Tel Aviv meeting, thought it had been 'presumptuous' to have nominated 
him to the delegation without his permission and he was certainly not ready to 
'explain' a decision which he would not have voted for. The place reserved for'the 
Chairman of the Management Committee'would have been filled by Yates and he 
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was sensible enough to realize how prejudicial his presence would be, The first 
reaction from the United States came within days of the suspension when on 21 April 
1961 three affiliates - the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots 
(MMP), the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association (MEBA) and the ILA 
(embracing its old enemy) - cabled their 'withdrawal' from the ITF because of its 
'precipitous' [sic] action. De Vries, the sole survivor of the delegation as the 
Executive Committee had originally conceived it, was already in the USA for 
'valuable' but entirely unsuccessful talks. On his return he informed the three unions 
that 'withdrawal' required one year's notice and so, like it or not, their affiliation (and 
fees) had still twelve months to run. (The MMP decided in September 1961 to 
rescind its notice. ) 74 
There were many false starts and dead ends in the negotiations over the following 
two years on a settlement. A constant and difficult factor was the SIU's 
determination to give no comfort to its great rival in the American maritime industry, 
the National Maritime Union (NMU). That rivalry, both organizationally and 
personally, was rooted in history and it had its quieter moments, but at this period it 
was made all the more intense by a political gulf (the SlU on the right and the NMU 
to the left) which put any compromise or even a truce beyond reach. 75 There was 
also the aggravating factor of the presence of the NMU's President, Joe Curran, on 
the ITF Executive Committee, to which he had been co-opted on the proposal of 
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Paul Hall in a very rare moment of collaboration. Curran had nonetheless voted for 
the SIU's suspension. His high-minded disavowal, subsequently, of any but the 
purest motive, namely the defence of the ITF's Constitution, 76would only have 
stiffened Hall's resolve, as his authorized spokesman Ed Wilson later put it, 'not [to] 
sign anything which implied an admission of the SJUIS guilt'. 77 Wilson's formal 
position at that time was European Representative of the 'International Division' of 
the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department (MTD), the MTD being one of a number of 
AFL-CIO departments which served a similar purpose to that of the ITF's sections 
but were much more loosely structured and defined. Paul Hall was its President and 
its member-unions, all from the former AFL, invariably followed his lead. (Maritime 
unions of the former CIO, led by the NMU, had a rival co-ordinating body of their 
own. ) 
The "International Division" had been created at the MTD Annual Convention in 
December 1961 and in January 1962 it was given a three-man Executive Committee, 
comprising Teddy Gleason of the ILA, Ray McKay of the marine engineers (MEBA), 
and -just in case the ITIF had missed the point - Hal Banks of the 
SIU's Canadian 
District. De Vries promptly enlisted Omer Becu's support, as General Secretary of 
the ICFTU, in protesting to George Meany at this 'prospect of competition for the 
support and loyalty of maritime workers' unions at international level' and they 
together met Meany, Hall 'and a number of other American friends' in the USA. 
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But the meetings came to nothing and, meanwhile, the International Division began 
to woo the ITF's affiliates in Latin America by offering 'pacts' or'mutual assistance 
agreements', taking the line that the ITF was more interested in looking after its 
European affiliates than those in the developing world. 78 
The ITF now had two issues to tackle, the NUS and SIU affair and the MTD's 
international enterprise, but Becu and Wilson had been working on a joint 
statement as a basis for reconciliation. A late telephone call from Becu to the 
Executive Committee meeting in April 1962 reported that Hall was ready to sign the 
statement and that Meany had ruled that the MTD 'would have no reason to conduct 
international activities' if the SIU, ILA and MEBA resumed their ITF affiliations. 79 The 
draft statement itself lacked any specific commitments but spent the warmest of 
words on the 'friendly and constructive conversations' concerning 'regrettable 
differences' and the need for 'world-wide unity' to meet the 'challenge of international 
communism'. 80 It was enough to induce the Executive Committee to agree that the 
General Secretary should be authorized to lift the SIU's suspension provided the SIU 
'declared its readiness to observe the ITF's Constitution' and the MTD 'ceased its 
activities outside the United States. ' 81 
The peace effort foundered on the first of those conditions. Hall insisted that a 
declaration of good constitutional behaviour in future would be seized on (by the 
[1451 
NMU, presumably) as an implicit confession of past misbehaviour. 
Meanwhile, the MTD's trawl for'mutual aid' partners in Latin America netted only a 
very small catch - an 'irresistible opportunity to acquire American money 1, was the 
unashamed explanation of the Chilean maritime confederation's leader. 82 More 
bizarrely, Ed Wilson offered an MTD'pact'to a bemused Philipp Seibert, President of 
the German Railwaymen's Union (GdED) and a member of the Executive 
Committee. 83 Hall would have known, moreover, that support within the USA for his 
international venture was dissolving. George Harrison, standing in for the retired 
Lyon at the ITF Executive Committee meeting in July 1962, made it clear, with all the 
authority appropriate to his eminence within the RLEA and the AFL-CIO, that the 
MTD 'had no right' to function outside the USA. 84 
Hall tried to smuggle Wilson into the 1962 Congress as an accredited adviser to the 
delegation from the Trinidad Seamen and Waterfront Workers' Trade Union 
(SWWTU) but the Congress Credentials Committee was of the 'opinion' that Wilson 
was really there for the SIU, which as a suspended affiliate, had no right to 
representation. George Munroe of the SWTTU revealed that his union had been 
'affiliated' with the SIU since October 1961 (it had 'not cost a penny') and contested 
the ruling, which was constitutionally very unsound, but Congress endorsed the 
Credentials Committee's judgment and the SWTTU delegation walkedoUt. 85 
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That was the last direct contact that anyone in the ITF had with Wilson. 
Masquerading as an adviser to an ITF affiliate from Trinidad was perhaps the most 
unusual and innocent of all the deceptions deployed in the long career of this 
maverick CIA agent whose subsequent freelance activities earned him an epic 
notoriety. 
Hall then decided to use the SIU's membership of the RLEA (a constitutional 
complication overlooked throughout the dispute! ) as a channel for re-opening peace 
talks. Donald Beattie, who had succeeded Lyon as Executive Secretary of the RLEA 
and as a member of the ITF Executive Board, signalled to De Vries in February 1963 
that the SIU and its allies were ready to talk. De Vries met them in Washington DC 
on 27 April 1963 and two days later was handed a joint letter from Hall, Mackay and 
William Bradley of the ILA in which they withdrew their 'resignation' from the ITF and 
so would again 'assume all of the rights, privileges and obligations [of affiliation]... as 
well as accepting the responsibilities set forth in the constitution'. He was also given 
a copy of a letter from Hall to Peter McGavin, Executive Secretary of the MTD, 
advising him that a settlement with the ITF was in the offing and that he should be 
ready for a cessation of hostilities. 86 
The Executive Board meeting in Oslo from 6 to 8 May 1963 decided after a long and 
anxious discussion (a) to lift the SIU's suspension; (b) formally to note that the SIU, 
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ILA and MEBA had cancelled their notice of withdrawal; and (c) 'to state that in lifting 
the suspension of the [SIU] the Executive Board had in no way expressed approval 
of the action of any organization in Canada, and that the ITF would continue to 
support any efforts to unify the Canadian seafarers' movement and solve those 
difficulties which at present divideit. ' 87 
The second phase of the ITF's troubles with the SlU then began. The only member 
to record his dissociation from the decision was a bitter and incredulous Bill Smith of 
the Canadian CBRT, for the ITFs fraught relationship with the SlU had already 
entered a second phase, set once more in Canada. What had made Smith so angry 
was the readiness of the ITF, as Smith saw it, to welcome the SlU back without 
calling Hall to account for the conduct of Hal Banks, the boss of its Canadian District. 
Born in California and one of Hall's most trusted muscle-men, Banks had been 
drafted into Canada in 1949 at the invitation of the Liberal government and the 
leaders of the Canadian wings of the AFL's 'international' unions to promote the 
hitherto vestigial Canadian District of the SIU as a rival to the'communist' Canadian 
Seaman's Union (CSU). Banks's goons had been a significant force in the breaking 
of the CSU's strike in 1949 (see Chapter V) and the subsequent destruction of the 
CSU itself. 88Banks thus became the dominant trade union figure in the Canadian 
shipping industry, to the great pleasure and relief of the government, shipowners and 
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more than a few Canadian trade union leaders. He then exploited his position over 
the years so outrageously that by mid-1 962 the Canadian government was forced to 
set up an inquiry, the 'Norris Commission', into his activities. It issued its report in 
July 1963 and its chairman, Judge Norris spoke plainly: 
'Banks is capable, decisive, egocentric, intolerant and ruthless. He is the 
stuff of the Capones and Hoffas ... a bully, cruel, dishonest, greedy, power- 
hungry, contemptuous of the law. In his mouth, the use of the word 
"democracy" is sheer blasphemy... ' 89 
The Banks story is told vividly by Peter Edwards in his Waterfront Warlord: the Life 
and Violent Times of Hal C. Banks, a tale of 'sweetheart' deals with the shipowners; 
'do not ship' lists (i. e. blacklisting) of dissident members; brutal beatings and the 
systematic terrorising of more serious opponents; and massive theft of union funds to 
finance Banks's high living. 
Edwards limits his ITF references to the 1960 ITF Congress when Banks ordered the 
beating up of Don Secord, the CBRT's National Secretary, because the CBRT had 
I used the occasion' to denounce Banks as a thug. Secord gave Edwards that story 
some twenty-six years after the event 90 and though the assault did not happen, the 
story was certainly plausible. There is no record, however, in the 1960 Congress 
Proceedings of any denunciation of Banks (or of any other speech) by Secord. 91 
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Though the Norris findings came some two months after the lifting of the SIU's 
suspension, the indictment was so sweeping and unequivocal as to give the 
Executive Board good and urgent reason to reopen the SlU case. De Vries's 
alternative suggestion, tacitly accepted at its May meeting, that the Board could ask 
the Seafarers' and Dockers' Sections to look at anything arising from the Norris 
report, 92was to prove a bad idea. 
Breaches of the Constitution were a matter for the judgment of the Executive Board, 
not for any ITF section, but, entitled to it or not, the Seafarers' Section was only too 
happy to accept the Norris Report business when the Executive Board handed it on. 
The seafarers' first, not very grateful, step was to adopt a resolution at a Section 
Conference in November 1963 calling on the Executive Board to're-examine' its 
decision to lift the SIU's suspension 'with a view to expelling' it instead. 93 
The resolution had been moved by the Canadian Maritime Union (CMU), which had 
been created under the aegis of the Canadian Labour Congress to provide Canadian 
seamen with a clean union and had been accepted rather nervously into affiliation at 
the Executive Board meeting in November 1962 on the 'understanding' that If the 
Canadian SIU was ever rehabilitated in Canada, then every effort would be made to 
merge the CMU and the Canadian SIU. 94 That rider (in practice unenforceable) 
reflected an anxiety on the part of the American members of the EB and of 
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one of the two Canadian EB members, Frank Hall (no relation! ) of the Canadian 
division of the 'international' railway clerks' union (BRAC), not to upset Paul Hall 
more than was absolutely necessary. De Vries would have shared that concern, but 
Bill Smith, the other Canadian member, was determined that the application should 
go through and there were no constitutional grounds to refuse it. 
The Executive Board gave the Seafarers' Section resolution a very cool reception at 
its meeting in June 1964. The power to expel lay with the General Council and the 
EB agreed without any discussion of substance to pass the seafarers' resolution on 
to the General Council. 95 It then decided in November 1964 that the GC should 
meet'eady' in the course of the 1965 Congress so as still to leave time for any 
appeal before Congress adjourned. 96 
That last dispensation clearly anticipated a disputatious session, but much had 
happened by the time the General Council met on 30 July 1965 to take the heat and 
urgency from the situation. The trustees imposed by the Canadian government on 
the Canadian SIU in the aftermath of the Norris Report dismissed Banks from office 
in March 1964 and on 1 May 1964 he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for 
ordering 'a manifest act of gangsterism', namely the brutal beating up in August 1957 
of Henry Walsh, an organizer of the Canadian ships' officers' union, the Canadian 
Merchant Service Guild. Released two weeks later on bail, pending an appeal, 
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and with a string of other indictments awaiting a hearing, Banks fled to the United 
States. He found sanctuary there until he died in 1985, thanks to Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk, who in 1968 overruled a move to extradite him to Canada. Rusk might 
just have had in mind the importance to the Democrat Party of the AFL-CIO's 
support, the heavy influence of Paul Hall within the AFL-CIO and the size and 
generosity of the SIU's'political educabon'fund. Any number of Canadian politicians 
and shipowners would have been relieved to know that they would not be asked to 
explain their past dealings with Banks. Their relief would have been nothing 
compared to that of many Canadian trade union leaders, including Frank Hall, who 
had been an important 'matchmaker' in the introduction of the SIU into Canada in the 
late 1940s, a r6le he was 'deeply [to] regret' when 'he lived in fear that the man he 
helped bring to Canada would leave him dead in a ditch'. 97 By the time the General 
Council met, therefore, Banks had long gone from both the SIU and Canada. He was 
succeeded in 1964 by'Red' McLaughlin (who preferred 'Leonard' to 'Red' when he 
became an ILO official some years later). Judge Norris had found McLaughlin 
'devious' and 'unscrupulous' and '[an] entirely untruthful witness' but he had been 
elected 'on a reform platform' and had set out to make himself and the Canadian 
District acceptable to the mainstream movement. 98 
If minutes of the Gener8l Council meeting on Friday, 30 July 1965 were taken, no 
copy exists and no reference has ever been made to them. The official Proceedings 
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of the 1965 Congress in Copenhagen confirm (p315) that the General Council met 
that day to consider the Seafarers' Section's 'resolution' but say nothing about what 
happened there. There is, however, a cross-reference to p263 which covers the last 
moments of the plenary session on the morning of 2 August. It records De Vries as 
having passed on fraternal greetings from the Trawler and Line Fishermen's Union of 
South Africa and the same paragraph continues: 
'He went on to tell delegates that seafarers' delegations from a number of 
countries (United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Greece, United 
States, Italy and Japan) were of the opinion that the [Seafarers' Section] 
resolution ... recommending the expulsion of the Seafarers' International 
Union of North America should not be pressed. It was felt that there was 
now no need to call a further meeting of the General Council. ' 
De Vries was followed by Paul Hall, who'expressed gratitude to the General 
Secretary and all organizations from the Seafarers' Section for withdrawing their 
resolution. '99 
And that is all there is to be found in the official record. If anyone took notes, no-one 
seems ever to have written them up. Perhaps it was decided that De Vries's 
announcement said all that anyone needed to know. The writer was present at the 
meeting and remembers that the motion to expel the SIU was moved by Bill Hogarth, 
General Secretary of the British NUS, and seconded by Don Secord of the 
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CBRT- Paul Hall, in the SIU's defence, made no attempt to justify or excuse Banks's 
conduct but asked the General Council to understand that Banks had been his ftiend 
and that he, Paul Hall of Inglebrook, Alabama, lived his life by the principles of those 
parts (the Southern accent seemed much stronger than usual) which put loyalty to 
friends beyond price. He was begging his audience to allow his conscience to rest 
easy and not to insist that he disown his friend, but to take on trust his and the SIU's 
deep attachment to the ITF and its great cause. It was an enormously effective 
performance and he clearly worked great rhetorical magic on the GC members, very 
few of whom were from seafarers' unions and as engaged with the issue as the 
seafarers were. When Hall finished, Hogarth and company knew their cause was 
lost. No-one called for a vote and the session did not end as much as fade away. 
iv. The more positive side to the American Lný 
The ILA, the Teamsters and, above all, the SIU gave the ITF leadership much grief 
and there must at the time have been more than one 'old' affiliate which wondered 
why the ITF should have brought so much trouble on its own head. Some mention 
has therefore to be made of the affiliation of a number of American organizabons 
which gave the ITF absolutely no trouble of any kind and, better still, made some 
contribution beyond simply paying up. The International Association of Machinists 
(IAM) affiliated in 1950 on behalf of its large membership in the airlines'ground 
maintenance facilities (its railway membership was regarded as covered by 
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the IAM's membership of the RLEA). Formerly a pillar of the old AFL, it was one of 
the AFL-CIO's biggest affiliates and close to itsestablishmenf (the IAM's very 
radical political stance was still to come). Another veteran of the AFL, the 
Amalagamated Transit Union (ATU), 100 affiliated in 1961. The first of the former CIO 
unions to affiliate (Curran's NMU did not arrive until 1955) was the Transport 
Workers' Union (TWU) in December 1953. Headed at that time by a famous Irish- 
American personality, Mike Quill, the TWU's substantial membership had spread 
from its odginal base in the New York Subway to other urban transport companies 
and to the airlines, organizing both ground and cabin staff. It was to become a 
forceful and positive influence in the Civil Aviation Section. 
v. Rehabiliation: the Germans 
Within weeks of the end of the war in Europe, Hans Jahn had re-established the 
ITF's presence in Germany. He was one of a tiny group of German trade unionists 
whose long record of active resistance to the Nazis had won the confidence of the 
Allied civil and military authorities (though their confidence might have been qualified 
if they had known of his anti-Semitic instincts'01). He had already worked his way 
through Italy, in the wake of the Allied forces on an ITF mission to promote the 
restoration of transport workers' unions. Once a locomotive engineer and official of 
the pre-war German Railwaymen's Union (Einheitsverband der Eisenbahner 
Deutschlands) he had worked with the ITF from September 1933, first from Holland 
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and then from Luxembourg, organizing opposition groups among German 
railwaymen. He had made his perilous way to Great Britain in October 1940 and from 
there became a key figure in the attempts by the ITF and the Allied intelligence 
agencies to sabotage German railway operations. (His wife, also active in the 
resistance, was captured in Luxembourg when it was overrun and spent much of the 
war in a concentration camp. ) 102Though seen even by some of his own union in 
1950 as 'the paid agent of a foreign power', 103 Jahn was clearly a very experienced 
and skilful organizer. As the 'accredited liaison officer of the ITF' and with its 
'material, moral and political support' he could take much of the credit for the 
establishment within the first twelve months of peace of thirteen assorted transport 
workers' unions in the British, American and French zones. (The Soviet zone was 
already out of bounds to the ITF and remained so. ) The ITF itself claimed that it had 
'in many cases [been] instrumental in establishing good relations between the trade 
unions and the occupation authorities'. 104 The constructive nature of those relations 
is borne out by the report of the visit of an ITF delegation to Germany in February 
1947 to study the state of the port and shipping industries. For example, the 
delegation was able during its short stay to 'dispel' the authorities' 'apprehension' at 
the reception British seafarers and dockers might give German seafarers if they were 
to sail once more into British ports. Four ships crewed by Germans sailed to Britain 
within days. The delegation had been prompted partly by the fear felt by ITF 
Seafarers' and Docke& Section Conferences of unfair competition within Europe 
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from their far 'cheaper' German counterparts. The evidence the delegation found of 
an emerging trade union movement was clearly comforting. 105 
When the ITF Congress convened in July 1948, the President, Omer Becu, was very 
happy to welcome German affiliates back to an ITF Congress'for the first time since 
1932'. He saw the German trade union movement as 'one of the forces working for a 
Germany prosperous and in harmony with the rest of the world'. His welcome came, 
however, after some sombre reflections, all the more relevant because the Congress 
met at the height of the Berlin cdsis, on the need for'a truly democratic regime' in 
Germany as 'an essential condition for the achievement of European co-operation 
and avoidance of another world war'. 106 
The two German affiliates whose applications had been accepted by the Executive 
Committee in April 1948 were the German Railwaymen's Union (GdED) 
(Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner Deutschlands) and the Transport and Public Service 
Workers' Union (OeTV) (Gewerkschaft Mentfiche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr), 
with hefty memberships of 404,000 and 70,000 respectively. 107 Their path to the ITF 
had had to be cleared of two potential obstructions, the first - and less serious - 
being none of their doing and the second being entirely so. 
The first and very transient problem had arisen when the WFTU circularized ITSs 
4requiring [them] I, as Oldenbroek reported to the Executive Committee in 
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March 1947, ( not to admit any German trade unions'. The Executive Committee 
endorsed John Benstead's reaction: the ITF was 'free to decide [such things] 
irrespective of any decision by the WFTU' and it was in the interest of 'democratic 
forces in Germany' for the ITF 'not to leave the question in suspense'108. The 
Executive Committee had indeed committed itself in August 1946 to the re-admission 
of German unions provided they were free of any Nazi associations, were 
democratically structured and were more than 'local or small-scale organizations'. 109 
The last of these conditions reflected the largely spontaneous nature of the German 
trade union renaissance, for though old hands such as Jahn would have 
remembered well the union structures as they had been in 1933, there was as yet no 
particular structure to which any of the new trade unions were expected to conform. 
Their early efforts could not help but be 'local or small-scale' because unions in the 
British and American zones were not allowed to operate even on a zonal basis until 
mid-1946 and, with the exception of railwaymen, that restriction still applied within the 
French zone at the end of 1947. But administrative, economic and political realities 
were steadily pushing the western occupying powers together, just one relevant 
instance of which was the merging of the railway operations in the British and 
American zones in October 1946, bringing together a workforce of some 410,000. 
The second and much more serious complication came when the German unions 
themselves regained a large measure of control over their trade union structures 
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but found themselves in very deep and increasingly bitter disagreement about what 
shape those structures should take. In discussions in London in February 1948 with 
Jahn ('Chief of the Committee for the Amalgamation of the Railwaymen's Unions'), 
Heinrich Malina ('President of the OeTV of the British Zone') and Adolf Kummernuss 
('President of the Hamburg District of the OeTV and the OeTV's International 
Representative'), the 'ITF Secretaries' (Oldenbroek and Tofahm? ) thought Germany 
was big enough to accommodate three transport unions. It is likely, though not 
recorded, that they were thinking of one each for railwaymen; other land transport 
workers; and maritime workers. Malina and Kummernuss ( but'the latter less 
emphatically') disagreed. 110 
At the beginning of 1948 the OeTV claimed some 100,000 members among the 
230,000 railwaymen in the British zone and had 'successfully opposed the affiliation 
of the Railwaymen's Union to the Trade Union Confederation of the British Zone'. "' 
But Jahn would have disputed the OeTV's claim and it was debatable enough for the 
ITF to suggest that their railway members' organizational preferences should be 
confirmed in a secret ballot. 112 In the American zone, now part of the Anglo- 
American 'Bizone', the railwaymen had their own organization, which merged with 
the railwaymen's union in the British zone at the end of March 1948 to create the 
GdED. 113 The GdED position on the structural issue was unambiguous: the state 
railway (Deutsche Bundesbahn as it was soon to become) was one 'industry' and 
[159] 
the rest of 'transport' another. Malina, on the contrary, maintained that the OeTV 
railway membership was'practically unanimous' in wanting 'closer integration with 
public authority workers'. All 'state' employees should be in one 'departmentalized 
union' and 'state' should be defined very broadly, taking in local and national 
government and any services they controlled or funded. 114 He was inclined to pin 
much of responsibility for the railwaymen's separatist convictions on Hans Jahn 
personally. Jahn had been elected to the Executive Committee and General Council 
of the newly formed national centre, the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), on 
behalf of the OeTV. He resigned those positions on becoming the first President of 
the GdED and a week after the ITF Oslo Congress in July 1948, a very bitter Malina 
was reported to have dubbed the GdED a'yellow'(gelb, i. e. foutlaw') organization. A 
nervous DGB, anxious not to upset over 400,000 railwaymen who had decided, 
freely and emphatically, that they wanted a union to themselves, denied that the 
word 'yellow' had passed anyone's lips, at least within the DGB. 115 
But Adolf Kummernuss had by then succeeded Malina as the OeTV's President. 
Kummernuss had worked with Jahn in the earliest days of the ant-Nazi resistance, 
was caught by the Gestapo in 1935 and survived a brutal imprisonment. 116 Old 
comradeships, however, were not as much help in reducing the mutual tensions as a 
recognition of the hard facts. (Malina, after all, had also been active in the resistance 
and, like Jahn, had been an official in the pre-war railwaymen's union, the 
Einheitsverband! ) 117 Kummernuss knew that the GdED was there to stay and 
[160] 
that Malina's cause, however principled, was hopeless. And so the OeTV and the 
GdED learned to live together within the ITF, never very warmly, usually quite wadly 
and sometimes very frostily but always stopping short of overt hostility. The GdED 
may have been outnumbered by the OeTV within the DGB, but it had the edge within 
the ITF and the OeTV itself consolidated the GdED's lead by deciding with effect 
from 1951 to transfer some 80,000 members in municipal public transport 
undertakings to another ITS, the International Federation of Unions of Employees in 
Public and Civil Services (later thePublic Services International (PSI)'), on the 
grounds that the municipal transport workers' ultimate bargaining partners were 
public authorities, not transport operators. 
For the GdED, its problem with the OeTV was not the concept of 'industrial 
unionism', which it positively championed, but its application. Germany's railways, in 
the form of Deutsche Bundesbahn, a state monopoly, indeed came to look much 
more like an homogeneous 'industry'than the OeTV's'public services and transport' 
(Mentliche Dienste, Transport u. Verkehr118) package. In the first two or three years 
of post-war devastation, almost all transport in Germany was 'publicly' owned and 
administered, but it was not long before private transport enterprises re-emerged in 
shipping, the ports, inland navigation and road haulage. Within ten years, the OeTV 
was much closer to being ageneral' union than the GdED. In reality, neither 
industrial unionism nor the DGB has ever gone unchallenged. The OeTV has 
[1611 
constantly had to fight off (not always successfully) many incursions from the 
Deutsche Angestelften-Gewerkschaft (DAG), which represented 'white-collar' or 
'salahed' workers, irrespective of their'industry' and the DAG was soon to give the 
OeTV some stem competition among, for example, merchant marine officers and 
airline staff. The GdED faced similar competition from the Deutsche Beamtenbund, 
'Beamten' being established civil servants, which a high proportion of German 
railwaymen actually were, and had also to try to keep its locomotive drivers out of a 
craft union, the Deutsche Lokomotiv Verband. 
vi ... and the JaDanese 
Japan was rebuilt after its surrender as a parliamentary democracy, but in the early 
post war years ultimate power remained with the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP), effectively the administration of General Douglas MacArthur. He 
had few progressive inclinations himself, but the American officials and experts in his 
administration had rather more. The policy planning department of the SCAP's 
Labor Division, for example, was eager to apply the requirement of the 'United States 
Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' that 'encouragement shall be given and favor 
shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry and agriculture, 
organized on a democratic basis'. 119 A'Trade Union Law', the first of its kind and 
drafted by a tripartite group which included an All-Japan Seamen's Union (Kaiin) 
representative (see below), was passed by the Diet in December 1945. It 
[162] 
guaranteed workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively, sought to secure 
trade union independence, exempted unions from liability for damages arising from 
reasonable actions in disputes and set the ground rules for collective bargaining. 
This basic law was then supplemented over the following two years by laws setting 
down the bargaining procedures and specifying minimum standards. 120 The 
legislation was echoed in the new Japanese constitution itself, drafted by the SCAP 
and accepted by the Diet in November 1946: the Japanese people had the right to 
'minimum standards of wholesome and cultural living' (Article 25) and workers the 
explicit right 'to organize and to bargain and act collectively' (Article 28). 121 
The labour legislation and the seemingly benign political climate gave a great 
incentive to trade union organization. In the seven months or so from December 
1945 to July 1946 trade union membership grew tenfold, from 379,631 to 3,813,665, 
and belonging to a trade union had been made 'respectable'. 122 The unions were 
quick to put their new freedom to use, first within the private sector but then, more 
militantly still, within the public sector (including notably the railwaymen). Two 
groups of unions, embryonic 'national centres', had been formed in the summer of 
1946: what Price sees as the 'heterogeneous but left-leaning' Sambetsu (Harari 
prefers 'communist-dominated' 123) and the 'more conservative' Sodomei, which 
supported the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). They jointly demanded substantial 
wage increases from the conservative Yoshida government late in 1946 for some 
[1631 
2.6 million government employees. The government rejected the demands and the 
unions therefore decided on a general strike to begin on 1 February 1947. 
MacArthur's emissary ordered the unions to retreat on 22 January but only the 
Sodomei faction did so. MacArthur formally banned the stdke on 31 January, had 
the strike leaders marched off to radio studios and only released them from 'what 
was effectively military custody' when they broadcast a total surrender, which 
ironically'came to symbolize labor's high tide mark'. 124 
Domestically and internationally the climate had become cold and hostile. The only 
occupying power that mattered, the United States, was in the legislative hands of 
conservative Republicans, whose approval of the Taft-Hartley Act in June 1947 
should have told the Japanese unions what to expect from their ultimate masters. 
The one left-of-centre government Japan was to have in the period, a coalition of the 
JSP and the 'Democratic Party' (a moderate conservative group), lasted only some 
nine months and was followed by an administration led by the leader of the 
Democratic Party which lasted two months fewer but long enough, in the summer of 
1948, to bow to the SCAP's 'suggestions' that the 'general welfare' of the country 
justified a restriction of the trade union rights so imprudently given to public 
employees. By October 1948 the formidable and durable Yoshida was again Prime 
Minister, more than ready to put legislative muscle on the SCAP's 'suggestions'. 
[164] 
The restrictive legislation which followed had the effect, Harari explains, of 
fragmenting the Japanese workforce into three clear sectors. The private sector was 
still covered by the basic labour laws; government employees were removed from 
them altogether and had to rely on 'independent' arbitration of their claims; and 
public service workers such as those of the state-owned Japan National Railways 
(JNR) were brought under a new'Public Corporation and National Enterprise Labour 
Relations Law (PCNELRL). 125 
The unity with which the Japanese unions had planned their general strike was not to 
be revived, or even seriously attempted, during the period. Sambetsu quickly 
disintegrated after the strike was aborted in a tide of recriminations which led in July 
1947 to the founding of a 'Democratization League' (Mindo) to represent a 
substantial body of trade union members and activists who attributed the February 
events to the Communist faction's insistence on political rather than 'economic' 
priorities. A new national centre, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan 
(Sohyo) was founded in July 1950 and promised briefly to be more genuinely 
inclusive than any of its forerunners until a group of unions, Kafin very prominent 
among them, decided that Sohyo had also become too left-wing and confrontational. 
Kafin disaffiliated from Sohyo in 1953 and with some like-minded unions, such as the 
textile workers, founded a smaller, but still substantial centre, the All Japan Trade 
Union Congress (Zenro). In 1964 Zenro joined with constituents of the small but 
[1651 
resilient Sodomei, also long disaffected from Sohyo, to create Domei. 126 
By the end of the period, all the major Japanese unions belonged either to the 
left-wing Sohyo or the centre-moderate left, Domei. The political alignment of the 
Sohyo unions was typically with the JSP, which was itself to the left of the Socialist 
International spectrum, but all the Sohyo unions also had Japanese Communist 
Party (JCP) factions of varying, and sometimes critically significant, size. The typical 
Domei unions chose to be much more politically reticent, stressing their 
representational and bargaining functions and rejecting with special vehemence the 
JCP or JSP 'fellow traveller' activists who, they alleged, placed politics above the 
members' practical interests. These political characterizations will serve the purpose 
of this chapter, with two riders: firstly, that whilst all the Sohyo unions were on the 
left, some were much more to the left than others; 127secondly, that Domei's 
'apolitical' stance was disingenuous and remained so until it eventually promoted the 
'Democratic Socialist Party. 
The progress and problems of the post-war Japanese movement, and its deep 
political divisions, form an essential backdrop to any consideration of the nature and 
contribution of the ITF's Japanese membership over the period, all the more so 
because the ITFs earliest affiliations included champions of each camp: the Japan 
National Railway Workers' Union (Kokuro) of Sohyo and Kafin of ZenrolDomei. 
[1661 
The ITF's first contact with Japan, however, had come soon after the war when it 
tracked down Kafin's former General Secretary, M. Yonekubo. Kafin had affiliated in 
1929, unique in Japan both in its strength - 92,521 members by 1932128- and in its 
international commitment. Its brave and lonely opposition to Japan's militairistic 
governments in the 1930s had provoked decrees ordering its disaffiliation from the 
ITF and, finally, its dissolution. Japanese unions had to wait on permission from 'the 
US authorities' before they could affiliate internationally and the first batch, consisting 
of Kafin, Kokuro, the Municipal Transport Workers (Toshiko), the General Federation 
of Taxi Workers Unions and the Japanese Travel Bureau Workers' Union were 
affiliated in December 1949.129 
Despite their often fierce political disagreements, the Japanese affiliates were always 
ready to make the compromises and accommodations needed for them to function 
as a national group within the ITF system. Their implicit approach was that if the 
ITF's policies were more than a union could stomach, then it should leave, as the 
General Federation of Private Railway Workers (Shitetsu) did in July 1953,130 but for 
so long as a union remained affiliated it was obliged to co-exist with its compatriots 
and not to export Japanese domestic quarrels. The arrival of the Japanese affiliates 
accounts almost entirely for the steep rise in the ITF's Asia/Pacific membership (see 
Table 1) in 1950. Kafin (which covered the large and growing Japanese deep-sea 
fishing fleet as well as the merchant marine) arrived with 145,229 members 
[167] 
and Kokuro brought 450,000. Toshiko had a substantial 30,000 and the taxi and 
travel bureau workers helped push the total to 631,587. Though both the big 
affiliates trimmed their memberships to 100,000 (Kafin) and 386,967 (Kokuro) for 
1951, the arrival that year of Shitetsu's 100,000 brought the total to 622,567 - giving 
the Japanese a substantial (but short-lived) majority (some 90,000) over the German 
affiliation. 131 
By the end of 1964 the Kokuro membership had been hammered down to 270,000 
after taking heavy membership casualties in its war with the JNR management and 
the government over the repressive measures in the Public Corporations and 
National Enterprise Labour Relations Law (PCNELRL), of which more below. The 
ITF's loss had been partly compensated by the affiliation of the locomotivemen's 
union, the National Railway Motive Power Union (Doro), 132 in July 1958 and the All 
Japan Express Workers' Union (Zennittsu) in August 1963. Kafin had also recovered 
to 120,000. The Japanese total membership of 503,000 was by then established as 
the fourth strongest, nationally, in the ITF, exceeded only by the Americans 
(1,024,900), the Bdtish (911,500) and the Germans (541,500). 
The PCNELRL, which was passed in November 1948,133denied public corporation 
employees (most importantly the railwaymen and postal workers) the right to strike; 
heavily qualified the collective bargaining process by requiring the Diet's specific 
[1681 
approval for the funding of any settlement; and restricted the holding of union 
membership and office to corporation employees. Kokuro's (and, to a lesser extent, 
Doro's) struggle against these restrictions was enormously costly and, by the end of 
the period, still indecisive. Kokuro would call strikes to win the right to strike; the 
management would impose sanctions of varying severity, from dismissal to the 
withholding of pay increments, on thousands of strikers; and at vast cost to the union 
treasury, Kokuro would indemnify its members against any losses arising from their 
support of the strikes. At international level, the ITF joined with the ICFTU and other 
ITSs (notably the postal workers' PTTI) in putting the Japanese government under 
embarrassing pressure within the ILO on the related issue of its failure to ratify the 
basic ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. 134 
vii. France and Itaiv /arge iosses and smaller gain 
The ITF admitted in the Report on Activities to the 1948 Congress that 'the uncertain 
position at the end of the war' had made it impossible to give 'a true picture of the 
membership of the ITF at January 1,1946% 135 hence the presentation of the 
membership data in the report to the 1946 Congress under various headings in an 
attempt to indicate (or guess at) how 'effective' (i. e. real) an affiliation was. 136 
Some of the entries were patently and optimistically speculative. In the group of 
'Affiliations between 1940 and 1946', for example, under Czechoslovakia the 
[169] 
'Transport Workers' Section of Trade Union Centre' appears on the strength of a 
claim to be the 'successor' to the ITF's two Czechoslovak affiliates 'before 
Munich'. 137 The'Nominal affiliations (effective before the war)' group included the 
French dockers' and railwaymen's unions; two affiliates from Hungary (the 
tramwaymen's union and the dockers' and road transport workers' union); two from 
Poland (the railwaymen and the transport workers and seamen); one from Romania 
(dockers and road transport workers); and three from Yugoslavia (tramwaymen, 
railwaymen and seamen). None of these 'affiliabons' ever became 'effective' Wthin 
the period, in the great majority of cases for political reasons that will be discussed in 
Chapter V and which were exemplified by the ITF's refusal to become a department 
of the WFTU. 138 
Thus, the two French unions which did resume their affiliation after liberation, the 
road transport workers' and seafarers' unions (F6d6ration Nationale des Moyens de 
Transports and F6d6ration Nationale des Syndicats Maritimes), had both left the ITF 
by the end of 1947. The road transport workers' union was expelled by the ITF 
General Council in November 1947 after informing the ITF that it had 'decided to 
suspend payment of affiliation fees to the ITF until its [the ITFs] integration in the 
WFTU was settled. ' The seafarers' union was more constitutionally scrupulous: its 
congress decided in September 1947 to withdraw the union from the ITF 'after 
meeting its obligations' and to call on the WFTU to set about establishing an 
'International Trade Department' for transport workers. 139 
[1701 
Mussolini had ensured that the ITF had no formal Italian affiliations between the 
world wars, other than of small, clandestine, courageous, but largely token, anti- 
fascist groups. 140 The ITF set out to make good that weakness even before the 
Allied forces had reached Rome. Pier Paulo Fano, an Italian trade unionist in British 
exile, arrived in Bari in southeast Italy as the ITF's representative in December 1943 
to find that a veteran of the pre-fascist railwaymen's union was already organizing 
effectively, as were other activists in the liberated areas. Within a few weeks an 
inaugural railwaymen's congress had met and agreed the rules for a revived and free 
railwaymen's union, which by August 1944 had 50,000 members, some 70% of the 
potential. The ITF also helped set up a tramwaymen's union, a dockers' union and, 
working from Naples, a seafarers' union. Most unexpected of all was the founding in 
Rome towards the end of 1944 of an Air Transport Workers' Trade Union (Sindicato 
Gente dell'Aria), one of the first of its kind. 141 
Accompanied by Becu (who soon claimed much of the credit 142) and encouraged 
and advised at one period by Hans Jahn, Fano also presided over the committee 
which organized the national congress that 'resurrected' the General Confederation 
of Labour (CGIL) as a national centre in 1944. The ITF intended him to run the 
Italian Office which the Management Committee agreed in October 1944 to set up in 
Rome but Fano joined the ILO at the end of 1945 and the office was entrusted to 
another former exile and veteran trades unionist, Giuseppe Sardelli. 
[1711 
The total Italian membership for 1946 was reported to the 1948 Congress as an 
impressive 200,000 for the three unions which made membership returns for that 
year: railwaymen (140,000), tramwaymen (50,000) and civil aviation workers 
(10,000). No returns were submitted, however, by the seafarers and the dockers and 
none was made by any of the unions for 1947. For 1948 the Secretariat signalled 
that all the Italian memberships were 'estimates', 143or ratherwishful thinking in the 
face of the reality that the Italian unions had, by the end of 1947, gone the way of the 
French, and for identical reasons. The Report on Activities to the 1948 Congress 
contained both a specific and a general forewarning. A short note on the Italian 
Dockers' Federation reported that'it declined to pay affiliation fees on the ground 
[sic] that it did not yet consider itself as affiliated'. Sardelli reported to the ITF in 
September 1947 that the CGIL 'had given orders' to the tramwaymen's union 'to 
cease paying affiliation fees to the ITF' and that'Communist influence in the CGIL 
... 
[was] ... very strong. 
' 144There were no Italian delegates at the 1948 Congress, just 
two'guests', one of whom had attended the 1946 Congress as the tramwaymen is 
delegate. Pier Paulo Fano, now representing the ILO, perhaps remembered 
uncomfortably the part that he (and through him the ITF) had played in the re-birth of 
the CGIL, '45for it was that 'Communist-dominated' centre which early in 1948 
ordered its affiliates to end 'any official relations'with the ITF or its Italian 
representative. 146 
The same ideological strains which had underlain the departure of the French and 
[172] 
Italian transport unions from the ITF had proved every bit as unsupportable 
domestically. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) encouraged and 
financially supported anti-communist groups (see Chapter V) which broke away from 
their unions - and thus from the French (CGT) and the Italian (CGIL) national centres 
- in the course of 1947 and 1948. In France, they first banded together as a Force 
Ouvridre or'workers' force' faction within the CGT, taking a name once attached to a 
workers' group in the war-time resistance, and they then institutionalized their 
disaffection in December 1947 by founding an alternative national centre, the 
Conffid6ration G6n6rale du Travail - Force Ouvridre (CGT-FO), soon known simply 
147 as'Force Ouvii6re (FO)'. 
A group of 'non-Communists' among the CGT railwaymen ('non-' and 'anti-' were not 
always synonymous) had preceded the emergence of the FO faction and founded an 
'autonomous' union which applied for affiliation with the ITF in December 1947. But 
by then the FO had been transformed into a national centre and had set about 
establishing various transport workers' unions. The ITF Management Committee 
decided to send a mission comprising Becu, Ehlers (a French member of the 
General Council) and Tofahrn to Paris and Dunkirk in January 1948 and its report led 
the MC to grant E2,000 to help the FO transport workers' unions on their way. In 
March 1948 the autonomous railwaymen's union was merged with an FO 
railwaymen's group to become the FO railwaymen's union and in that same period 
(173] 
FO unions were formed for seamen (ratings), merchant marine officers, dockers, 
road transport workers, and workers in nationalized enterprises (primarily civil 
aviation employees). 148AII but the merchant marine officers (who followed in July 
1948) were accepted by the EC in April 1948. By January 1950 the total French 
membership, all of it attached to the FO, stood at 72,600. It was more than negligible 
but far too small realistically to challenge the CGT transport unions which, in the 
railways and ports especially, still represented the great majority. 
The CGT unions were not the FO's only competition. A'Christian' (essentially 
Roman Catholic) national centre, the CFTC (Conf6d6ration Frangaise des 
Travailleurs Chr6fiens), had a small but determined following among transport 
workers, with a railwaymen's union which complicated an organizational scenario 
already crowded by the existence of many 'autonomous' unions, most of them of the 
'craft' variety (including, inevitably, one for footplate staff). Most were small and of 
little more than nuisance value but the F6d6ration des syndicats ding6nieurs, 
cadres, techniciens et agents de maitrIse des chemins de fer de France, 
representing the 'white-collar' technical and supervisory staff on the state railways 
was a more substantial and influential body altogether. Known within the ITF (and 
henceforth here) as the 'Cadres', it had been founded in 1920 and had twice 
belonged to, and twice left, the CGT, its departure from which in 1948 had signalled 
its rejection of the CGT's Communist leadership. On that, at least, it saw eye to eye 
[1741 
with the FO, but the Cadres prized their'craft' (or class? ) roots and were wary of the 
FO railwaymen's union, which claimed jurisdiction for all sections and grades. The 
Cadres were too well entrenched and too well endowed for the FO union to be any 
kind of challenge and its affiliation was agreed by the EC in August 1959, with a 
pious and constitutionally unenforceable note in the relevant minute instructing the 
General Secretary to Ipoint to the importance of its [i. e. the Cadres'] consulting with 
fellow ITF affiliates [i. e. the FO railwaymen's union] on industrial matters and 
action'. 149 The Cadres, with their 15,820 members, were the first substantial 
manifestation within the ITF of the FO's less than exclusive claim to the 
non-Communist transport workers' allegiance. By the end of the period, the 
autonomous group had been strengthened by affiliations from small but powerful 
unions organizing civil aviation flying staff, for example, radio officers, cabin crew and 
(a rare capture) pilots, all categories where the FO (or the other national centres) had 
little or no membership. 150 
The Italian return to the ITF was more halting and less tidy than the French. After the 
CGIL effectively cut the Italian affiliates off from the ITF, Sardelli, the ITF 
representative, was reported to have worked with 'other representatives of the anti- 
Communist minority [sic] ... with a view 
to eventually recapturing control of the 
unions'. 'Other groups ', however, were working closely'with different political parties 
- Social Democratic, Republican and 
Roman Catholic', an approach which the ITF 
disliked. It had instead 'constantly urged ... that an endeavour should 
be made to 
[175] 
organize on an exclusively trade union basis'. 151 But the ITF's aversion to what it 
saw as destructively divisive politicking was never likely to Garry much weight in the 
far wider context of Italian domestic politics and cold war tensions (see Chapter V) 
and, to thicken the political stew, the anti-Communist forces were divided among 
themselves. In October 1948 the Christian Democrats ('Roman Catholics' as the ITF 
reports described them at the time) formed what became the Confederazione Italiana 
Sindicati Lavoratori (CISQ. In June 1949, the Social Democrats and Republicans 
formed an 'Italian Federation of Labour' which later became the Unione Italiana de/ 
Lavoro (UIL). These developments (much simplified in the telling here! ) necessitated 
building up 'new trade unions from scratch', but three of them were affiliated by early 
1950 152 and affiliates from both the CISL and the UIL camps arrived over the 
following years. By January 1965 the ITF had twelve Italian affiliates with a declared 
membership of some 135,600.153 But, as in France, the far left, represented in Italy 
by the CGIL, dominated key sectors such as the railways and the ports. And though 
the CISL (the larger of the two) and the UIL unions claimed substantial memberships, 
they were almost all poor enough to pay their affiliation fees at a reduced rate (and 
sometimes in arrears at that). 
vifi. First steps into the ! EeýJons 
The ITF's expamion into North America had been seen as welcoming home some 
close relatives who had been keeping their distance until the family changed some 
[176] 
of its off-putting ways (most of them political). What was still known to the general 
public in the 1950s as the 'underdeveloped' world, and to the 'free' internabonal 
movement as the 'regions', was much more vast and difficult territory for the ITF, 
taking in most of Africa, Asia (excepting China, which was never a serious prospect) 
and Latin America. The few unions known to the ITF in the regions and the tiny 
number of them that had ever been affiliated (usually fleetingly) were 
characteristically very frail, very unrepresentative and often politically beleaguered. 
They operated for the most part in colonial or, as the period progressed, newly ex- 
colonial societies and in predominantly agricultural economies. The practicalities of 
the ITFs venture into the regions are described in Chapter 111, and the motives and 
principles driving it are discussed in Chapters V and VI. 
The overall numbers are set out in Tables 1 to 4 and 7. Tables 5 and 6 are relevant 
in respect of Japan. Table 3 conveys the extent of the geographical redistribution of 
the ITF's total membership from 1946, when the regions accounted for only 6.82% of 
the whole, to 1964 when they amounted to 26.83%. The regional growth looks even 
more striking in terms of the absolute number (Table 2) and the regional distribution 
(Table 4) of affiliated organizations. The three regions together could only muster 
seventeen affiliates in 1946 but by 1964 had 177, more than ten times as many and 
making up almost 57% of the affiliated organizations worldwide. These examples 
illustrate, however, a less robust characteristic of regional affiliation which is 
[177] 
illustrated in Table 7: the average membership in 1964 of each African affiliate 
(2,700), of each Latin American (4,400), and even of each Asian (19,000 including 
the Japanese and 8,700 without them) fell well short of the European 21,000 and 
even shorter of the North American 66,100.154 
The biggest national group of affiliates in Africa never exceeded Ghana's 38,800 for 
1958, the year when Kenya's reached a peak of 30,300. The Ghanaian unions 
departed soon afterwards under pressure from their government, the leader of the 
'Pan-African' movement which wanted all African institutions to give their first loyalty 
to purely African international bodies. The lCFTU bore the brunt of the effect on 
African participation in the international trade union movement, whilst the ITSs on the 
whole retained their memberships. For quite different reasons, the ITF's Kenyan 
membership had slipped to 23,600 by 1964, just exceeding Nigeria's 22,000. 
'Rhodesia' was a consistent presence throughout, rising from 8,800 in 1956 to 
19,000 in 1964, which gave it third place. 
The Japanese membership was by far the biggest in the Asia region. But the Indian 
representation was also very heavy, matching any but the largest in Europe, though 
for much of the period it consisted almost entirely of the All India Railwaymen's 
Federation (AIRF). The official reporting of the AIRF membership was sometimes 
inconsirStent - in the 1948 Congress report '475,000' for 1947 became just a question 
mark in the report to the 1950 Congress 155- but the often extreme variations in the 
[1781 
membership the AIRF declared to the ITF had more to do with what it could afford for 
affiliation fees than with counting heads. Its membership was never less than huge 
and always greater than it could afford to pay for. The ITF's affiliations from Pakistan 
(which had taken over a sizeable part of the Indian sub-continental railway system) 
were nominally strong for much of the 1950s, peaking at 142,000 in 1956, but the 
two organizations which made up almost all the declared membership, the Pakistan 
Transport Workers' Federation and the East Pakistan Railway Employees' League, 
were unstable and destitute. The first affiliation from the Philippines came in 1958 
and towards the end of the period the affiliations from the Republic of Korea, 
amounting to a membership of 70,600 in 1964, were a growing force. The ITF's 
most miserable performance was in the two countries, Australia and New Zealand, 
where traditional links and almost generic affinities ought to have brightened the 
ITF's prospect no end. But the biggest of the Australian unions - and especially the 
dockers' and seamen's unions - were Communist-led and gave their loyalties to the 
WFTU. The position in New Zealand was only a little less unfriendly. 
The raw statistics of the ITF's Latin Amefican experience (Tables 1 and 2) show a 
steep rise in the number of affiliates from 1954 onwards but a markedly less steady 
progress in the affiliated membership over the same term - 121,000 in 1954, 
439,000 in 1958, slumping to 164,000 in 1960, but back to 438,000 in 1964. The 
very volatile state of the Argentinian movement and of the ITFs relationship with it 
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(see Chapter V) has a big bearing on the bumpy membership progress: 
Argentina contributed 107,000 of the Latin American total of 123,000 for 1948 but it 
did not feature at all from 1950 to 1955. By 1956 it was back to 84,000, dropped to 
20,000 in 1960 but had reached 124,000 by 1964. Pre-Castro Cuba entered the ITF 
in 1949 with some 58,000 but was effectively lost when Castro came to power in 
January 1959. Brazil arrived in mid-1956 with 192,000 members of the inland 
transport workers' confederation (Confederagao Nacional dos Trabalhadores em 
Transportes Terrestres), but in 1958 the membership sank to a more affordable 
50,000. For some years Mexico was represented only by a small tramwaymen's 
union (Alianza de Tranviarios de M6xico) 1% but was bolstered in 1956 by the 50,000 
members of the busmen's union (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Auto- 
Transportes yAnexos). The biggest pdze, the national railwaymen's union, was still 
to be won when the period ended. Venezuela had been closed to the ITF before the 
overthrow of the Jim6nez dictatorship in 1958 but by 1964 it was contributing 67,000 
members. Chile had been a substantial presence from the mid-1950s and in 1964 
had 52,700 members, with particular strength in the maritime sector. 
ix. The British or the dis-United Kingdom 
In 1946 the British membership of 963,000 was 51 % of the declared total of 
1,891,000 (see Tables 1 and 6). In 1945 British affiliates had paid some 54% of the 
total affiliation fees collected for that year. 157 The National Union of Railwaymen 
(NUR) and the Transport & General Workers' Union (TGWU) were among the 
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largest of the ITF's affiliates throughout the period, though the NUR membership 
dropped from a peak of 434,009 in 1948 to 266,303 in 1965, as what was then 
known as 'automation' cut deeply into railway jobs. The TGWU declared 250,000 
members for 1946 and 350,000 with effect from 1959. The white-collar Transport 
Salaried Staffs' Association JSSA) - known as the 'Railway Clerks' Association' 
until the late 1940s - and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen (ASLEF) were substantial affiliates throughout, even though ASLEF lost 
almost half its membership (from 90,361 in 1948 to 45,561 in 1965) as steam traction 
disappeared and firemen were phased out. The Union of Shop, Distributive and 
Allied Workers' Union (USDAW) contributed 40,000 road transport members, most of 
whom worked for the British Co-operative retail movement. The National Union of 
Seamen (NUS), a founder-member of the ITF, declared 55,000 for 1946 and 60,000 
from 1950.158 The Navigators'and Engineer Officers' Union (NEOU) affiliated in 
1946, following the voluntary dissolution of the International Mercantile Marine 
Officers' Association (IMMOA). 159 It became the Merchant Navy and Airline Officers' 
Association (MNAOA) in 1956 following a merger with an independent marine 
engineers' union. (The 'Airline' in the new title recognized the growing importance of 
its flight engineer membership. ) 
The British affiliation lost only a little weight over the period, despite the many 
pressures on jobs and manning levels, particularly on the labour-intensive railways. 
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The 963,000 of 1946 had reduced to 912,000 in 1964 but the British still accounted 
for over 18% of a total to which 312 organizations were by then contributing. They 
were outnumbered by the USA from 1952 onwards but the British were only 113,000 
short by 1964 (see Table 5) and there was a steadiness and solidity to the Bdtish 
membership that the Americans, for reasons that have already been explored, never 
attained. 
The size alone of the British contributions of members and of money was enough to 
secure respect and due influence for the British affiliates, as did the less tangible 
factors of the British movement's historical prestige, the basing of the ITF's 
headquarters in London and, almost certainly, Britain's war record. There was no 
British General Secretary during the period (though Lyon 160 thought Oldenbroek was 
as 'British' as he was Dutch) and only one Assistant General Secretary (Lawrence 
White) but there were three British Presidents: Benstead, Deakin and Cousins, the 
last for two terms (1958-1960 and 1962-1964). The British claimed most of the 
chairmanships in the maritime and civil aviation sections for much of the period, 
though the inland transport sections tended, probably by tacit agreement, to be left 
largely to the Central Europeans. The written proceedings of the ITF Congresses in 
the period record a prominent British participation in all the debates of any 
significance, as Chapter V will confirm. But, more impressionistically, those pages 
often give off a distinct sense of British self-importance, of an assumption 
[182] 
by British speakers, perhaps unconsciously, that Congress needed always to know 
what the British thought before it could come to a sensible conclusion about 
anything. But in fact there was rarely any such a thing as a British view. For almost 
all the period, the largest two British members, the TGWU and the NUR, were on 
very cool terms at best and at worst were at each other's throats as a great gulf 
opened between their political stances, at least at leadership level, from 1947 
onwards. It was made all the harder for the non-British affiliates to understand their 
positions when both of them did an about-face in a matter of months in 1956-57. 
John Marchbank, General Secretary of the NUR and Vice President of the ITF died 
suddenly shortly before the ITF's ZOdch Congress in May 1946. He was succeeded 
in the NUR by John Benstead who was appointed immediately after the 1946 
Congress as President of the ITF, a very rapid promotion which had almost certainly 
been intended for Marchbank. Benstead left the NUR and the ITF in September 
1947 to become a member of the British Transport Commission, the body given 
overall control of the nationalized transport industry. Howell writes that Jim Figgins, 
who succeeded Benstead, was 'widely seen as close to the CF. 161 Lyonwas 
typically blunter: Figgins was a'vile British Communist ... the only communist on 
the 
Executive Committee'162 and was happy to see him go when the'British affiliates 
were persuaded under pressure to remove him' at the 1950 Congress in favour of 
Deakin. 163 Figgins's personal standing was further diminished during the 1952 
[183] 
Congress when the Railwaymen's Section Conference removed him from its Section 
Committee to make way for Bill Webber, who was about to become General 
Secretary of the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA) and stood 
aggressively on the right of the Labour Party. 164 Figgins retired from the NUR in 
1953 to be succeeded by Jim Campbell under whom Howell describes the NUR as 
still 'left of centre on many issues'. 165Campbell, however, was perceptibly edging 
away from Figgins's position towards the mainstream when in November 1957, by 
cruel irony, he was killed in a road accident in the course of an official visit to the 
Soviet Union. The election some weeks later of Sidney Greene as his successor 
brought an abrupt end to the NUR's left-wing orientation, for Greene was (and the 
members would have known it) 'firmly on the right'. 166 
Arthur Deakin, became the de facto General Secretary of the TGWU when Ernest 
Bevin joined the British coalition government in 1940 and was still its General 
Secretary when he died suddenly on 1 May 1955. Always a powerful figure in the 
ITF, as any leader of the TGWU would be, he had become Vice President in 1952, 
Acting President from 1 January 1954 and President from July 1954. As a militant 
leader of the right within the British TUC and the Labour Party, he had also had an 
agonized and inglorious spell as President of the WFTU (see Chapter V). The 
election of his successor was already in progress at the time of his death 
andproduced a predictable winner, the Assistant General Secretary, A. E. 'Jock' Tiffin, 
[184] 
who had made a Deakinesque speech at the ITF's 1954 Congress on a document 
concerning 'The Fight for Democracy and Peace' when, with Deakin looking on from 
the presidential chair, he had made Jim Campbell a special target. 167 It will never be 
known, however, how faithful Tiffin would have been to Deakin's memory over time, 
for he died in late December 1955. Meanwhile, Frank Cousins, who as National 
Secretary of the union's Road Transport Group had run a respectable third to Tiffin in 
the General Secretary election, had been appointed as Assistant General Secretary. 
Goodman has wdtten that Cousins would have had 'virtually no chance' of becoming 
Assistant General Secretary 'had Deakin lived to preside over his succession' 168 but 
Cousins won the election (unusually, in those days, a ballot of the membership) by a 
massive majority from the highest turn-out in the union's history. 169 
Cousins had been an active member of the ITF Road Transport Workers' Section 
Committee but Deakin had been careful not to let him near an ITF Congress. The 
ITF's Vienna Congress in July 1956 was the first Cousins had attended, as he was 
quick to tell the delegates, and it was one of his first appearances anywhere as 
General Secretary. Newcomer though he was, he was elected Vice President 
of the ITF by the General Council. Nothing he said in Vienna, where his 
contributions were uncharacteristically low-key, signalled his performance at the 
British TUC less than two months later when he proposed the total rejection of the 
[185] 
Conservative government's policy of wage restraint, leaving 'old guards ... in disarray 
and old alliances shaftered'. 170 
It is impossible to know whether the course of the long and costly London bus strike 
from 5 May to 21 June 1958 would have taken a different course if Campbell, 
politically close to Cousins, had not died in December 1957. By Nina Fishman's 
careful account it is very unlikely. What Goodman termed Cousins's 'ingenuously 
sanguine' expectation of support from the railwaymen 'at least the underground 
drivers' 171 was indeed misplaced, for in May, with the busmen's strike in its second 
week, the government sanctioned a settlement of the railway unionsi own claims that 
was too generous to be refused and it was extended to the London Underground 
workers on 20 May. Sidney Greene, who was now leading the negotiations for the 
NUR would have thought it madness not to take the money. The'moderate majority' 
within the TUC shared the resentment felt by the 'old guards' at Cousins's 
presumption in presenting the strike as a common cause and the Minister of Labour, 
lain Macleod, was advised that they 'wanted Cousins taken down a peg'. 172 
The strike ended messily, angrily and with little to show for the busmen's loyal and 
heavy sacrifices. The divisions among its British affiliates over the strike meant that it 
was reported only very briefly in ITF documents and that the TGWU made no attempt 
to seek the ITF's formal support. Like the TUC, however, the ITF saw no problems 
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with financial aid and it agreed in May 1958 to advance E5,000 (a lot of money to the 
ITF, almost 10% of its affiliation fee income for 1958173) in the hope that 'a selected 
number of affiliates' would 'help finance the donation'174which they 'largely' did. 175 
Cousins never referred to the strike during the ITIF Congress in Amsterdam in July 
1958 and immediately the Congress ended the General Council elected him as 
President in succession to Hans Jahn. 
Within the TGWU and the NUR, as personified by Cousins and Greene, the mutual 
resentment stoked by the busmen's strike clearly underlay a very public and 
destructive clash at the ITF's 1960 Congress in Berne, which was bound to be a 
tense event because of deep divisions over the succession to Becu who was about 
to leave for the ICFTU (see Chapter 111). Cousins coped well in the chair but when it 
came to the election of the Executive Committee for the coming term he was 
challenged by Greene for the British seat. The Constitution at the time allowed for 
only one elected seat per country and neither Greene nor Cousins would withdraw. 
A vote of the whole Congress was taken to choose the British candidate and Greene, 
obviously backed by the American RLEA's million and more votes, won comfortably 
by 2,1111,000 to 1,787,600. But his win produced too many railwayman candidates 
and Greene lost out to Frank Hall of the Canadian RLEA in a further vote. It was an 
outcome that the American delegates - all at sea procedurally in the absence of a 
sick Lyon - had not foreseen and Ed Hickey, the labour lawyer on the RLEA 
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delegation, challenged the result by arguing that some of the winners had achieved 
only 'pluralities' and not the 'majorities' demanded by the Constitution. Cousins, still 
in the chair and in no mood to facilitate Sid Greene's resurrection, dismissed 
Hickey's submission and the delegates - probably unsure (were Cousins and the 
interpreters any surer? ) what a 'plurality' was - supported his ruling. 176 Thetwo 
British contenders were left with entirely negative consolations: for Greene that he 
had toppled Cousins from the Presidency and the EC; and for Cousins that Greene 
failed at the last to win a seat himself. 
When he came to the President's customary closing speech, 177Cousins disposed 
quickly of the usual thank-yous and directed an oratorical salvo at the RLEA. 'If the 
RLEA wanted a President of the ITF who would look at their card vote before taking 
a decision, they had done right in voting him out of office'. 178 He also regretted that 
'the American State Department should have thought fit to interfere in the work of the 
Congress', a charge he did not elaborate, but was possibly a general swipe at the 
RLEA's ring-masters, as he saw them. 179 
Cousins had already made it clear that he would not join the Executive Committee as 
a 'co-opted' member and Greene never so much as mentioned the possibility. And 
so the next two years passed without a formal British presence on the Executive 
Committee, although the new General Secretary, Pieter de Vries, went out of his way 
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to keep in close touch with both Cousins and Greene and consulted them on 
anything important. Meanwhile, he laid the ground for a radical shaking up of the 
Constitution (see Chapter 111) which meant that both Greene and Cousins could 
occupy the two more or less reserved British seats on the new Executive Board 
which was elected at the 1962 Congress, where the General Council also restored 
Cousins to the Presidency which he then held until he joined the Labour Government 
in October 1964. 
x. Summa 
The emphasis in this chapter has been on those factors and developments in the 
spread and nature of the ITF's membership over the period which had political 
significance and consequences, though they may not always have been obvious or 
explicitly acknowledged. Oldenbroek, for example, first set out to argue that the ITF 
had to set politics (that is, its traditional social-democratic stance) to one side if the 
Americans were ever to join, but, clever and clear thinker that he was, he would have 
known that any such abnegation would in itself be a political act. In the event, it was 
politics, that is the need to save the ITF from the communists, that brought the 
American railwaymen in. The space devoted to the American affiliates reflects their 
sheer numbers and impact, and even the more sleazy side to the nature and 
practices of unions such as the ILA and the Teamsters has political point for what it 
says about their basic ethos, their ultra 'economism', and the ideologically bereft 
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expectations of their members. No wonder the ITF's governing bodies, still in 
'traditional' hands, were for much of the time at a loss to take in and react to 
American trade union bosses like the ILA's Ryan and the Teamsters' Beck (small- 
time huckster though he was, compared with Hoffa). As for the SIU affair, its initial 
spat with the British NUS had enough political significance to send the CIA high-flyer, 
Ed Wilson, to the SIU's aid and the appalling Banks was imported into Canada as a 
political weapon in the destruction of the CSU which, for political reasons of its own, 
was probably set to self-destruct anyway . The political aspects of the other cases 
given prominence here are self-evident and many of them will be revisited and taken 
further in the next chapter. One final and general point has to be made in order to 
restore any balance that may have been lost in the process of selection and space 
restraints. The 'membership' narrative of this chapter highlights many features that 
constituted problems or even crises. They were too important to be ignored or 
understated but they were in no way typical. The great majority of the affiliates 
turned up, spoke up and paid up, and if the mark of their 'normality' is the absence of 
a mention here, they may regard it as a compliment. 
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Chapter V: Politics 
i. The ideolouical inheritance 
Edo Firnmen was quite certain what unions were really for. It was not the 
'everyday' struggles to defend workers' standards. They were a necessary but 
secondary chore. The 'ultimate purpose' of trade unions was 'the destruction of 
capitalism, the world revolution, the inauguration of socialism. The aims could 
only be achieved, however, by action at international level, for capital had broken 
national boundaries and restraints and the unions had to follow suit if they were 
to confront the 'associated capitalists of various lands' 2successfully. It would be 
a 'crime' for workers to fight sectoral battles for better wages or conditions when 
the 'very life' of the movement was endangered. 3 'International direct action' 
was 'indispensable' and the workers' first step had to be to 'unite under 
International Trade Secretadats 'which had themselves to form links with each 
other. 4A 'general staff' (Fimmen took the class 'war' literally) would have to 
'survey the whole fighting field' and decisions on actions and means would have 
to be taken by a supranational 'supreme authority' made up of the International 
Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and the Red International of Labour Unions 
(RILU), of which the Soviet Russian trade unions were the only substantial 
constituent. I The ITSs should become 'organizationally associated' with the 
IFTU which would thus have two constituents, the national centres and the ITSs. 
This change in the form of the IFTU would avoid the need to create'yet another 
international organization. 6 
Writing in 1924, he was sure that even revolutionary Russia could not escape 
capitalist exploitation, and for that 'practical reason' alone, the ITSs needed 
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contacts with their Russian 'comrades'. 7His enthusiasm for that kind of 'unity' 
had already cost him the secretaryship of the IFTU in 1923 and it was certainly 
not shared by all the ITF's affiliates. He had to assure some very hostile critics at 
the 1926 Congress that he would 'submit' to the ITF EC's decisions but still 
asserted his right to a mind of his own: 'try not to make a eunuch of me', he 
pleaded. 8 The ITF's relations with the IFTU were never afterwards to be more 
than coolly formal and spasmodic attempts to agree on a new structure for the 
IFTU in which the national centres and the ITSs would share power always 
foundered on the central question of the size of the shares. 9 
But whatever the misgivings within the ITIF about the nature and extent of 'unity 
Fimmen's general thesis that capitalist exploitation was the ultimate evil was 
invoked in its response to the Munich Agreement, which the ITF Congress in 
November 1938 denounced as 'tending to perpetuate the domination of the 
capitalists and employers over the working class' and '[paving] the way for new 
conflicts'. 10 By 1939, however, neither of the two steps he had identified as 
prerequisites for the defeat of capitalism had been taken. The ITIF had not 
broken out of its eurocentric confines (see Chapter IV); and the IFTU and the 
RILU were farther than ever from 'unity 
Throughout the 1930s, the Russian unions had not shown the slightest interest in 
a friendly relationship with the ITF, let alone in affiliation, and from 1932 when 
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Ernest Bevin was still calling for an understanding of the Soviet Union's 
I superhuman effort to rebuild a state on socialistic lines 11 1' the ITF's own 
expectations of any rapprochement steadily faded away. When on 30 November 
1939, 'to the dismay and horror of the civilised world the Soviet Union brutally 
attacked her little neighbour of Finland', 12 the ITF produced a film supporting the 
Finns against the'unholy alliance between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia' 13 
and contributed to a'Finnish Relief Fund' sponsored by the British TUC and 
Labour Party. 14When Russia became an'Ally'(and Finland an'enemy'15) the 
all-consuming priorities of survival and then victory seemed to demand a new 
effort to build bridges. A Soviet Union representative, Mikhail Tarasov of the 
railwaymen's union, addressed the ITF International Railwaymen's Conference in 
London in September 1943. The symbolic significance of the event was qualified 
by his failure in a very long speech, devoted to the heroism of Soviet railwaymen 
and the successful practice of 'Socialist emulation', to offer any prospect of a 
relationship with the ITF in future. 16 
ii. Broader horizons 
Torstoff might or might not be right - there is no way now to count the heads - 
that only a 'small minority' in the ITF supported Fimmen's 'political leanings, ' 17 
but by the end of the war Fimmen had gone and his very individual Marxist- 
syndicalist concept of the ITF's r6le and purpose had died with him. There is 
nothing in the documents or the proceedings of the ITF's first post-war 
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Congress, in May 1946, that remotely echoes his revolutionary convictions. The 
Introduction to the Report on Activities to that Congress gave rhetoric ('slogans 
... flaming manifestoes') short shrift. The ITF had 'to enter an age of practical 
achievement and 'make our contribution towards bringing about ... peace and 
prosperity ... ' 18 The sweep and vagueness of such a mission and the reticence 
about means and ends were understandable in the context of a very general 
report to a Congress but they also reflected the substance and tenor of a 
document which Oldenbroek had put to the EC in November 1944.19 The EC 
had approved his ideas for'The Future Programme and Policy of the ITF' in 
which he came down emphatically in favour of the maximum tolerance and 
diversity within the ITF and of widening the ITF's membership and influence. His 
specific application of this ecumenical approach to the case of the American 
transport unions has already been noted and discussed in Chapter IV. The one 
essential commitment required of ITF members was their observance of 'the 
principles of free trade unionism', that is that unions must be free from 'outside 
control' of any kind. The programme, for both the ITF and the international trade 
union movement as a whole, would be to'support the forces - governments or 
political parties - which defend the interests of the workers'. It would also 
'advocate ... the liberation of all oppressed peoples, 
the ensurance [sic] of peace 
and the destruction of militarism'. 20 
The ITF's 'objects' as set out in the new Constitution adopted at that Congress 
were just as broad and rhetorical: 'the struggle against economic exploitation 
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and political oppression'was to be supported 'thus to make working class 
solidarity effective' and the wider goal was'a world order' in which everyone 
would associate 'in freedom and equality for the promotion of the common 
welfare by the joint use of the world's resources'. 21 A resolution on Full 
Employment and Social Security might have been expected to generate an 
ideological exchange but it was adopted unanimously on the recommendation of 
a Congress committee. The mover and the only speaker, Vercruyce of the 
Belgian tramwaymen, saw 'the present economic system' as the source of 'over- 
production' and so, inevitably, of 'the exploitation of labour'. Neither Vercruyce 
nor the resolution, however, pursued any critical analysis of the 'system' itself but 
concentrated on two specific measures, the maintenance of full employment and 
the application of social security schemes, as the means of protecting workers 
against the system's effects. 22 
For all the ideological fuzziness of the ITF's constitutional 'objects', they are as 
good a guide as is to be had to the ITF's political stance in those early formative 
post-war years and it was never refined or further defined in any systematic, 
analytical way to the end of the period. After all, if Oldenbroek was right, 
fuzziness was a posibve, liberating virtue, opening up unions and whole countries 
to the ITF that would otherwise feel alienated. But he would have known and, 
consciously or not, affiliates would have recognized, that the trade union 
'principles' accepted by the EC in 1944 and the simple, even simplistic, 
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constitutional objects' adopted in 1946 stood or fell on a profound political 
assumption: that governments would at the very least allow (or, better, would 
actively encourage) their trade unions to play an active part in public and political 
life. Unions could only survive, as the Nazi experience had so recently proved, 
within a benign political system. If the most favoured model among the affiliates 
had a social-democrat-cum-Labour Party look to it, and if it was commonly 
assumed by insiders and observers alike that at some point the ITF had actually 
embraced a doctrine of that kind, then that was surely self-evident, given the 
nature of the ITF's predominantly European mainstream at that time. 
But in fact the embrace was never formally made and the ITF never explicitly and 
authoritatively located itself anywhere on the political spectrum. Most of its 
European affiliates supported political parties within the Socialist International 
and over the years many of their leaders became very high-ranking political 
figures, Ernest Bevin a celebrated example. In the American tradition, the United 
States affiliates operated politically on the principle of 'reward your friends and 
punish your enemies': most of the friends were progressive Democrats and 
almost all the enemies were Republicans or southern Democrats. In practice, it 
was generally true that many ITFs affiliates, especially the smaller'craft' 
organizations, spent little of their time on 'politics' and limited their political 
involvement to whatever was necessary for the pursuit of their industrial or 
professional agendas, especially in areas such as standard setting or regulation. 
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iii. Surviving the WETQ and co-habitation with the ICFTU 
The first and by far the most testing of the post-war challenges faced by the ITF 
came with the founding in 1945 of the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU). The WFTU, initially the brainchild of the British TUC, had the 
enthusiastic backing of the Soviet Union's All Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions (AUCCTU) and the American Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). 
It was to be, so its supporters claimed, a truly world-wide trade union force, 
based on the affiliation of all the national centres of any importance. Its industrial 
arm would be its 'Trade Departments' (TDs) which would come largely pre- 
fabricated by the 'integration' of the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs). The 
jurisdiction of the TDs would be strictly limited to the concerns of their specific 
'trades'; they would be expressly barred from considering or taking a position on 
anything of general interest. The WFTU governing bodies would decide and 
finance their budgets and would have the final say in appointments to the Trade 
Departments' secretariats. 23 The WFTU and the ITSs shadow-boxed and dug 
their trenches (negotiations' in the true sense of give-and-take never happened) 
for four years from the founding of the WFTU to the schism in January 1949. 
The ITF and Oldenbroek personally led the ITSs' resistance (despite the passing 
awkwardness of having the President of the WFTU, Arthur Deakin, on the ITF 
Executive Committee) and there is an air of inevitability about the outcome in 
the subsequent telling. 24 The general view is that the communist and 
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non-communist forces were doomed to divorce. As Carew put it, 'between the 
Leninist model of trade unionism as adapted to Stalinist totalitarianism and the 
model of unionism practised under capitalism there was little common ground'. 25 
There were many occasions and issues which validated that judgment as the 
Cold War deepened. But Cold War or not, the very narrow but absolutely critical 
point of departure for the ITF was the threat to its survival as an autonomous 
organization: self-standing, financially independent and answerable only to its 
member-organizations. The WFTU insistence on Trade Departments may have 
been 'Lenin ist-Stalinist' (though it was probably the British TUC that thought them 
up! ) and there were countless 'political' issues, current or brewing, over which the 
ITF and the communist faction of the WFTU were bound to clash, but even if that 
had not been so, the one issue of 'autonomy', seen by the ITF as being as 
central to its own legitimacy as to that of any of its affiliates, would have been 
reason enough for the ITF to reject the TD project root and branch. 
Yates's 'promise' to the 1948 Congress that if the ITF was 'submerged' in the 
WFTU then the seafarers would found a'separate Seafarers' International' 26 
was not bluster but his hypothesis was procedurally premature. It would have 
taken a decision by a 'three-quarters' majority of the affiliated membership to 
'dissolve' the ITF and by 1948 it would have been hard to find an affiliate ready 
even to put the motion. The importance that the ITF's affiliates attached to the 
ITF's survival has eluded some commentators, 27but the most cursory dip into 
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the recordS28of the debates on the WFTU issue at the 1946,1948 and 1950 
Congresses, which not all of them have made, ought to have convinced them of 
it. There might have been a 'cloak-and-dagger' air to some of Oldenbroek's 
activities as leader of the ITS resistance, and especially to his dealings with the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL), but he had declared his determination to 
defend the ITF's independence from the outset. Single-minded and relentless as 
he was, Oldenbroek would have used the AFL every bit as much as it thought it 
was using him. 
The schism within the WFTU meant that Yates and the seafarers were never put 
to the trouble of fulfilling his 'promise'. But the ITF and the other ITSs had then to 
decide the nature and the mechanics of their relationship with the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which the 'free' national centres 
founded in December 1949. Oldenbroek's translation to the General 
Secretaryship of ICFTU (see Chapter 111) did not itself guarantee a smooth ride - 
he had new masters to satisfy - but almost his last words to the ITF EC, literally 
within hours of the formal end to his ITF General Secretaryship, were that the 
relationship between the ICFTU and the ITSs should be'an association on a 
footing of equality. 29 
That basic principle underlay the subsequent discussions on the practical form of 
the relationship. Agreement on mutual but purely consultative representabon 
at ICFTU and ITS Congresses, and on collective (but still consultative) ITS 
[213] 
representation on the ICFTU's main governing bodies, had been reached readily 
enough for the ITF Congress in July 1950 to express its appreciation of the 
ICFTU's'speed, goodwill and ... constructive spirit'. 30 Those understandings 
were approved by the ICFTU's Second World Congress in Milan in July 1951 and 
recognized that the ICFTU and the ITSs were part of the same international 
movement, each having autonomous roles but observing an implicit division of 
labour which 'implies the adoption by the ITS of the general policy of the 
ICFTU'. 31 The ITS-ICFTU modus vivendi, arrived at so quickly and 
undramatically, came later to be known rather grandly as the 'Milan Agreement' 
and Carew points out that 'significantly' it was never'ratified' by some ITSs. 32 
But formal 'ratification' by the ITSs seems never to have been considered or 
asked for, at least within the ITF. It took the Milan Agreement so much for 
granted that no reference was made to it either in Becu's very brief report to the 
EC on the Milan Congress (where he had not spoken) or in a substantial 
document to the ITF's 1952 Congress on Relations with the ICFTU. 33 
In the event, the ITIF had no serious dispute with the ICFTU over the period. 
(There were some subsequently: the ITSs' implicit 'adoption' of the ICFTU's 
I general' policy went very much to the 'general' and left ample room for conflict 
on the particulars. ) There was anyway a natural, to a large degree genetic, 
inclination towards a positive relationship: most of the ITF affiliates belonged to 
national centres that were part of the ICFTU and the 'family' ties were close. 
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This did not ensure an identity of view by any means - the TUC had clearly not 
welcomed, at least initially, the enthusiasm with which most British unions had 
supported their ITSs in their confrontation with the WFTU - but there was 
undoubtedly a community of shared principles and instincts among the great 
majority of unions, the 'free' national centres, the ITSs and the lCFTU. This 
generalized harmony of political interests and outlook came to them easily and 
largely unconsciously and, in this less than rigorous ideological environment, was 
rarely theorized. 
iv. The Marshall Plan 
The Marshall Plan, more properly the European Recovery Programme (ERP), 
was a four-year programme of some $17 billion of American economic aid to the 
European participating nations. Proposed by the United States Secretary of 
State, George E. Marshall, in June 1947 and enacted by the United States 
Congress twelve months later, the original proposal allowed, sincerely or not, for 
the possibility of the Soviet Union's participation, but the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
Molotov, rejected the project out of hand, denouncing it as an American 
imperialist plot to subjugate Europe. The ERP's first Administrator, Paul 
Hoffman, who would certainly have known what it was really about, wrote in 
1951, when the Cold War no longer gave him reason to be coy, that the ERP had 
been the economic manifestation of what was at bottom an ideological battle, 'a 
contest between the American assembly line and the communist party line'. 34 
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The ITF was happy to claim in a report to its 1948 Congress that it was the first 
intemational trade union organization to respond formally to the ERP proposal. A 
meeting of the General Council in November 1947 welcomed the project, offered 
the ITF's co-operation and decided that the ITF should convene a conference on 
the ERP for all the ITF affiliates in the countries most involved. 35 But by the time 
the ITF conference gathered in April 1948 in Luxembourg, the western European 
national centres had met a month previously in London, exasperated at the 
months of resistance by the Russian AACCTU, abefted by the WFTU's General 
Secretary, Louis Saillant, to the demands from the British TUC and the American 
CIO that the WFTU take a position on the ERP. 'Taken together with the support 
of the Christian trade unions', Carew writes, 'the conference provided a solid 
enough demonstration of western European labour's approval of the Marshall 
Plan'. It also established a Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to 
participate in the programme's implementation. 36 
The attendance at the ITF's Luxembourg conference a few weeks later 
(6 to 8 April 1948) was notable for the presence of a heavy contingent from the 
USA. The American unions were represented by Bert Jewell of the RLEA and 
Irving Brown, at that time the European representative of the AFL's Free Trade 
Union Committee, but there was also a group of observers from 'United States 
government departments ', identified only by their names, not their functions, in 
the conference documentation. 37They (and Brown) would have applauded 
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Jewell's wholehearted commendation of the ERP which embodied, he claimed, 
all the principles advocated by the American trade union movement during the 
consultations on its formulation. They had insisted that the ERP should 
contribute to the strengthening of free trade unions, which should be given a r6le 
in the project's administration and implementation. The ERP plan, Jewell 
insisted, would be a 'powerful' contribution to world peace, 'unless Russia wills 
otherwise'. 38 Jim Figgins of the British NUR seized a rare moment of freedom 
from Deakin's baleful presence (he had a genuine prior commitment) to explain 
that though 'the aims and objects of the Plan ... are sincere and honest', it was 
basically flawed. It did not provide a way 'to overcome the formidable tariff 
barriers of the USA' and Europe's economic salvation lay in its 'progressively 
increasing trade between ... eastern and western Europe ', which was why the 
British government favoured 'balanced' and 'expanded' trade with the USSR. 39 
(A little more than a year later he was much more robust: 'the Marshall Plan was 
at best an intelligent means adopted by the capitalist class to safeguard US 
interests'. 40) But the general political tide within the ITF swept away even 
Figgins's uncharacteristically moderate reservations. The ITF's ERP conference 
gave the project its approval and expressed its appreciation 'of the open- 
handedness with which the US government had offered help under the ERF. 41 
Omer Becu was equally unequivocal in his Presidential Address to the ITF's 
1948 Congress. The ERP was 'an attempt, inspired by generosity and 
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enlightenment, to prevent the ruin of Europe'. The ITF was not only prepared to 
play any part assigned to it ... [but]... will also fight uncompromisingly the forces 
which still strive to sabotage it. ' Later in the Congress proceedings, Reint 
Laan Sr of the Dutch transport workers was ready to put a figure on the good the 
ERP had already done: 'If we had not received this help in April [1948] ... the 
standard of living of the Dutch people would have been twenty-five per cent 
lower'. He rejected communist accusations that'we are placing ourselves at the 
service of American imperialism ... we have the fate of Czechoslovakia and the 
death of Masaryk as a warning of what would happen if the workers were to 
listen to them [the communistsf. 42 
Such stout defences of the motivation and effect of the ERP and such a forthright 
denunciation of its communist opponents would have been music to the ears of 
two Congress guests, Clinton Golden and Bert Jewell, the joint chief Labour 
Advisers to the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA), which 
administered the ERP. Golden came from the Steelworkers' Union (CIO), in his 
young days a 'radical' socialist, a former railway fireman, union organizer, labour 
educator, an intellectual eminence and, towards the end of his career, a Harvard 
academic. Jewell, the first American to serve on the ITF Executive Committee 
and briefly the International Representative of the RLEA (see Chapter IV), now 
appeared at the Congress as an important American public servant, the AFL's 
nominee and its counterweight to Golden. 43 
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That both of them felt the need to address an ITF Congress was almost surely a 
sign of the ITF's importance to the ERP and not simply the result of the 
understanding between their not very fraternal patrons, the CIO and AFL, that 
everything Golden and Jewell did officially had to be done jointly. 44 By their own 
account, they were men of high status within the ECA structure. In Golden's 
words, 'organized labour ... has a co-equal position with other groups'. 
Conscious, perhaps, that many in his audience might be unaware how capitalism 
had moved on, he explained that despite the 'past great sins against humanity 
committed in its name', capitalism in the USA had become 'democratic' and 
'capable of progressive change in the direction of industrial democracy which 
European labour seeks to achieve'. He endorsed the welcome that Oldenbroek 
had recently given to the ERP's stress on economic planning: 'properly planned' 
economic expansion was not incompatible with maintaining and strengthening 
'democratic institutions'. He knew'of nothing within the ECA which will militate 
against such a programme'. 45 
How convincing the audience found Golden's thoughts on capitalism's American 
mutation cannot be known, but almost everything else about his presentation 
was sure to play well with the great majority of the European delegations at 
whom it was aimed. An assured and respected place for the trade union 
movement at the heart of policy-making and decision-taking, an assertion of the 
necessity for economic planning, a declaration of faith in the synergy of economic 
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growth and strong democracies - very few of his listeners would have hesitated 
to embrace the ERP on that prospectus. 
Golden's choice of the relatively higher, more theoretical ground had been 
preceded by Bert Jewell's briefer and more homely contribution. He stressed his 
family ties (very recent in fact) to 'the greatest international labour organization in 
the world today', whose members held the future in their hands, for'as the 
transport workers go, so the world goes'. Most of the audience would have 
recognized the all-American hyperbole as a friendly act and would have liked the 
peroration, with its assurance that the ECA saw labour as'human beings' not as 
a 'commodity. They were unlikely to have been bothered by, or perhaps to have 
noticed, his care always to specify that when the ECA referred to any kind of r6le 
for'labour he meant 'non-commu n ist labour organizations' or 'non-Communist 
European trade union leaders'. 46 
There is no call here to consider at length whether the ERP produced the 
benefits for European workers that Golden and Jewell demanded of it. The 
significance for the ITF of the ERP issue lay in the obligation it placed on the ITF 
to decide where it intended to locate itself politically as the Cold War tensions 
deepened. Having borrowed so profitably from Carew, however, it is only right to 
note that he has tracked the American unions' growing dismay at the ERP's 
failure to justify the support they had given it. He concludes generally that the 
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effect of the ERP was to tame the European unions. The ECA's priorities of 
'sound money' and 'productivity', and the'Marshall Plan's values ... provided a 
congenial environment in which deradicalising pressures could operate on the 
[European] labour movement in the 1950s'. 47 
v. The ITF and the Cold War 
To the WFTU loyalists, the ITF's support for the ERP would simply have 
confirmed their conviction that the 'Yellow' ITF was the home of 'infamous traitors 
of the working class... venal lackeys of the warmongers ... nothing more than 
fascist beasts. In the specific matter of western arms shipments the ITF was 
'helping the Anglo-American rulers ... to brutally murder innocent women, 
children and old people'. 48 
That particular outburst had come from the General Secretary of the WFTU's 
Land and Air Transport Workers' Trade Department in September 1950 and was 
prompted presumably by the ITF's reaction to the Korean War, which began on 
26 June 1950 shortly before the ITF's 1950 Congress. The Congress Resolutions 
Committee (on which Irving Brown49represented the RLEA) produced a draft 
resolution on 'the War in Korea'. Presented to Congress by Ferri-Pisani of the 
French Seamen's Federation FO (of whom much more below), it pledged 'aid 
and support to the troops now fighting for freedom and democracy; called upon 
'the members of the ITF to do everything in their power to ensure the shipment 
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and delivery of arms to the fighting front; and condemned the 'discreditable 
efforts of the Cominform and the WFTU' to 'sabotage' the United Nations war 
effort. 50 
Niilo W5115ri of the Finnish Seamen's Union, a militant anti-communist but 
conscious of his country's imposed neutrality, was concerned that the ITF was 
becoming 'entangled' in 'power politics' and he was supported from another anti- 
communist source, the French FO railwaymen's Bodeau, 51 who thought that 'the 
best way to fight Communism is to raise standards in the backward countries'. In 
contrast to the principled reservations from the right, the one contribution from 
the left, from Jim Figgins of the British NUR, was very formal and procedural: the 
war had begun too recently for affiliates to have the time to form considered 
judgments and the NUR's Annual Conferencejust before ... this Congress' had 
taken no decisions on Korea. The NUR would abstain. 
Deakin had no time for either principled or procedural shilly-shallying. How could 
the ITF 'have no point of view to put' on 'tremendous issues' like the Korean war.? 
As a member of the TUC General Council he thought he could speak for the 
British movement 'collectively'. Would Figgins say that the ITF 'must stand 
passively by' if Great Britain were attacked? 'International Communism has been 
seeking to enslave the free peoples of the world' and 'it is no use talking about 
democracy unless you are prepared to do something to keep it'. He carded the 
day. The 'general principle'of the first draft was approved there and then 
[2221 
with eighteen abstentions and a final version, slightly amended to meet some 
Swedish textual quibbles and W5115d's concerns, was adopted very comfortably, 
with only two against and twenty-two abstentions. 52 
Deakin's uninhibited assertion that the ITF had a positive duty to declare its 
position on 'tremendous issues' may have been accepted in that instance, but 
the ITF was usually concerned to find an industrial aspect to political events and 
crises which touched on trade union principles and workers' rights. For example, 
Hans Jahn described to the ITF's 1954 Congress how in June 1953 a protest by 
a small group of East Berlin building workers against 'increased output demands' 
had grown overnight to become a mass movement'for freedom and democracy I. 
Warming to his theme (perhaps too enthusiastically for complete coherence), he 
speculated on the political path to be taken by the vast populations of Asia: 'are 
these thousands of millions of men [sic] in the east Communist by conviction? 
I say they ... are 
Communists by hunger'. 53 A resolution at the ITF's 1956 
Congress on 'Solidarity with the workers of Poznan', which compared the Polish 
workers' demonstrations in June 1956 to the similar events in East Germany 
three years previously, declared that Polish and East German workers had 
I neither bread nor freedom' and 'as everyone knows' the two are 'inseparable'. 54 
The Suez crisis was gathering pace as the ITF's 1956 Congress convened and 
on its last day, 26 July, President Nasser of Egypt placed the Canal Zone under 
his government's control. The news seems not to have reached the Congress 
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hall before a discussion of the Suez crisis which first considered a draft resolution 
from the Finnish Seamen's Union (W5115d was evidently no longer worded about 
Russian sensitivities) condemning communist arms shipments to the Middle East 
as'a danger to peace'. Ze'ev Barash of the Israeli Seamen's Union and John 
Hawk of the American SIU combined incongruously to persuade 'an 
overwhelming majority' not to proceed with the Finnish anti-communist motion 
but instead to demand an end to the Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping 
through the Suez Canal on the grounds that the action violated the international 
principle of freedom of navigation. 55 
In contrast to the ITF's response to the Korean War, the ITF's reaction to Suez 
was unexpectedly muted and by reducing its concern to the one principle of 
maritime law, it came uncomfortably close to bathos. 56The spontaneous and 
unanimous reaction to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956 was of 
a wholly different order. The Hungarian revolutionaries' cause was embraced by 
ITF dockers' unions within hours of the arrival of the Russian tanks on 
4 November. Russian cargoes were boycotted the next day in the main Dutch 
and Belgian ports and Becu moved quickly to convene an emergency conference 
of the seafarers' and dockers' unions on 8 and 9 November to discuss whether a 
'full-scale' boycott of Soviet shipping was feasible. Executive Committee 
members were asked to attend if they could and eight did so. 
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Becu's account of what happened next is unmistakably bitter. 57 The conference 
unanimously called upon the lCFTU 'to undertake an international boycott of 
Russian goods and services'. The ITF dockers and seafarers were ready to take 
their full part in the action and they called upon other transport workers also 'to 
play their respective parts'. 58 The appeal to the lCFTU had been encouraged by 
Becu's report to the conference on discussions he had already had with 
Oldenbroek and with Walter Schevenels, the General Secretary of the ICFTU's 
European Regional Organization (ERO), who had advised him that as soon as 
the ITF decided on a boycoft'they would call on their constituent national trade 
union centres to back it up with all the means at their disposall, a necessary and 
welcome commitment to the ITF's maritime unions, whose members' pay and 
possibly jobs could be at dsk. 
The almost instantaneous response to the ITF's call was an emergency 
conference of European trade union representatives, convened jointly by the 
ICFTU, the ERO and the ITF in Hamburg on 15 November 1956. It was agreed 
there that 'the free Labour Movement should give further practical and organized 
expression'to its 'indignation and horror' at the Soviet invasion and a twelve-man 
committee then asked European affiliates of the ICFTU for their comments on a 
list of proposals, including a boycott of Soviet goods and services 'for a limited 
period'. Only eight of the lCFTU's European affiliates replied at all and of those 
only three favoured a boycott, one of them conditionally. The proposal for a 
boycott died at that point: 'rejection, almost by default', as Becu saw it. 
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In a rueful look back at what he clearly thought was a shaming failure of the 
international movement's nerve and resolve, Becu had a few uncharacteristically 
philosophical reflections on trade union action for political purposes. 'Was it 
perhaps wrong to support the underground fight against Mussolini, the struggle of 
the Spanish workers against Franco ... the trade unionists of Hungary ... under 
almost identical circumstances in 19207 Hungarian workers themselves had 
appealed 'to the world's dockers and seafarers to refuse to handle goods for 
Russia' and had 'believed that the world's trade unionists would help them'. The 
whole issue of international solidarity and of international boycott actions 
specifically is discussed further in the last pages of Chapter A 
The great crises such as the Korean War and the Hungarian uprising were 
untypical dramas, however, in a Cold War which proceeded routinely by the 
relentless building of military and political alliances which were always presented 
as purely defensive reactions to the constant threat of aggression from the other 
side. For the ITF, with its Second World War experience still fresh in the 
collective memory, the combining of military strength and democratic virtue, on 
which the West claimed to depend for its survival, would have been both familiar 
and entirely justified. 
And so, no sooner had the 1950 Congress decided the ITF's position on the 
I Korean War, than it moved on to a resolution on the 'Transport of Arms . 
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The ITF, it declared, 'endorses the "Atlantic Pact" as 'a defensive alliance of the 
peoples of Western Europe and North America', the declared aims of which 'are 
the very expression of the beliefs and the will of the peoples'. The ITF would 
'frustrate Communist endeavours to sabotage the fulfilment of the Pact' and the 
resolution specifically approved the action the ITF had already taken to meet that 
threat by setting up'Vigilance Committees' (of which much more below). 
Meanwhile, Congress'calls upon the members of the ITF to continue the carrying 
and handling of all [Western] arms and ammunition'. The resolution was carried 
without debate, with two votes against and four abstentions (none identified) - 59A 
further 'Resolution on Dictatorships' reminded 'the democratic governments of 
their moral duty to limit their dealings with all dictatorial regimes to what is strictly 
unavoidable'. Was that a warning against the Western governments'getting too 
close to, say, Franco's Spain? If so, it was a pity it was not more explicit. 60 
The 1950 Congress set a pattern of intense ideological breast-beating for the 
following two Congresses. In the very last hour of the 1952 Congress, for 
example, a draft resolution on 'Countries behind the Iron Curtain' was moved by 
Metslov of the exiled Estonian Seamen's Union. It condemned 'the evil of 
Communist domination and tyranny' in 'Eastern and Central Europe) , and 
proposed that the Congress 'pledges its full moral and material support to the 
fighters for freedom' in those countries. It was again W5115d, from the Finnish 
Seamen's Union just across the water, who objected that countries such as 
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Lithuania, Rumania and Bulgaria had had Fascist regimes before the war and the 
resolution could be taken as support for like-minded groups seeking a return to 
power. WNIM's declaration and his union's abstention were noted and the 
resolution carried'nem. con. '. 61 
That such an unqualified and open-ended commitment ('full moral and material 
support') should be taken on so airily, without a passing thought, W5115ri 
honourably excepted, perhaps simply shows how serious resolution fatigue can 
be. Two days previously the Congress had debated a draft resolution on 
Transport in War and Peace devoted to the essential r6le of transport workers 
and the transport industries in the struggle for'lasting peace', the prospects for 
which were 'endangered by dictatorial powers', and in 'the achievement of social 
justice through the appropriate institutions of the United Nations'. 62There was 
no mistaking its tenor or its targets, even if the language was rambling or even at 
times incoherent, and it made Figgins very angry. 63 The Korean War'was 
being fought in American interests and ... when the third world war 
did develop 
he hoped the Americans would be able to take what was coming to them, as they 
were the instigators of it ... 
America ... 
had no alternative, if it wished to preserve 
capitalism, but to prepare for war and to wage war. Battling on over 
'interruptions', he reported that an NUR delegation had attended 'the great 
demonstration for peace in the [Moscow] Red Square on 7 November [19511' and 
had seen the great strides made in the Soviet economy since the war. At that 
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rate 'in about five or six years it [the Soviet Union] would have a higher standard 
of living than any other country in the world'. Percy Morris of the British TSSA64 
was sure Figgins 'would be put to death' if he made that kind of speech behind 
the Iron Curtain against Russia. It was'an insult to their [the Congress's] 
intelligence' and completely unrepresentative of British trade union and Labour 
Party opinion which was one of gratitude to the American people for their'help'. 
Jahn said workers in the West had 'many a bone to pick with the capitalist 
system' but at least they had the right to strike. Anyone who struck in Soviet 
Russia 'would be shot'. 65 The resolution was then adopted nem. con. Deakin 
wanted the Congress record to show (as it eventually did) that'Figgins had not 
been supported by his own delegation'. 66 
The high political temperature that was such a feature of the 1952 Congress was 
higher still in 1954. A special place was found on the Congress agenda for The 
Transport Workers' Organizations in the fight for Democracy and Peace, backed 
by a document67which set out to demonstrate that'organized transport labour' 
had both a general and a particular 'function' in 'the prevention of war and the 
defence of democracy'. Communism was 'the gravest threat to the peace of the 
world and the freedom of the peoples'. The'maritime and waterside industries 
and transport generally'were 'of strategic significance' in Communist 'plans'. A 
lull at that time in the communists' attempts at'stining up trouble' in ships and 
ports was tactical. Meanwhile, 'the most effective answer to the challenge of 
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Communist aggression and intrigue' was 'to pursue energetically ... the social 
interests of the workers ... Discontent and unrest are the most fertile soil for 
Communist intrigue'. Just as the ITF had confronted dictatorships in the past, it 
had to be ready 'to take its stand for right against wrong' in the face of the 
Communist threat. The report singled out for extended reference the topical 
issue of the European Defence Community -'another bulwark of Democracy ... 
in process of erection' - under which West Germany could be re-armed. 
'German rearmament cannot be delayed indefinitely ... today it is the friends of 
Democracy who are predominant in Western Germany'. Towards the end of the 
report, delegates were reminded that 'dictatorships in countries like Spain and 
Portugal, Argentina and other Latin American republics may not be as efficient as 
the Soviet prototype, but they are ... equally as obnoxious'. The emphasis was 
soon back, however, on the 'Soviet-occu pied countries' where 'the spirit of 
resistance is by no means dead'. The ITF and its unions had 'various channels' 
through which they could 'keep in touch with the underground movements' and 
so, as &one of our first duties ... keep alive the 
flame of resistance where it still 
burns'. 
The debate began with a call from Benghozzia of the Tunisian railwaymen to 
remember that 'colonial oppression' presented dangers as great as those of 
Fascism and Communism but any chance (or hope) that the discussion might be 
broadened out in that direction was lost when he sat down. 68For the rest of the 
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session, it was largely devoted to the issue of German rearmament and 
dominated by the British delegates - Campbell of the NUR from the left and 
Haworth, Webber (both from the TSSA) and Deakin (speaking from the 
Presidential chair) from the right - perhaps relishing another round of a very 
rough argument that they had been having among themselves in Britain. The 
contributions of Jahn and Kummernuss, men closer to the frontline than the 
British delegates, were given scant consideration or even respect. When 
Kummernuss asked 'are we to call upon these young [German] men, who have 
passed through National Socialism and the war, and who have become 
opponents of war, are we to call upon them to support war? ', Deakin's 
impatience (again from the chair) was magisterial: 'Our German friends have got 
to face up to this. You cannot sit on the fence and ask the rest of the world to 
defend democracy in Germany... '69The report was finally approved on a card 
vote by 1,677,193 to a puzzlingly small 357,403 against, which was lower than 
the NUR's affiliated membership of 360,071. Perhaps Campbell's impassioned 
peroration (Ior God's sake don't let us say we are in favour of a third world war') 
had been softly translated into one of the abstentions, which together added up 
to a significant 526,66870 and were perhaps a warning to the ITF leadership 
against imposing similar agenda items and reports on future Congresses. 
The 1954 debate was indeed the last of its kind in the period. No general 
political resolution of any kind was produced by the next four Congresses and 
when Joe Curran of the American NMU proposed in September 1962 
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that the ITIF seafarers' and dockers' unions should consider'a boycott against 
Cuba', De Vries replied with a catalogue of all the technical difficulties and 
advised him that since'the question was a purely political one ... [it was] ... more 
within the province of the ICFTU'. The ITIF's EB 'endorsed the General 
Secretary's action' in November 1962 and hoped that with the 'verified removal of 
the threat to the peace of the world' (the Cuban missile crisis having been settled 
just beforehand) there would be no 'limitations' on 'the freedom of lawful 
navigation'. That rebuff was underlined brusquely when Curran tried again in 
August 1963, on behalf of both the NMU and the ILA, to interest the maritime 
sections in taking action against Cuba. A Seafarers' Section Conference 'noted' 
his proposals but decided 'not to take any action on them'. 71 
vi. Political fall-out 
The ITF's loss of Communist-led affiliates in France and Italy to the WFTU's new 
TDs has been described in Chapter IV. Only the Finnish Transport Workers' 
Union and the New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union followed suit and both 
were formally expelled by the 1950 Congress. 72Politically motivated 
disaffiliations were generally rare, but two later cases require reference here. 
The first, and in its ramifications by far the less serious, concerned the Japanese 
Federation of Private Railway Workers' Unions (Shitetsu), which withdrew from 
the ITF in July 1953 after its Annual Convention had reproached the ICFTU for 
[2321 
'supporting' the 'rearmament' of Japan. The ITF was evidently found guilty of the 
same offence 'by implication only', as the ITF's report73put it. But the report also 
recognized that the 'background' was 'clearly political' and there was no denying 
that if the Shitetsu Convention had disliked the ICFTU's politics, it would have 
found the ITF's equally unappealing. The ICFTU's and the ITF's support for the 
'United Nations' in the Korean War would certainly have been a big factor in 
Shitetsu's departure. 
The second case, the expulsion of the Canadian Seamen's Union (CSU) by the 
ITF's 1950 Congress, 74meant the loss of 6,000 members from a declining 
Canadian merchant marine but Tofahm insisted it was a necessary sacrifice to 
principle when he came to support the relevant motion on behalf of the EC. He 
alleged that the CSU, like the Finnish transport workers and New Zealand 
dockers, had 'joined' the WFTU. The motion in fact stopped well short of that, 
instead accusing the CSU of having 'conferred secretly'with the WFTU. Those 
secret contacts had allegedly concerned the Canadian seamen's strike in 1949 
(see below) but the general indictment was that the leaders of the CSU 'are the 
lackeys'of 'an outside power' (presumably the Soviet Union) at whose behest the 
Communist leaders of the CSU had begun and conducted the strike. The CSU 
was not therefore a 'free' union in the sense of the ITF's Constitution. 
The consequences of the CSU's strike in terms of the imposition of the Canadian 
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SIU and the gangster Hal Banks on Canadian seamen have been discussed in 
Chapter IV but for some ten weeks in the summer of 1949 the immediate 
consequences were also seriously felt in Great Britain as British dockers took 
I unofficial' action in support of the CSU. 
The strike began in April 1949 after the shipowners had decided to cut wages 
and end the CSU's control of recruitment and engagement through its 'hiring 
hall'. A violent clash in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in late April 1949, when armed SlU 
'goons' shot a number of CSU pickets, and the government's subsequent refusal 
to have the matter examined by parliament have been cited by Lipton in support 
of his finding of 'collaboration between shipowners, government andSIU'. 75 By 
May 1949 striking CSU crews 'had tied up Canadian shipping at ports in Great 
Britain, Western Europe, Latin America, Africa and New Zealand'. 76 
But in Canada itself, the Canadian 'international' unions, under pressure from 
their Amedcan headquarters, demanded and achieved the suspension of the 
CSU from its national centre, the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC), in July 
194977on the grounds that its strike was harming members of other TLC unions 
and was part of a global communist conspiracy. Two months later, the TLC 
Convention adopted a motion barýring any'known communist'from holding office 
in TLC bodies either nationally or provincially. 78 
For some labour historians and commentators such as Lipton and for some 
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surviving CSU activist veterans, the CSU strike was a classic defence of union 
rights and of the members'wages and conditions which was caught up in Cold 
War paranoia, wilfully misrepresented and then betrayed. 79But the allegations 
that the CSU was indeed communist-controlled and that its strike was designed 
to serve the communist cause are not easily waved away. In an article, Death of 
a Union, published in Macleans magazine in December 1950 and reprinted 
immediately in the ITIF Journal, 80 T. G. (Gerry) McManus, Secretary-Treasurer of 
the CSU until 1 July 1950 and a member of the Canadian Communist Party from 
its foundation in 1936 describes how he went to work for the CSU on the party's 
instructions in 1945 and how party officials organized and ensured the party's 
control of union elections and policy. He alleged that the 1949 strike was called 
'at the secret request of the British Communist Party to create an artificial strike 
issue for the workers of London'. Harry Davis, the CSU's Communist President, 
had then visited Europe for two meetings, with 'executive members' of the WFTU 
and with 'the dock workers' fraction of the British Communist Party', and had 
returned to tell his comrades 'exultantly' that 'We can strike the wodd! ' Davis 
appointed his brother as the CSU representative in London and he then 
instigated the British dockers' 'solidarity' action which began in support of the 
CSU strikers on two Canadian Pacific vessels when their ships docked in London 
and triggered similar actions in the major British ports. 
It is not necessary to believe McManus in every particular or to be sure of his 
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motives (or, indeed, to respect him when he wants his readers to know that the 
'real name' of the Davis family was 'Popovich'81), but there is some authority in 
his account of how the communist group manipulated the CSU's electoral 
processes: no ballot rigging, no corruption, but dedicated, disciplined, single- 
minded planning and organizing. The party was also tactically astute: 'often the 
party will lay down objectives ... and prescribe courses of action which are 
perfectly sound and valid'. 82 Abella effectively endorses McManus's central 
charge against the party when he concludes that although the communists 
'provided first-rate leadership' in the CSU (and in some other important unions), 
'unbending loyalty to communist policy destroyed their [the communists'] 
credibility with most Canadian trade unionists'. 83 
Nowhere was 'solidarity' with the CSU anything like as extensive or as lengthy as 
in Great Britain. 84 A Canadian vessel was first'biacked' in support of the CSU at 
the end of March 1949 and the last boycott was lifted towards the end of July. 
On 29 June the dispute seemed finally to have ended when the CSU, by then 
fatally weakened, came to a face-saving settlement with the Canadian owners, 
but the CSU then claimed that the owners were not implementing the agreement 
in good faith and the strikes which had developed from the 'blacking' boycotts in 
Avonmouth, Bristol and Liverpool spread within the London docks as the port 
employers imposed what to the strike leaders was nothing less than a lock-out, 
by insisting that if 'blacked' ships were not worked, then all work would stop in 
the docks concerned. 
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The government declared a formal State of Emergency on 11 July 1949 but one 
week later, with some 7,000 troops at work on stikebound ships, the number of 
strikers in London had grown to 15,000. On 21 July Harry Davis, President of the 
CSU, arrived in London and after intensive meetings with the leaders of the 
National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers (NASD) and the small but 
strategically important Watermen, Lightermen, Tugmen and Bargemen's Union 
(WLTBU) announced on 22 July that the CSU was ending its strike in Great 
Britain in return for a promise from the owners that the strikers would not be 
victimized. (it was McManus who informed the Canadian government of the 
decision. ) The strikers then voted to return to work. 85 
As the dispute developed, the British Labour government's concern had 
deepened and by the end it was close to desperation. On 11 June 1949, an 
exasperated Minister of Labour, George Isaacs, declared as a 'plain fact' that 
British dockers were being 'used' by communists who were out'to dislocate our 
trade and thus retard our economy'. 86 The Home Secretary, Chuter Ede, 
speaking on the eve of the State of Emergency saw the strikes as 'a challenge to 
the whole authority of the State'. To the Attorney-General, Sir Hartley 
Shawcross, the unofficial strikes were the means by which the communists were 
out to 'destroy Social Democracy, our way of life'. Aneurin Bevan, Minister of 
Health, spoke of 'malignant forces' and the 'two dangers of Fascism and 
Communism'. 87 
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The government's plight would have weighed heavily on Deakin personally. His 
union had apparently lost control or even respect. The Bristol dockers, for 
example, had refused early in June to give so much as a hearing to Arthur Bird, 
the TGWU's National Docks Secretary. 88 The union's position in London was 
complicated by the substantial presence of the NASD (which never showed any 
interest in joining the ITF) and Deakin was obliged on 20 June to offer a 
humiliating defence of his union by anouncing that the dockers holding the two 
Canadian ships in London did not belong to the TGWU. And so it was that the 
TGWU, the giant of the British movement, led by a household name and a real 
power in the land, was seen for much of the time as marginalized and irrelevant. 
Most wounding of all was the fact that the strike movement was headed by 
TGWU activists in open defiance of all their union's instructions and appeals. 
With the London strikes still unresolved, the TGWU's conference (Biennial 
Delegates' Meeting) in July 1949 decided by 426 to 208 that no member of the 
Communist Party (or'the Fascist Party' [sic]) could hold any office in the union. 89 
A union enquiry came up with names of the leading TGWU activists who had 
defied the union's authority and had colluded with 'known Communists' in 
promoting the strikes. A further enquiry looked into the special case of the 
London actions and three culprits were eventually expelled, four were barred 
, 90 from holding union office and one was 'warned . 
The ITF did not feature prominently in the reporting or public discussion of the 
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British dock strikes in 1949, though Isaacs made much in one of his statements 
of the ITF's judgment - coming from 'the most responsible' international 
organization - that the Canadian ships were not truly'black'. 91 Yet the ITF had 
been keeping a close and apprehensive watch on the Canadian situation 
throughout and its European affiliates in particular were shocked by the TGWUs 
disarray. What hope for them if the mightiest of British unions could be reduced 
to apparent impotence in an industry where the fabled Bevin had once been 
idolized? How could they best defend themselves against such forces? 
The CSU leadership seemed set on confirming their worst fears and suspicions. 
When Harry Davis arrived in London at the climax of the July stdke he came 
directly from a conference of the WFTU's maritime Trade Department in 
Marseilles which had resolved to give 'immediate and effective' support to the 
CSU 'and London dockers'. 92 
vii, Vqflance Comm#tees' 
No ITIF meeting seems ever to have found the time or the inclination during or 
after the CSU strike to consider dispassionately its various causes and 
motivations. No-one in the ITIF therefore appears to have recognized that it was 
entirely possible to justify the strike by reference to the most fundamental of 'free' 
trade union principles and that that jusfification should weigh no less heavily in 
determining the ITIF's position, for all the efforts of the CSU's communist 
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leadership to exploit the strike for their political ends. But with the enemy at the 
gate there was no mood for that kind of complication. The seemingly unanimous 
perception of the ITF's EC and of its seafarer and docker affiliates was that the 
CSU strike and the 'solidarity' actions were part of some great communist design. 
An ITF Joint Dockers' and Seafarers' Conference ITF met in Rotterdam in August 
1949 and decided to recognize the Canadian District of the SlU as being the 
'most representative of the seamen of Canada' and 'the ITF [seamen's] affiliate in 
Canada. ' A resolution asserted that'Communist and crypto-Communist 
organizations' were out'to frustrate economic recovery' and to subvert free 
unions so as 'to sacrifice [their] members' interests to the designs of Soviet 
foreign policy. ' Workers were urged 'to meet the challenge by waging an 
offensive [sic] campaign against the Communist menace wherever it shows 
itself. ' The ITF EC should do everything that was 'necessary to conduct and 
coordinate the anti-Communist campaign on the national and international 
planes. ' 93 
The resolution was backed by further recommendations on the form and 
mechanics of the 'campaign' and was put to the EC meeting in October 1949, 
where the initial reaction was to see the 'task' as one for the 'new' international, 
the ICFTU, which was about to be founded. The communist attack, it was 
argued, might be concentrated first on the 'waterfront industry' but its target was 
the free trade union movement as a whole. Pending the enlistment of the ICFTU 
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and the other ITSs, however, it was agreed that the ITF should 'make a start with 
the counter-attack'by establishing a'Vigilance Committee'of six members, two 
each from the Seafarers I, Dockers' and Inland Navigation Sections, under the 
chairmanship of Tom Yates, Chairman of the Management Committee. 94The 
first requirement was regular information on relevant activities and developments 
'in as many ports ... as possible', but particulady in 'danger areas' such as 
'France, Italy, North Africa, Australia, New Zealand, US West Coast and the 
whole of South East Asia'. A 'close watch' was to be kept on the WFTU and its 
madtime Trade Department. Communist propaganda had to be countered and 
the free unions' message spread among seafarers and dockers. The EC asked 
dockers' unions to make donations of 3d (old) pence per member to help meet 
the costs of the campaign. 95 
The first meeting of the Central Vigilance Committee (CVC) was held in London 
on 23 and 24 January 1950, with Yates presiding over Haugen (Norway) and 
Ferri-Pisani (France) for seafarers; Bird (Great Britain) and Dekeyzer (Belgium) 
for dockers; and Hildebrand (Germany) and Smeding (Netherlands) for the inland 
navigation workers. 96 Given its global mandate, it was a surprisingly small group 
from a very restricted catchment area and at first sight its decision to sponsor 
three Regional Vigilance Committees (RVCs) did little to broaden its presence, 
for two of the RVCs were northern European: one for Scandinavia and the Baltic 
and the other for the North Sea and the Atlantic. The third was to be 
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for the 'Mediterranean', an area of particular concern to Ferri-Pisani who had 
pressed at the Rotterdam seafarers' and dockers' conference for an ITF office to 
cover the 'Western Mediterranean'. 97 
The first CVC meeting produced a long resolution denouncing the communists' 
policies and intentions in general but specifically highlighting their plan to 
interfere with Atlantic Pact shipments by 'all possible means' which could include 
'violence and sabotage in order to intimidate the workers. ' The Atlantic Pact was 
an 'instrument' for the defence of democracy and the CVC called upon ITF 
affiliates to oppose in every way they could 'the political campaign which has 
been launched against Western Europe by the Cominform. ' The ITF EC in 
February 1950 endorsed the resolution unanimously and the message was 
pressed home with red-blooded enthusiasm by Yates in the ITF Joumal. 98 
The meeting showed evident satisfaction at the 'energetic action' being taken 'in 
the different countries ... to purge the unions of communist influencel, which was 
believed mostly to be 'negligible I, though 'care would have to be taken to deal 
with ... attempts to exploit misguided 
feelings of solidarity and pacifism. ' How that 
I purge' could be undertaken was the subject of some agonized discussion at the 
second meeting of the CVC in Sorrento (Italy) on 2 and 3 September 1950. 
Smeding referred to a dispute in Rotterdam and Amsterdam when the 
communists had exploited a grievance over the use of casual labour at higher 
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pay than regular dockers. His union had quickly arranged a return to work and 
the employers had then dismissed seventy to one hundred 'communist 
ringleaders' who, he reported, 'would no longer be given any work in 
the ports'. Bird referred to the TGWUs recently imposed ban on communist 
office-holders and to the expulsion of some communists from his union. Those 
expelled were still, however, working at the docks despite its being a condition of 
port employment that workers belong to a union. Depriving them of their 
livelihood might gain them sympathy, given the 'well known loyalty of dockers'. 
He hoped that more and more of their workmates would refuse to work with 
non-union labour. Ferri-Pisani said the communists were fought in three ways in 
France: firstly, by anti-communists' refusal to take part in communist-led strikes, 
so that it was the communists who were dismissed when the employers fired the 
leaders; secondly, by the action of the authorities in 'directing' labour and firing 
those that disobeyed; and lastly, by creating 'vigilance squads ready to resist 
violence with violence. The third of Ferri-Pisani's choices will be picked up 
below in the context of the Mediterranean RVC's activities and his personal r6le 
in the whole operation, but the general discussion was felt to have been useful by 
Smeding who had most wanted it. He acknowledged that'the sacking of trouble 
makers from work in the docks was indeed a difficult matter ... One should, 
however, wait for the right opportunity and, when this presented itself, go ahead 
without hesitation. ' Ferri-Pisani thought that Smeding's conclusion should be 
commended to the ITF EC and sent on by the EC to ITF affiliates. 99 
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The EC never took that last suggestion up and so no-one can be sure how it 
would have been received. In retrospect, the most charitable gloss to be placed 
on those extraordinary CVC exchanges is that they demonstrated to what 
extreme lengths some ITF unions were ready to go under pressure. 
The most important specific decision taken in Sorrento, however, was to 
authorize Ferý-Pisani, I as chief of the Mediterranean area' (RVC chairmen were 
designated as 'chiefs") to establish a Mediterranean RVC. For the rest, the most 
striking feature of the discussions was the very tense concern with secrecy and 
discretion. Even the members of the RVCs were not wholly to be trusted, for the 
'regional chiefs' were 'to bear full responsibility' for their reports to the chairman 
of the CVC and to the ITF secretariat. They were to be under'no obligation to 
submit them to the members of the regional committee'. 'The main importance 
was that information should be communicated with a maximum of speed and 
secrecy. ' Bird made a special point of the need for all documents sent to the 
CVC to be marked 'PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL. Not to be communicated to any 
unauthorized person or body, in part or whole'. CVC meetings would be held 'at 
the discretion of its chairman and of the ITF Secretariat' and, at Ferri-Pisani's 
suggestion, it was agreed that the CVC 'should as a rule meet at ITF 
Headquarters or in another large town, in order to attract as little attention as 
possible. "00 
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There was no need, in the event, to spend much time on security precautions, for 
the CVC was only ever to meet once more. Becu's notice to the members 
convening the meeting in London on 17 and 18 August 1951 pointed out that it 
was almost a year since the Sorrento meeting and that there was need to review 
what affiliates had been doing meanwhile. The 'widespread publicity' given to 
the establishment of the CVC and the RVCs had had 'a salutary effect ... 
particularly in the Mediterranean region. ' Nevertheless the communists were still 
a threat and 'reliable sources' warned of 'a fresh offensive' concentrated on 
'Northern France and the North Sea coast'. 101 If minutes were taken of the 
August 1951 CVC meeting, no copy seems to have survived. The only account 
of the proceedings is a brief and teasingly uninformative item in the general 
report on activities to the EC meeting in October 1951 which does not even 
record the attendance. The CVC, it reports, had 'decided to continue its activity' 
and had instructed the RVCs 'accordingly' because there was'every likelihood'of 
renewed communist attempts to hold up arms shipments. Was the 'activity' too 
secret to be mentioned in even the most general terms? 
Perhaps, and more likely, it meant no more than 'existence' but that raises a 
another difficulty, for two of the three RVCs - those for the Scandinavian/Baltic 
and North Sea/Atlantic regions - had no real past or present existence to 
I continue'. There is no record of an RVC meeting of either. Haugen's written 
report from the Scandinavian/Baltic region, made to the Secretariat some four 
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months previously, was distributed to the Sorrento CVC meeting and earned the 
meeting's 'appreciation', but the minutes do not say what was in it. As for the 
North Sea/Atlantic, Daems, standing in for the absent'chief, Dekeyzer, reported 
at Sorrento on a turbulent summer of 1950 in the port of Antwerp when the 
communists had organized an unofficial strike on the back of a general strike, 
supported by the Belgian Transport Workers' Union (BTB), to force the 
abdication of King Leopold. Smeding, as already noted, reported on problems, 
by then resolved, in the Netherlands and Bird reported on communist agitation in 
the British docks. None of these experiences had been reported to their RVC 
because Dekeyzer had found it impossible to bring it to life. As the RVC chief, he 
had asked the British, French, Dutch and German members for information on 
communist subversive activities and only the Dutch had responded. Ferri-Pisani 
had undertaken to organize a gathering of the French members and to advise 
Dekeyzer of the arrangements, but Dekeyzer heard nothing further from him. 'I 
suppose', wrote Dekeyzer, 'they [the French] forward the ITF and our friend 
Irving Brown all information.... ' 102 
viii. The Mediterranean Commiffee: Ferri-Pisani, the Americans, and Marseilles 
The ITIF was prudently modest in claiming no more than a 'salutary' effect for the 
Vigilance Committee project as a whole. It would have been difficult to talk up 
the CVC's achievements and impossible to explain the point of the phantom 
RVCs in the north. But it had no such inhibitions about the Mediterranean 
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region and above all about Marseilles, where the ITF's EC and General Council 
met in October 1951. 'Comparatively recently, ' the 1952 Congress was informed, 
'this seaport was a Communist stronghold, but thanks especially to the work of 
the Mediterranean Vigilance Committee the Communists' reign of terror is over 
and Marseilles is today safe for free trade unionism. ' 103 
The triumph, if it had been one, would have been remarkable, given such 
ostensibly puny resources. In the early 1950s, the great majority of the ITF' s 
affiliates in the region 104were small or impoverished or, like its French Force 
Ouvri6re maritime unions, both. The Italian maritime affiliates had more 
members but were just as insolvent and very given to quarrelling among 
themselves. In Greece, the Panhellenic Seafarers' Federation (PNO) had 
affiliated with the ITF in 1948 after displacing the left-wing Federation of Greek 
Maritime Unions during the Greek civil war. It was a zealous supporter of the 
ITF's anti-communist efforts, but to the extent that the Mediterranean committee 
was charged with countering internal subversion or disruption, the PNO had no 
need of it within the anfi-communist, sternly policed Greek environment. 
The weakness of the affiliates could well have been one reason for the delay in 
establishing the Mediterranean RVC. A second would be that the region did not 
have priority. The prime targets for subversion were in the north, the giant 
deep-sea ports - Antwerp, Hamburg, London, Rotterdam - that would 
handle the 
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great majority of Marshall Aid, Atlantic Pact and, soon, Korean War shipments. 
But despite the lesser (Antwerp and Rotterdam) and greater (London) alarms 
and disruptions in the north, the civil and military cargoes had still moved and the 
communist threat had been seen off. And so the CVC's attention was turned in a 
circular of 5 August 1950 to the Mediterranean 'where Communist influence is 
still very strong'. A meeting of the CVC in southern Italy (Sorrento) would 'give 
special support to the anti-communist campaign in the Mediterranean region. ' 
CVC business was to take the first day and the next two would be left for the 
members to 'meet representatives from ... France, Italy and Greece, and discuss 
with them the details of the campaign to be undertaken in that [Mediterranean] 
region. ' 105 A few days later, a further circular invited 'affiliated seafarers' and 
dockers' unions in the Mediterranean areas [sicl"06to attend what had now 
become a 'conference' on 3 and 4 September 1950 in nearby Naples to assess 
communist influence 'in the merchant fleets and the ports of the Mediterranean 
Basin'; to obtain 'some idea' of communist activity directed against Atlantic 
Treaty 'war material'; and to consider how to 'combat communist influence and to 
strengthen the [Mediterranean) free and democratic trade union movementi. 
These topics made up a 'CONFIDENTIAL' agenda for what was finally entitled 
Conference of unions of dockers, seafarers and allied trades in the 
Mediterranean area. 107 
Fred Strauss, the ITF's 'Technical Officer' (see Chapter 111), stood in for the 
'unavoidably' absent Becu and his Confidential Report on Italian Trip, 108 written 
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immediately after the events, provides an incomparably rich and revealing insight 
into a morass of personal and organizational relationships - never trusting, 
always fragile and often hostile, working by dubious means to different ends and 
never within the ITF's control - which bedevilled and ultimately vitiated the whole 
Mediterranean exercise. 
Strauss arrived in Rome on 1 September to be told at the airport by a 
'Commander' Mucci of the Italian seafarers' federation that Romagnoli, his 
union's leader, was ill and that the Mediterranean 'conference' had been 
cancelled. The CVC members would instead meet 'representatives of the Italian 
dockers and seafarers' in Naples on 4 September. The decision to cancel the 
conference had been taken by Ferri-Pisani and Canini of the CISL national 
centre (see Chapter IV) after consulting Colonel Lane, the American Labour 
Aftach6. Mucci explained that the Colonel and Irving Brown effectively controlled 
the Italian non-communist maritime unions, which the two of them had 'formed 
and maintained' (but not, he complained, 'on a sufficiently large scale'). 
Ferri-Pisani repeated this explanation of the realities of Italian trade union life to 
Strauss the following morning in Sorrento and said it applied to the French as 
much as the Italians. Anti-communist maritime unions in both countries had 
functioned from the beginning 'by the grace of the AFL'. Ferri-Pisani's 
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recollection was that the idea of holding a meeting of the CVC in Italy, to be 
followed by a 'big conference of Italian seafarers' and dockers' representatives 
had first been agreed at a meeting in Marseilles of Becu, Tennant, Brown and 
Ferri-Pisani. Becu and Romagnoli had confirmed the arrangement during the 
ITF's Congress in July 1950, but once back in Italy, Romagnoli worried about the 
costs and who would meet them. He went to Canini who went to Brown who 
gave the project his 'approval'. Canini himself then started to organize the 
conference, effectively taking over from Romagnoli, whose illness Ferri-Pisani 
believed was not real but 'convenient'. A clearly dumbfounded Strauss and 
Ferri-Pisani spent a CVC tea-break the next morning with Irving Brown, who had 
arrived from Naples and was 'to say the least ... in a very bad temper. He said 
that the ITF has acted in bad faith because it had been agreed in Marseilles that 
the Naples 'show' should be 'big' - the Italians 'loved showmanship' - and he 
was very upset that the American organizations had not been allowed to send 
delegates to the Mediterranean conference. He had the funds to cover, all 
vigilance activities and ... if the ITF did not want 
to come in, the Americans would 
proceed on their owni. 
When the three resumed their encounter over lunch, it was Ferri-Pisani who 
followed up Brown's attack against Becu's rejection of American participation at 
the Mediterranean conference and said he would raise the issue at the next EC 
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meeting. (There is no record of his ever having done so. ) Later that afternoon, 
Brown asked Bird and Stan James (Assistant General Secretary of the British 
NUS and representing the absent Yates) if they would 'shake hands' with 
'trustworthy' dockers and seafarers' representatives at their union offices in 
Naples and talk to them about their industrial problems and 'free trade unionism 
in general'. They agreed on condition that there should be no 'publicity' that 
would allow the CVC members' 'movements ... [to]... be traced. ' 
They might have regretted their ready acquiescence the next day when Strauss 
read out to the CVC a cable from Romagnoli's sick bed, sending his 'best wishes' 
but adding that'contrary to my precise instructions various dockers and seafarers 
have been invited who are not qualified to attend', a cryptic warning that Bird and 
James (wondering perhaps whether Yates had been wiser than he knew in 
staying away? ) were quick to pickup. But Bird agreed 'in order to assist Brown' 
to speak 'as a British docker to his Italian counterparts and James, Daems and 
Smeding also agreed to participate on that basis, that is, as individuals speaking 
neither for their organizations nor the CVC. Ferri-Pisani contacted Brown 
(Strauss noted that they were in 'constant' touch with each other) and reported 
back that Brown was'highly safisW'. 
When the CVC members arrived in Naples the next day for the informal meeting 
with their Italian colleagues they found that the meeting was to be held in the city 
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council chamber, guarded by five armed police and already set up with arc lights, 
cameras and recording equipment. Brown was nowhere to be found but Colonel 
Lane was present'with five more Americans' and was told by Strauss that the 
British refused to speak. Brown eventually appeared and 'after a conversation 
with Ferri-Pisani' agreed that the CVC members (Ferri-Pisani excepted) would 
not be filmed or recorded, but the speeches to be given by Ferri-Pisani, Canini 
and a distinguished visitor, Giulio Pastore, the President of the CISL, would be 
given the 'fullest publicity'. And so, somehow, the demands both for discretion 
(to protect the CVC members) and publicity (Brown's 'show') were met. 
Pierre Ferri-Pisani is central to any account of the ITF's Mediterranean activities. 
He was born in 1901 into the Corsican community of Marseilles and from the 
early 1920s until 1940 he was deeply involved in the riotous, corrupt, 
occasionally murderous (and always tribal) political and trade union life of the city 
and port. 109 He was a union and Socialist Party (SFIO) activist from a 
precociously early age and briefly associated in the 1920s with Simon Sabiani, 
the Corsican community's political chieftain and later fascist collaborator. But he 
soon returned to the CGT and SFIO mainstream and in 1927 he became General 
Secretary of the Marseilles seamen's union, part of the national seafarers' 
federation ftd6ration Nationale des Syndicats Maritimes) which was affiliated 
with the ITF (in 1933 he wrote a manual on how to organize and represent 
seamen, in which he found substantial and appreciative room for the ITF's 
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maritime activities. ) 110 He was a very substantial figure in the Marseilles political 
hot-house, serving as a city councillor and deputy mayor in the 1930s. 
After the surrender of France in 1940, he became a 'courageous and important' 
member of the resistance, was arrested by the Gestapo in March 1943 and 
interned in Buchenwald concentration camp, from which he arrived back in 
Marseilles in June 1945in a pitiable state'. M He was shocked to find that the 
regional SFIO party was to be led into the national elections in October by 
Gaston Defferre, who was determined to rid the local party of its 'dissolute pre- 
war habits'and'old guard', of whom Ferri-Pisani was proudly one. Ferri-Pisani 
headed a dissident SFIO list in the October 1945 National Assembly elections 
and went down heavily (75,371 to 17,325), clearing the way for Defferre's 
I cleansing' (6puration) of Marseilles politics. 112 
There is no mention of the SFIO in the pen-picture which introduced Ferri-Pisani 
to the readers of the ITF Journal following his election to the EC in 1950.113 The 
1945 experience must have hurt him deeply and his trade union career suffered 
a comparable blow with the emerging communist ascendancy in the CGT 
seamen's federation, confirmed internationally by its withdrawal from the ITF in 
September 1947 (see Chapter IV). But a new lease of life arýrived when he 
became General Secretary of the FO seamen's federation. He defeated Lafond 
of the FO railwaymen when the 1950 Congress had to choose between the two 
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French candidates for the French seat on the General Council (a foretaste here 
of animosities to come) and so automatically secured a French seat on the EC 
which had been empty since the CGT unions' disaffiliation. His victory over the 
candidate of a union with an affiliated membership ten times bigger than the 
seamen's 5,000 indicates what a personal mark he had made on his Congress 
d6but, confirmed by his having shortly beforehand acted as spokesman for the 
Resolutions Committee in moving the draft resolution on the Korean War. 
The Mediterranean RVC was Ferri-Pisani's brainchild and instrument. He was its 
only authorized spokesman. He was always given, and never declined, personal 
credit for its 'successes'. He took criticism very personally and his responses 
were always in very personal terms. What is known of him, however, is sketchy 
and it is hard to arrive with any confidence at a real understanding of the man or 
his motivations. One thing, however, that can be said of him for sure is that he 
arrived at the ITF in 1949 as a political and industrial veteran, a graduate and 
survivor of some very hard schools. No lightweight would have given Sabiani 
and Defferre such problems (or have qualified for Buchenwald). 
As the CIA's involvement in international labour affairs has been exposed over 
the years, notably by Carew, 114in all its often comic, often nasty and consistently 
inept dimensions, anyone as prominently associated with Brown as Ferri-Pisani 
was likely to be given rough justice. One writer has dismissed him, some fifty 
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years on, as 'a drug smuggler connected with Marseilles crime lord Antoine 
Guerini', whom Brown had hired with CIA money to help set up a 'compatible left' 
union in Marseilles and 'to shellack striking Communist dock workers'. 115 It is a 
lazy, sensationalist characterization. Ferri-Pisani would have known the Guerinis 
very well as one of the select gangster families who provided 'specialized 
services for politicians' in return for protection. Every politician had needed his 
gangster accessories. 116 It was the Marseilles way. But any drug-smuggling 
know-how would not have interested Brown a fraction as much as Ferri-Pisani's 
years of political, maritime and trade union experience, intimate knowledge of a 
strategic waterfront, and his fanatically focused hatred of the communist 'enemy 
which came close in intensity to Brown's own. There is a Manichean, avenging 
zeal to Ferri-Pisani's writing and it even survives the flattening effect of reported 
speech in the ITF records of his speeches. No wonder Brown was so very proud 
of his acquisition, making much of Ferri-Pisani's anti-Nazi and Buchenwald 
survivor credentials and showing him off to the AFL President George Meany. 
Two general points need to be made before going on to considering the 
Mediterranean RVC's activities. The first is that no minutes exist of its two 
meetings, in Marseilles in January 1951 and Salonika in June 1951, so there are 
no formal records of who attended and what was said. 118 The Mediterranean 
RVC's own printed organ, Air, Teffe, Mer, appeared in French (clearly the 
original), with English and Italian translations, more or less monthly from 
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May 1951 to November 1953 and published the texts of the meetings' 
resolutions which were invariably described as unanimous. 119 ITF governing 
body documents (see below) add little or nothing to the very thin record of the 
proceedings. 
The second difficulty arises from the ITF's concern for security. Becu was 
convinced of the need to 'keep the adversary in ignorance' in the Mediterranean. 
The maximum publicity was very desirable but activities had also to be 
'confidential'. 120 What he did not acknowledge, but would have known very well, 
was that when security had priority, it was not only 'the adversary' whose 
'ignorance' had to be ensured. The affiliates and the governing bodies were far 
too big and too variegated to be entrusted with anything remotely confidential. 
The most that could be expected of them was that they should give the leaders of 
the Vigilance Committee operation the same unquestioning trust as was given to 
the ITF leadership when it collaborated with the Allied intelligence services in the 
Second World War. 
But Becu was also insisting that the 'confidential' work had to be balanced by 
activities that would attract public attention and the resolutions adopted by the 
first Mediterranean RVC in Marseilles from 10 to 14 January 1951 were clearly 
intended for that. They did not, however, please the Management Committee, 
which discussed them before the EC met from 29 to 31 January and was 
[256] 
concerned that'a regional committee had gone so far beyond its terms of 
reference' by adopting resolutions of such an 'obviously political' nature. It 
recommended the EC 'to consider steps' to prevent any recurrence. 121 
The resolutions were certainly uninhibited. One on the War in Indochina, 
declared the war to be 'part of the vast plan of the imperialists in the Kremlin to 
conquer the world ... congratulates France on having met the desire for 
sovereignty' and 'assures the Franco-Vietnamese troops ... of its [the 
committee's] support'. A typically rhetorical resolution on Objects and Means 
seemed to be proposing some kind of purge (among affiliates? ) by insisting that it 
was essential 'to distinguish clearly between organizations genuinely and 
practically averse to Sovietism [sic] and those who, despite appearances, in 
reality promote Soviet policy. ' 
The EC confirmed that the CVC and RVCs were 'action committees', not policy- 
making bodies but its discussions - Ferri-Pisani, as always, the exception - were 
marked by an almost nervous anxiety to stress the procedural and not the 
substantial nature of the MC's reservations. There was no question of a 
I condemnation', said Deakin, and Haugen congratulated Ferri-Pisani on the 
RVC's work. Lyon found nothing wrong with the substance of the resolutions and 
I I results' mattered more than 'methods , 
The 'results' that Lyon had welcomed had been claimed in Feni-Pisani's opening 
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statement: the Marseilles RVC meeting had changed 'the whole atmosphere' by 
convincing the communists that the RVC was a'serious menace'to their 
domination of Marseilles which they had secured by violent suppression of their 
opponents. 'Free' unions (he did not specify which) were now winning heavily in 
union representation elections. The ITF unions had decided in Marseilles to 
establish an RVC in their region and to pay for it. The RVC 'had the right to use 
the powers laid down in their own rules' and if they were to fight the communists 
- 'physically if necessary' - the RVCs had to be given the competence to act in 
whatever ways their constituent unions decided. This implicit declaration of 
independence was underlined in a second contdbution. His committee was'the 
Mediterranean Committee of the ITF' [emphasis added], but the title did not 
commit the ITF to the committee's decisions. The French national vigilance 
committee was known as a'Study Association' and made no mention of the ITF 
in its statements. He would 'bear in mind' the EC's procedural concerns but the 
Mediterranean unions would hold to theirunorthodox line'. 122 
Becu, as Ferd-Pisani had been quick to point out, had been invited to the 
Marseilles meeting, but had not attended, thus foregoing the chance to iron out 
any procedural problems on the spot. But, like Lyon, Becu was happy to 
concentrate on 'results' and described Ferri-Pisani's work in France (presumably 
his anti-communist activities) as the 'inspiration' for the establishment of the 
Vigilance Committee operation. A'similar campaign', he thought, would have 
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improved matters in the Belgian and Dutch ports. He then made his plea for 
secrecy and declared that RVCs had the right to decide on actions and methods 
'within the regional confines. 'Political' resolutions from a RVC, however, should 
come to the EC by way of the CVC. Gomez then proposed, and the EC decided, 
that the MC and Ferri-Pisani had both been right: it endorsed the MCs view that 
it was not for the CVC and RVCs to make ITF policy; and it expressed 
'satisfaction' at the 'results' of the Marseilles RVC meeting. 
The Mediterranean RVC met again, from 15 to 20 June 1951, in Salonika, 
Greece, only five months after its inauguration in Marseilles. A supplement to the 
ITF Press Report of 16 July 1951, headed 'Safeguarding Democracy - the third 
meeting of the Mediterranean Vigilance Committee' 123- was given over to the 
meeting and is apparently the only record of sorts to be issued from the ITF 
headquarters. It was very short of details of the attendance (they are not to be 
found anywhere), describing instead 'delegations of Greek railwaymen, seafarers 
and dockers ... French seafarers, 
dockers and civil aviation workers ... seafarers 
and dockers from Trieste ... 
Maltese seafarers ... dockers 
from Algeria, Tunisia 
and Morocco'. It does not mention any Italian presence. Makris, General 
Secretary of the deeply anti-communist Greek national centre, the GSEE, 
addressed the meeting and Greek dignitaries from the unions and government 
were plentiful and prominent. Becu was careful to attend for at least the first two 
days, before 'other commitments' took him back to London and he delivered a 
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very fiery message. Transport workers who valued democracy were 'no longer' 
prepared 'to allow themselves to be intimidated ... by acts of [communist] terror 
and violence' and 'peace-loving folk [sic] as they are', they would pay the 
communists back in their own coin. 124 
The 'discussion' was opened by Ferri-Pisani, who'emphasized ... that free and 
independent trade unionism can only function effectively if communism ... is 
annihilated. ' The'general discussion' which followed 'lasted several hours', none 
of which is captured, beyond the Press Report's assurance of the gathering's 
desire for'the success of the [RVC's] undertaking'. 125 The meeting welcomed 
the very first edition of Air, Terre, Mer and adopted a number of resolutions, the 
texts of the three 'most important' being added to the Press Report supplement. 
One, cryptically headed 'Measures for defence', deplored the lack of due 
diligence by some leading bureaucrats in rooting out communists from public 
services. 'All brave men who love freedom'would support administrators who 
dismissed 'Communist saboteurs'. A second resolution on the'General action of 
the Mediterranean committee' noted that since the last meeting in Marseilles 'the 
Communists have been unable to prevent the unloading of arms' but 
nevertheless appealed to the RVCs members for'intensified vigilance and 
action. ' A third, entitled 'Appeal for the unity of all democrats', asked for'all men 
of good will' to unite in a campaign 'in which all ideological differences will 
be 
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consciously thrust aside' against the 'many-sided advance of Sovietism. ' 
The Press Report made no reference to three other resolutions which clearly 
broke the bounds of the committee's competence - and regional bounds, too, in 
the first and second cases. The resolution on Conditions of life in the USSR 
listed the various horrors which made 'Soviet society ... synonymous with 
slavery, misery and extreme oppression' and declared that workers should give 
first priority to resisting 'Stalinist domination. The second, on Far Eastern 
Problems, welcomed the United Nations intervention in Korea and identified 'the 
same aggressor' (the USSR) at work in 'Korea, Burma and Malaya As for 
China, 'negotiations with the Mao Tse Tung Government are unthinkable without 
... [the] ... participation of Chiang Kai Shek'. The resolution on the Atlantic Pact 
demanded the 'immediate inclusion of Greece and Turkey'. 126 
By skirting this contentious territory, the Press Report put a very positive face on 
the Mediterranean RVC's activities - strongly based, already halting the 
communist advance, every prospect of a successful counterattack if it kept up the 
momentum. But the formal report on the Salonika meeting to the EC in October 
1951 was preoccupied with a fierce attack on the Mediterranean RVC, the 
Salonika meeting and Ferri-Pisani himself from Fernand Laurent, General 
Secretary of the French FO railwaymen's union, by far the largest of the ITF's 
French affiliates. 127 In a letter of 8 August 1951,128he referred to an exchange of 
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letters with Becu some weeks previously (no copies appear to have survived), in 
which, Laurent believed, it had been made clear that the Mediterranean RVC 
was both subordinate and answerable to the CVC, which in turn owed its 
existence to the ITF Executive Committee. As an affiliate, the FO railwaymen 
were therefore entitled to take a view of the Mediterranean RVC's activities. This 
they had done in a long resolution 129which in its first broad assault 'denounces 
and deprecates the activities, essentially political in character ... [of]... the 
Mediterranean Committee, calculated as they are to create a supra-national 
union organ acting outside and beyond the control of national or international 
trade union organizations... ' The resolution then 'dissociated' the FO railwaymen 
from the very three resolutions which the Press Report had presciently chosen 
not to publicize. 
But the FO railwaymen's most bitter denunciation was reserved for what the 
resolution termed as the tendency 'on the pretext of anti-Stalinism ... to re- 
introduce into the trade union movement men ... [who 
had collaborated with] ... 
the Hitler regime and its tools in France'. Laurent's covering letter justified that 
accusation by reference to a laudatory article, At Salonika with the Mediterranean 
Committee, in the June 1951 issue of the Revue Syndicaliste by a certain 
Raymond Froideval, 'an ex-trade union leader' and a 'notorious pro-Nazi'. The 
Revue Syndicaliste, he alleged, was controlled by a group who'had been barred 
for life from the trade union movement on account of their activities and 
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behaviour during the German occupation. ' The FO railwaymen had brought the 
article to the attention of the FO, whose General Secretary, Robert Bothereaut 
had written to Ferri-Pisani on 7 August 1951. His letter, markedly more 
restrained than the railwaymen's representations, conveyed 'the surprise'of his 
Confederal Executive Committee and asked Ferri-Pisani what he intended to do 
about the 'anomalous position' of Froideval as one of the Mediterranean 
Committee's 'collaborators'. 130 (Was the double entendre intended? ) 
The long 'extracts' given to the EC from Ferri-Pisani's letter to Bothereau of 
23 August 1951 dealt exclusively with the issue of Froideval. 13, The essence of 
Ferri-Pisani's defence was that Froideval had been judged and sentenced by the 
communist-dominated CGT and had never been allowed to defend himself. In 
any case the 'sanction' which barred Froideval from holding office in the CGT did 
not extend to 'his engagement as a paid employee ... of a trade union 
organization. ' He'did not ... approve of 
Froideval's attitude during the 
occupation'- his own line had 'meant ... prison and 
Buchenwald'- but that was 
a separate issue. 
Ferri-Pisani's disapproval of Froideval's 'attitude' during the war was withdrawn 
when he was the first to speak at the EC meeting. Instead, he denounced the 
accusations against Froideval as 'calumnious'. An investigation after the war had 
shown that Froideval had helped the resistance movement and he had been 
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cleared of all charges. Nevertheless, Ferri-Pisani had already offered to put the 
matter to 'impartial arbitration' and the proposal was gratefully taken up by EC 
members who felt themselves in no position to come to any judgment but were 
nevertheless concerned that, as Bratschi put it from the chair, 'anyone working 
for the ITF must be beyond reproach'. Lyon thought Ferri-Pisani 'should be free 
to choose the staff he needs' and Becu said the EC 'should not forbid [the CVC 
or RVCs] from calling on people whose cooperation was needed. ' The EC 
decided to accept Bratschi's proposal that the FO railwaymen should be asked to 
accept arbitration of the Froideval affair. 132 
Feni-Pisani had less success in the matter of the 'political' resolutions, which the 
FO railwaymen had disowned and he himself had not so far defended. Gomez 
said that the 'Far East' and the 'Atlantic Pact' were none of the Mediterranean 
RVC's business. Bratschi thought it should be told that political questions were 
outside its competence. Deakin declared his 'respect' and 'admiration' for the 
committee's work and thought the ITF was indebted to Ferri-Pisani. But he found 
the Far East resolution especially unpalatable. Chiang Kai Shek was'rotten to 
the core'. 133 Lyon agreed generally that the RVC could not decide the ITF's 
political position but, predictably, could see nothing substantially wrong with its 
resolution on the USSR. It seemed to him that the FO railwaymen were 
'following the communist line' (the first and last time an FO organization was 
accused of any such thing? ). Ferri-Pisani acknowledged the criticisms and 
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pleaded over-enthusiasm on the part of the Salonika participants, all passionate 
devotees of the democratic cause and very hard to convince that the free speech 
they cherished should not be spent on any and every issue they thought 
important. 
Laurent was not easily mollified. He took the FO railwaymen's accusations 
against the Mediterranean RVC to the floor of the ITF Congress in July 1952.134 
He started by stressing that his union had been founded by former members of 
the CGT railwaymen's union six months before the birth of the FO. The specific 
charges against the Mediterranean RVC were those his union had put to the EC: 
a preoccupation with 'political' resolutions beyond the RVC's competence and 
sometimes of objectionable content (for example, the Chiang Kai-Shek 
reference), an indifference to the EC's admonitions, and the employment of 
someone [Froideval] who had 'supported the Vichy regime and preached the 
advantages of compulsory work in Germany. ' But he also alleged that the 
Mediteranean RVC was a cause of deep dissension within the FO dockers' 
federation (see below). He put the basic question of 'whether the Vigilance 
Committees were justifying their existence' and speculated about the funding of 
the Mediterranean RVC. The ITF Financial Report revealed that the ITF was not 
paying for it, so its resources were not under the ITF's control. The RVC's 
members were few, yet it could finance two offices, one in Pads and the other in 
Rome, and publish Air, Terre, Mer, which wasGonsiderably larger than the 
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ITF Journal. 'Far from operating under the auspices of the ITF, ' he said, 'it was 
really an autonomous body. I 
The first to defend the Mediteranean RVC was Pierre Felce of the FO road 
transport workers' union (Rd6ration Nationale FO des Transports), a union of 
few members (some 7,000) and smaller influence. Felce, whose high regard for 
his own speeches was always manifest as he made them, defended Froideval, 
saying that criticism of the FO was no great crime. More interestingly, he 
defended 'help from the international working class movement' to the RVC and 
claimed that the FO railwaymen had sought and received help 'from the same 
organization' (to which he put no name). 135The Mediterranean RVC had 
prevented the Communists from organizing strikes even in ports which they 
'traditionally controlled'. That last claim was amplified by the two delegates from 
the Italian dockers' union (Federazione Nazionale Lavoratori Portuali). Maffei 
said the Communists had been 'defeated' in Leghorn (Livorno) where, Giomello 
explained, 'for over a year nobody could work in the port if he did not have a 
Communist card'. Similar success had been achieved in 'Trieste, Marseilles, 
Palermo, Taranto, Genoa, Bari and Algiers' by'presenting a united front in the 
Mediterranean, using the Communists' own weapons. ' As for the funds, the 
'simple' answer was that'they came from other workers and trade unions'. 136 
On the last point, Ferri-Pisani was not at all as forthcoming with Congress as he 
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had been with Strauss in Sorrento: no blunt statement of the obvious, that 
French and Italian activities and loyalties were bound to follow the American 
money, Instead he explained that the Mediterranean Committee was'dependent 
on the Central Vigilance Committee' and was therefore under the control of the 
ITF leadership. It would be'disarmingly childish'to try to distinguish between 'a 
political committee ... [and] ... a committee of action' because 'some kind of 
propaganda ... had to precede organizational action'. The Communists who 
controlled Mediterranean ports by 'terrorism' and the 'secret agents of the 
Cominform' could not be beaten 'without promising protection to the one [good] 
side and reprisals to the other... the Mediterranean seacoast was the one place 
where the Communists ... had not tried to declare a political strike'. But'they [the 
RVC] had entered upon a new stage of difficult underground action and ... the 
Mediterranean Vigilance Committee was more necessary than ever'. 137 
Much of Becu's 'reply' was spent on Laurent's indictment, which 'to a great 
extent' had been 'groundless'. The EC had not been concerned so much with 
the 'actual terms' of the RVC's resolutions as with the fact that a small number of 
affiliates could be assumed to speak for the ITF as a whole. Ferri-Pisani had 
understood that concern. By far the most interesting of Becu's comments, 
however, went to the matter of funding. The Financial Report for 1950-51 
revealed the existence of a Vigilance Committee Fund set up by the EC and fed 
by contributions from 'different affiliated organizations'. Some E890 had been 
[267] 
spent on Central Vigilance Committee travel but'none of the affiliated 
organizations which had something directly to do with the Vigilance Committees 
had asked for financial help; they had provided the finance themselves. There 
was nothing wrong in that ... the ITIF could not be expected to ask them where 
their money came from. That would be interference with the financial autonomy 
of a national organization. "38 
ix Which piper and what tune? The ITF, the AFL and the CIA 
Not one voice was raised at the 1952 Congress to support Laurent's attack on 
the Mediterranean RVC and, implicitly, on the whole VC operation. But, more 
significantly, only Becu of the heavyweights took the floor to rebut it. For the rest, 
it was Ferri-Pisani's friends who rallied to him, recognizing, as he did himself, 139 
that he was Laurent's main target. Perhaps the bigger and older hands sensed 
that there was more to Laurent's case than the debate conveyed and perhaps, 
despite the 'security' blanket, they sniffed something not quite right and running 
out of control. 
The fervour of the Mediterranean Committee's supporters, however, was 
undiminished. They cannot have guessed - and Becu gave not the faintest hint 
of it - that the whole Vigilance Committee operation was on 
its last legs. The 
debate at the 1952 Congress was the first and the last time that the Vigilance 
Committee project was ever openly and critically discussed within the ITF The 
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Road Transport Workers' Section was due to discuss participation in the VCs at 
a section conference in April 1952 but seems to have forgotten to do so. 140 The 
EC reports for 1952 and 1953 make no mention of a Vigilance Committee 
meeting of any kind and the main body of the Report on Activities for 1952-53 to 
the 1954 Congress is equally barren. It is left to a very determined reader to find 
the paragraph in an appendix to that Congress document which explains that'the 
network of so-called vigilance committees' was a 'structure [that] is still in 
existence today' and 'must be kept ready to bdng into action again as soon as 
Communist tactics change. ' That day never came and the 'structure' died in its 
mothballs, never again to be mentioned in a governing body document. 141 
It was a very muted, slightly shame-faced, end to an initiative which has often 
since attracted the attention of historians and commentators. Lorwin, for 
example, noted that the ITF, 'the strongest of the democratic international trade 
secretariats', had 'created a Mediterranean department, headed by the dynamic 
Marseille FO dock workers' leader, Ferri-Pisani' to counter the CGT and WFTU 
plans to sabotage transport 'in the event of overt [East-West] hostilities'. 142 
Lorwin assumes, typically and understandably, that the VC action was purely 
'Mediterranean'. Nothing happened elsewhere to undermine that assumption 
and there was a general haziness, even and especially within the ITF's governing 
bodies, about the mechanics and constitutional status of the Vigilance Committee 
project. The leading actors, such as Becu, Ferri-Pisani and Irving Brown, offered 
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their own understandings (Brown's strictly by implication only) from time to time 
but those were for the most part inconsistent and irreconcilable, and sometimes 
disingenuous. The discussion at the EC meeting in January 1951 of the 
Mediterranean RVC's 'political' resolutions (see above) was an eady example of 
the EC's readiness to fudge the basic question of the authority and competence 
of the Vigilance Committees. The issue could have been settled there and then if 
the EC had decided and minuted an unequivocal and general assertion of its 
authority but the opportunity was lost. Or was it consciously declined? Both 
Becu and Ferri-Pisani would have had their own reasons for leaving the 
Mediterranean RVC largely to its own devices. Ferri-Pisani would not have 
wanted his style cramped by rigorous reporting and accounting requirements. 
Becu could well have thought it wiser not to insist on giving the EC (and himself) 
total responsibility for the actions and behaviour of a body which would probably 
do things that he would never be told of, or want officially to know. 
If anything, the Sorrento experience a few months later would have brought 
home to him the fragility of the ITF's (and his own) grip on the Mediterranean 
operation. Brown's threat to go ahead without the ITF if it failed to accommodate 
his wishes was so much bluster; for the ITF's impfimatur gave the Mediterranean 
operations a semblance of industrial credibility. But if the French and Italian 
unions had become dependent for their very existence on American money, then 
the ITF, which had nothing like comparable funds to offer, would have either to 
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close the operation down or find a way to live with the American money and 
presence and hope for the best. 
It was ironically (or simply inconsistently) Ferri-Pisani, previously the strong 
defender of his RVC members' autonomy, who had chosen at the 1952 
Congress (see above) to stress without qualification the ITF governing bodies' 
responsibility for the activities of the VC and the RVCs. Laurent and any other 
critics, he implied, should take on the ITF's 'top responsible officers' not the 
honest infantry, who were doing their heroic best at the battle front. Becu's 
contribution on that occasion was plainly mendacious when he denied all 
knowledge of or interest in the French unions' finances. He knew exactly where 
the French (and Italian) maritime unions were getting their money and must have 
known long before Feni-Pisani and Brown confirmed it to Strauss in Sorrento. 
But it simply was not done in those highly charged times to make any concession 
to the enemy, even when the 'secrets' were as open as the FO's dependence on 
Brown's largesse. Laurent himself stopped short of naming the unnameable and 
the angry responses from his French comrades were vehemently discreet (or 
discreetly vehement). At this distance, it is possible to speculate that it would 
have been much healthier, and need not have been embarrassing or damaging, 
to have the issue of funding out on the Congress floor. The inevitable linkages 
between money, loyalty and respcmsibility were so obvious that any discussion 
about who actually was in charge of ITF operations in the Mediterranean was 
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bound to go for nothing if the ITF leadership pretended not to notice the 
American money flowing to the French and Italians. 
Some forty-six years later, Carew could tell the extraordinary story of the 
poisonous, back-stabbing and mutually suspicious and contemptuous 
relationship between Brown and his boss Jay Lovestone, Executive Secretary of 
the AFL Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), on the one hand, and their CIA 
paymasters on the other. 143The cloak-and-dagger codes (US$ 1,000 was a 
'volume' or 'book', CIA funds were the'library', George Meany'the plumber 144) 
give a juvenile air to a partnership made always difficult and eventually 
impossible by a great clash of incompatible organizational cultures and 
personalities. At bottom, the FTUC wanted the CIA to pay up for its projects and 
then mind its own business. The CIA's 'Fizzers'(Lovestone's derisive term for 
the CIA's Ivy League officials) treated the FTUC as'whores to be used and 
directed by politically incompetent dileftantes. "45Tom Braden, the CIA official 
who later cut back the FTUC's funding, saw the problem very differently. The 
CIA was 'handing over enormous sums of money to Lovestone and Brown ... 
and never got any accounting from them'. It would sometimes open the FTUC's 
mail in the hope of -finding out what exactly its money was buying. 146 Lovestone 
went through the motions'of indulging the CIA's 'book-keeping psychology' but 
Brown would spend before he had the money, entries were 'juggled around' and 
he once borrowed money privately in the expectation that official funds would be 
forthcoming. 147 
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Not all of the CIA funds in fact went through the FTUC, which makes it all the 
more difficult to attach any precise figures to this circus. 'Many of Irving Brown's 
activities in France' were financed directly by the CIA 148and there is no way to 
be sure what they cost them. And from 1949 the CIA was conducting its own 
operation in Italy, under the direction of Colonel Lane, the American Labor 
Attache whose identity and presence had puzzled Strauss in Sorrento. The 
FTUC was 'appalled' and morally affronted by the 'corrupting influence' of 'the 
huge amounts of money showered on the Italian labor movement'. Worse still - 
and a 'major grievance' for the FTUC - the CIA was pretending that its Italian 
action had the FTUC's approval. 149 
Despite the scarcity and inherent uncertainty of the specifics, Carew has winkled 
out more than enough of them to confirm once and for all that the CIA financed 
the Mediterranean RVC. Brown opened a2urich bank account' in Ferri-Pisani's 
name 'to which funds were periodically credited' 150 and though no date has 
been put on that move, it is clear from the Sorrento episode that Brown was 
already the committee's main, probably sole, provider by mid-1950. Carew has 
found a report on transactions in March 1953 by a certain Leon Dale, a CIA 
official who had been posted to Brown's Pads office to keep an eye on the 
finances. Dale handed out US$6,000 on Brown's behalf to a 'representative' of 
Ferri-Pisani, who simultaneously put in a request for US$3,000 - 4,000 more. 151 
By the beginning of 1953, Brown's CIA budget included the'ltalian Section'of 
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the Mediterranean RVC, later described as 'Italian port workers', who were 
subsidized at a handsome US$4,000 per month until the middle of that year 
when a reduction to US$2,500 per month caused Giornelli, the 'Mediterranean 
Section secretary' to protest to Brown, cryptically, that he was now in 'serious 
trouble, like you and Ferri'. 152 In 1954 the CIA's annual contribution to the FTUC 
fell to US$53,789, continuing a steep decline since the peak of US$172,882 in 
1950. Brown's own budget, for which there are no figures, was cut at the same 
time, leading him 'to report that the Mediterranean Committee was in danger of 
going under. ' 153The merger in 1955 of the AFL with the CIO, which strongly 
disliked the FTUC type of operation and its leading lights (feelings which 
Lovestone and Brown enthusiastically reciprocated), hastened the process. The 
FTUC was buried 'as a functioning organization' in December 1957, its CIA 
relationship having died long before, 154but Carew cautions that Lovestone's and 
Brown's personal associations with the CIA probably lived on. For example, he 
cites one incident which is particularly ironical in the light of the stand Laurent 
took against Ferri-Pisani's operations. In the 'late 1960s' the FO railwaymen's 
union wrote to George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, to complain that Brown 
had cut off its monthly subsidy. Meany's secretary gave the letter straight to 
Brown, who 'accepted it without a word'. 155 
The precise amounts provided by Brown to ITF affiliates will never be known but 
they were certainly substantial enough to be absolutely indispensable to the 
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French and Italian maritime unions. Meetings of the ITF's EC and General 
Council at the end of June 1953 had on their agendas consideration of financial 
assistance to France and Italy. Ferri-Pisani reported beforehand that 'thanks to 
the help of the American Federation of Labor, we [referring here to an 'inter- 
federation' of the FO seamen's, officers' and dockers' federations] are able to 
maintain a few paid officials ... in the chief ports, but income from trade union 
dues was too small for any port branch (syndicat) to employ even one official. 1% 
He told the EC meeting that'the three French organizations of seafarers, 
transport workers, and dockers were each receiving 150,000 French francs a 
month in assistance from the American Federation of Labor. ' 1571n the case of 
Ferri-Pisani's seamen's union, the AFL's 150,000 francs was the equivalent of 
the full monthly dues from 1,000 members. 158 (It was probably worth far more. It 
is very doubtful whether all the 7,650 members affiliated to the ITF in 1953159 
paid their dues or even existed. ) The same sum would have been worth a little 
more to the dockers' union and a lot more to the 'transport workers' (presumably 
Felce's union), whose dues were lower. It is not clear whether the money came 
from the CIA via the FTUC, or from Brown's own CIA budget, or was not CIA 
money at all, but the second hypothesis is the strongest. 
As for the ITF's direct investment, Becu's insistence (see pp266-67) at the 1952 
Congress that the ITF had indeed helped finance the 'Vigilance' campaign 
carried the risk that his audience might actually turn to the table in the 
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Financial Report that he was citing 160 and then ask why both the income and the 
expenditure of E860 (no great sum even then) were so modest for a campaign of 
such supposedly wide and profound importance. The EC's suggestion in 
October 1949 that dockers' unions should voluntarily put three 'old' pence (3d) 
per member into the fund had produced by December 1951 a very disappointing 
E650 in all from just four affiliates. By the ITF Congress in July 1952, the biggest 
contributor had been, and was to remain, the American SIU, whose anti- 
communist zeal had overridden the EC's decision to exempt seafarers' unions 
from the appeal. Without the SIU's E2,143 and without the E1,000 from the ITF 
General Fund as a 'start-up' transfer, the fund might have looked very sickly, but 
in the event it could almost have managed without either, for expenditure ended 
with the E860 spent in 1950-51. The balance of E2,991 in the fund on 1 January 
1952 had grown to E3,245 by 31 December 1953.161 The fund was wound up 
with effect from the end of 1955 and the balance transferred to the Edo Fimmen 
Free Trade Union Fund which financed the ITFs regional activities. 162 
x. Reflections on the 'Vigilance'exercise. And what really happened in 
Marseilles? 
The contemporary rhetoric may have been overheated and the threat 
overplayed, but there were real grounds for the fear and expectation of 
Communist-led disruption in the western maritime industries which prompted the 
introduction of the Vigilance Committee operation. It was a reaction to the 
declarations at the WFTU's 1949 Congress in Milan (its first since the departure 
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of almost all its non-communist affiliates) which 'denounced the evil 
consequences of the Marshall Plan and its counterpart, the Atlantic Pact', and 
condemned 'the colonial wars against Viet Nam, Indonesia, Malaya, Southern 
Korea and Greece'. The Congress had 'called on the trade unions of the whole 
world to give their fraternal assistance to the colonial peoples fighting for their 
liberty and national independence. ' The actions in Marseilles against the 'filthy 
war' in Viet Nam earned special mention and French dockers in the'Atiantic and 
Channel ports' were praised for their decision 'not to load or unload war material 
coming from the USA' once they recognized that'the campaign against the war 
in Viet Nam necessarily led to action against preparations for the imperialist and 
[anti-]Soviet war'. The ITF -'valets'of 'reaction'and 'splitters'- was denounced 
for creating Vigilance Committees 'whose avowed aim is to supply strike- 
breakers and spies to the [Marshall Plan] governments and police'. The ITF had 
'placed itself in the service of the warmongers'. 163 
These tirades and exhortations prompt three immediate reflections. Firstly, it 
was the WFTU that opened hostilities by calling for action at the workplace for 
purely political ends. The ITF's declared support for the Marshall Plan and the 
Atlantic Pact and its determination to frustrate any communist attacks on those 
measures were a defensive reaction. Secondly, and contrarily, the ITF was 
hardly the organization to complain about the use of industrial muscle for political 
purposes. The WFTU had been quick to recall the efforts made by Ernest 
Bevin, 
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Edo Fimmen and the ITF Congress in 1920 to prevent the shipments of arms to 
Poland for use against the Soviet Union. And the ITFs anti-Fascist campaigns 
between the world wars had been profoundly and proudly political. 164Thirdly, the 
WFTU's threats could not be taken lightly. The communist-led maribme unions 
of France and Italy dwarfed their'free' rivals and were potentially capable of 
paralysing the major ports. Elsewhere in western Europe, trouble in the Belgian, 
Dutch and, most gravely of all, British ports showed how even strongly 
anti-communist union leaderships could lose control. 
Yet however credible and imminent the threat, it was never translated into 
anything of remotely significant impact on the WFTU's main targets: the 
Viet Nam war, other colonial conflicts, the Marshall Plan and the 'Atlantic Pact' 
(NATO). Of the three regions devised by the ITF and established by the CVC, 
the only excitement in the 'Scandinavian/Baltic' region came with a rumour in 
January 1950 that arms shipments might be stopped in Copenhagen. They 
never were. 165Dekeyzer's efforts to find out what was going on in his 'North 
Sea/Atlantic' region (see p245) were abortive because there was really nothing 
serious to report. The WFTU's faith in the intentions of the French dockers in the 
'Atlantic and Channel ports' proved to be totally misplaced. 'They are calmly 
loading arms in Le Havre, ' a militant Communist docker gloomily observed, 'but 
perhaps it's not dockers doing it. ' 166 Yet dockers they were. FerTi-Pisani's failure 
to help Dekeyzer's research into the French situation may have been unfratemal 
but perhaps he simply had nothing to report. 
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Ferri-Pisani was only really concerned anyway with the Mediterranean and, 
above all, Marseilles. It was in Marseilles that he and his foot-soldiers claimed to 
have engaged the enemy and proved that, even in their stronghold, the 
communists could be beaten. The claim was never put to any test within the ITF. 
No-one seems ever to have asked who had done what and when. No-one 
questioned that the communists had been defeated, but no-one explained what 
positive gains had followed for'free'trade unionism. The ITF would, of course, 
have been predisposed to accept triumphs gratefully and not to be too fastidious 
in assembling the evidence and corroboration. Furthermore, Ferri-Pisani had 
consciously cultivated an almost romantic air of 'secrecy' and a sense of physical 
danger into the Marseilles operations which discouraged curiosity. 
Ferri-Pisani, Brown, the FTUC and the CIA would all have had substantial vested 
interests in the ITF's readiness to take Ferri-Pisani at his word. There were 
personal reputations and careers, not say many thousands of dollars, riding on 
his claim to have won the port of Marseilles for democracy. Many years later, in 
1967, Lovestone saw Ferri-Pisani's work in Marseilles as 'one of the brightest 
episodes in the history of our effort to help European labor. 167But, more than 
fifty years on, it must now be time to ask whether there really was a battle at all 
and, if so, who fought it and who won? 
Unfortunately, there are no answers to be found in the ITF archives. Nowhere is 
there even the most passing mention of any specific action directed or supported 
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by the Mediterranean RVC in Marseilles. The only report the writer has found of 
an action which can be attributed directly to Ferri-Pisani, comes from the 
communist side and took place in March 1951. The CGT dockers' union had 
imposed an overtime ban but as the dockers walked off a ship at the end of their 
normal shift a gang of 'scabs' Uaunes) appeared, led by August Marcily, one of 
Ferri-Pisani's henchmen (un homme de main) who had been engaged as a 
strike-breaker in 1950 and 'had just founded the FO dockers' union'. One of the 
scabs used his gun as they tried to board the ship, wounding five dockers. The 
police arrived, arrested the scabs and they did not come back. The incident 
provoked a 24-hour strike 'by all the unions in Marseilles' and was 'a major 
political mistake on Marcily's part and that of his sleeping partners 
(commanditaires). "68 
The author of that account, Alfred Pacini, was a staunch Communist, who 
regarded the CGT dockers' strike in Marseilles from 10 March to 17 April 1950 (a 
very long strike by French standards) as ranking among the 'finest actions' in the 
history of the French working-class movement, despite its having achieved a very 
euphemistic 'nothing much'. 169 The strike was 'political' in that the union was 
demanding an end to the employers' sanctions against dockers who refused to 
handle arms for Indo-China but it was also seeking wage increases. The 
reaction of the employers was to enlist agents-provoGateurs, the public 
authorities, and the para-military riot police (CRS) in a ruthless deployment of 
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strike-breakers. 'The Africans came ashore ... and were engaged immediately 
... There were independent unions led by scoundrels (canailles) who would 
recruit [scabs] and take them in vans to the quayside ... with the aim of having 
everyone work in the port except the dockers. ' 170 
Pacini's account of the crushing of the Marseilles dockers' strike and of the 
aftermath -'the union is in a bad way, dockers are hesitating to renew their 
membership ... constant blackmail on the quays' 171- may have been bitterly 
partisan but he was to be borne out by Jensen in much cooler, academic terms 
some fourteen years later. He writes that early in 1950 the Marseilles port 
employers had grown weary of a succession of politically motivated strikes and 
'decided to break it'. Whereas in previous strikes the government had limited the 
use of troops to the handling of military cargoes, the employers decided in March 
and April 1950 that they could be confident of the full backing of the guardians of 
public order. They therefore took the offensive by recruiting and training an 
alternative workforce (Pacin i's jaunes). Once the call for recruits went out 'it 
proved easy to break the strike'. 172Jensen puts no numbers to it, but Pacini 
claims that the number of 'casuals' (occasionels) grew from some 486 at the 
beginning of the strike in March 1950 to 3,773 one month later. 173The port 
employers consolidated their total victory in the 1950 strike when they decided to 
repudiate all existing collective agreements and to cease formally to recognize 
any union. They later reached an 'understanding' (Protocole d'accord) with the 
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'independent' union (Syndicat ind6pendant des ports et docks) and with the 
foremen's union but the port of Marseilles was kept free of any real union 
influence well into the 1960s. 174 
The ITF's affiliate, the FO dockers' federation (F6d6ration Nationale des Ports et 
Docks-FO), fails to rank a reference in Jensen's account, but it reported to the 
ITF EC in July 1953 that it had an equal share with the CGT and the independent 
dockers' unions of the workers' seats on a statutory joint committee (Bureau 
Central de Main-d'oeuvre) in Marseilles. But it had only one'paid official'there, 
as against the CGT union's three -- and he was probably shared with the FO 
seafarers' unions (see p274). 175 It fared even worse in other ports. It had no 
presence at all on the joint committees in the important Channel ports of Le 
Havre, Dunkirk, Boulogne and Rouen where the CGT had a total monopoly. It 
offered the ITF in 1953 a round '5,000' for its membership out of an estimated 
total of 'about 38,000' trade union members in the ports industry, of which 'about 
25,000' belonged to the CGT dockers' union. 176 Its affiliated membership 
peaked at 6,200 from 1957 to 1961 and fell back to 5,500 in 1964. '77 
On paper, its membership had in fact more than doubled over the period that the 
Mediterranean RVC was purportedly facing down the CGT in Marseilles 178 but if 
the RVC was ever inclined to seek credit for that, not everyone in the union was 
ready to give it. When its General Secretary died early in 1952 he was 
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succeeded at a union congress in May 1952 by a candidate, Boucher, who won 
by associating his rival, Piquemal, with certain 'extra-trade union committees', 
which the delegates would have readily decoded as bodies such as Ferri-Pisani's 
'Study Association' (see p257) or the Mediterranean RVC itself. Piquemal was 
not ready to accept second place and his supporters made him General 
Secretary of a new dockers' union which they founded one month later. The new 
union claimed affiliation with the FO, which settled the dispute by convening a 
third congress in November 1952 where Piquemal was confirmed as General 
Secretary of the FO dockers' union, the F6d6ration des Ports et Docks et 
Assimil6s. 179 Any French dockers who were looking for an effective 'free' 
alternative to the CGT dockers' union could hardly have been impressed. 
It is very unlikely that anything approaching the whole truth of the great 
confrontation in the port of Marseilles in 1950 will ever be known, but a few 
salient facts seem to be uncontested. The CGT dockers' union in Marseilles was 
indeed dominated by communist militants, like Pacini, who really did see it as 
their ideological duty to boycott ships with cargoes to which they had political 
objections. Their intentions were not the paranoid imaginings of NATO, the 
Pentagon or the ITF and the AFL, but were loudly and unapologetically declared. 
They were urged on by their WFTU Trade Department which is on record as 
demanding similar actions throughout western Europe. When the union's actions 
in Marseilles developed into a general dock strike, the port employers, backed 
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and protected by security forces of every kind, crushed the action by flooding the 
port with casual and totally compliant labour. When the strike collapsed, the 
employers made sure the port was free of any effective union presence for at 
least a decade. 
Here, undoubtedly, was an important victory over a communist-led union and 
western governments, concerned only with their political and strategic 
imperatives, must have been very pleased and relieved. The ITF chose to 
present the communists' defeat as a victory for the ITF's Vigilance campaign, 
won by Ferri-Pisani's troops whose heroic feats, necessarily largely clandestine 
and therefore unsung, had made the port secure for the 'free' trade union 
movement. Laurent, however, had known better and so, surely, had Becu. Any 
effective trade union presence and influence of any kind was eliminated for years 
and the FO dockers' union was among the very weakest of the crippled 
remnants. By its own reckoning, it ranked far behind the emasculated CGT 
union and Jensen did not think it worth one mention. There was some negative 
comfort to be scraped together for the ITF from the Marseilles episode: the 
communists' attempts to disrupt arms and aid shipments were defeated and their 
power in the port broken. Brown and Lovestone might have settled for that, but 
the ITF must surely have hoped for very much more. The final word could 
perhaps be left to Gaston Defferre, by the early 1950s politically impregnable in 
Marseilles and a %q noOnal star of the Socialist Party. Brown and his friends, 
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he wrote, had no credit among honest anti-communist trade unionists. Ferri- 
Pisani, Marcily and Irving Brown were spending all their time in night-clubs and 
their Mediterranean Committee was a joke (plaisanterie). 180 
If the only real victors in Marseilles were the port employers, did the Vigilance 
Committee exercise have anything better to claim elsewhere? At the ITF's 1952 
Congress, Giornelli of the ITF's Italian dockers' union named ships which the 
communists had been prevented from stopping and specified the new members 
(a few hundred) that his union had won over. 181 But in Italy, as in France, it was 
the weakness of the communists when put to the test, not the strength of the 
'free' unions, which decided matters. There were never enough Italian dockers 
so committed to the cause as to do more than stop the occasional ship for a 
symbolic day or two, their inhibitions backed by the very practical consideration 
that in the major ports the workers, CGIL members not least, operated as 
cooperatives and had a strong financial interest in maximizing their ports' 
business. 
By 1952, the two wings of the international movement were anyway coming to 
accept that quick victories were not to be had in Europe and their rivalry was 
soon to be located more and more in the 'under-developed'and increasingly de- 
colonized parts of the world. Giornelli's brown envelopes were getting slimmer 
and fewer and even Ferri-Pisani was losing heart. When the ITF EC came in 
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June 1953 to consider requests for help from their'free' French and Italian 
affiliates, Ferri-Pisani was quick to say that no amount of ITF assistance could 
produce 'any substantial short-term results' . 182The last issue of his Air, Terre, 
Mer appeared at the end of 1953. 
He had left both his union and the ITF by the time of the 1954 ITF Congress, 
where the French seat on the Executive Committee went to Laurent, his most 
tenacious critic. He was never seen again within the ITF, nor heard of until 
23 October 1963 when Le Monde reported that he had been found dead in his 
Marseilles home. He had ceased all his (unspecified) 'activities' several months 
earlier because of poor health and on 21 October put a gun to his head. 
A The enemies to the r4qht: Spain and AMentina - and Greece 
Franco's Spain had survived the war and served for some time as one of the few 
targets that the WFTU and the 'free' movement shared. But even that consensus 
was strained when it came to practical measures. The ITF's 1946 Congress 
adopted a resolution moved by the Executive Committee welcoming the WFTU's 
decision to ask national centres to press their governments to break off 
diplomatic relations with Franco but the ITF went further by asking its affiliates to 
lobby for the action to be extended to 'economic' relations. The ITF's French 
seamen's and transport workers' federations had proposed an amendment 
'inviting' all the affiliates to boycott Spanish goods and cargoes 'immediately'. 
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Trif6n G6mez, once leader of the Spanish railwaymen's union and now a 
member of the Republican government in exile, introduced the EC's motion to 
Congress and, with some 'embarrassment', persuaded the Congress to 'prefer a 
moderate resolution' because the affiliates were simply not in the position to 
carry off a successful boycott. 183G6mez would have been aware of a discussion 
at an ITF Management Committee meeting only two months previously (on 
11 March 1946) when Oldenbroek had reported a letter from Garcias of the 
French transport workers' federation (see Chapter IV) asking, on behalf of the 
French affiliates, for the ITF to cut off traffic to and from Spain. That much was 
minuted, 184 but Oldenbroek would almost certainly have reported also on a visit 
on 6 March 1946 from Walter Schevenels, briefly and very unhappily one of the 
WFTU's two Assistant General Secretaries. Schevenels had wanted to know 
what the chances were of the ITF's asking its affiliates 'to stop shipments to and 
from Spain. Any such boycott would require the ITF's cooperation but the 
French CGT had already decided to 'stop all transport to and from Spain' and 
had the 'solid backing' of its transport worker members. Oldenbroek, referring 
clearly to the WFTLI leadership's insistence that WFTU 'Trade Departments' 
would have to stick closely to their industrial business, wondered tongue in cheek 
whether the ITF might 'expose itself to reprisals' if it took action on 'a general 
political issue'. 'At this point', the note observes, 'it was clear that Schevenels did 
not wish to prolong the discussion. ' 185What Oldenbroek did not tell Schevenels 
was that the Bdtish affiliates were not ready for a boycott of Spain and that 
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without them there was no hope that a boycott could be effective. A discussion 
at the MC a few days after the exchange with Schevenels confirmed their lack of 
enthusiasm: Deakin was sure the British TUC would not do more than endorse 
the call for an end to diplomatic relations; Marchbank said there would have to be 
consultations to see what support a boycott would have; and Jarman, for the 
seamen's union, thought the proposal 'precipitate'. 186 Their reaction was a 
recognition that it was beyond the ITF or any other part of the international 
movement to do Franco significant damage without the active backing of the 
war-weary western governments, which showed no such inclination in 1946. The 
last hopes of their putting any real pressure on Franco (or SalazarI87) died as 
the Cold War intensified and Spain, its dictator notwithstanding, offered the 
western powers strategic assets that they found irresistible. The ITF's frustration 
was expressed bitterly in an ITF Journal article in 1953 which denounced the 
death in custody of Tomýs Centeno, a UGT activist, as an illustration of the 
enduring brutality of the Franco regime. The article featured a cartoon by a 
celebrated British political cartoonist, Vicky, in which Franco's study bears two 
posters: 'Come to Sunny Spain'and 'Bases to Let. 188 The one positive action 
the ITF could and did take was to help keep-alive the Socialist (UGT) transport 
workers' union in its French exile with mode6t financial help against the day 
(which came, of course, many years later) when it could resume its place in a 
free Spain. 
The other threat from the right to preoccupy the ITF in the early post-war years 
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had come in 1946 from Argentina, with the election to the presidency (by a huge 
majority, it must be said) of General Juan Peron. 'Peronismo'owed more to 
Mussolini than to Peron himself and Peron acknowledged the debt by neutering 
the trade unions with fascist single-mindedness. The national centre, the 
Confederaci6n General de Trabajadores, was soon brought under his party's 
total control and all the country's unions were then bullied to join the centre and 
to accept its authority. By early 1950 the ITF's railwaymen's and tramwaymen's 
unions had succumbed and the locomotivemen's union, La Fraternidad, a 
venerable and famously upright organization, was finally battered into submission 
in May 1951 by an armed mob after it refused to back the Peronists' election 
campaign. The ITF's seafarers' and dockers' affiliate, the Confederaci6n 
General de Gremios Maritimos y Afines (CGGMA) stood firm under a sustained 
attack from the national centre on its leadership and bargaining rights until May 
1950 when it called its 12,000 members out on strike to defend their union's 
rights. At the CGGMA's urgent request, Becu set out for Argentina, having 
secured authority also to represent the lCFTU, in the hope of interceding with its 
Minister of Labour. But he got no farther than Montevideo where he waited some 
five days towards the end of June 1950 for a visa to enter Argentina. When he 
was finally denied it, he arranged immediately from Montevideo for an appeal to 
be made to the ITF's seafarers' and dockersý unions to undertake solidarity 
action against Argentinian slýips- 460 
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The appeal came at a difficult time for the European dockers' leaders. Great 
Britain was still coping with rationing and needed Argentinian beef, a 
consideration Deakin denied -'it is not a question of getting Argentinian meat'- 
when explaining to the ITF Congress in July 1950 why the TGWU had abstained 
from voting at a Dockers' Section meeting for a resolution supporting Becu's 
appeal. The'practical difficulties' in British ports, he said, 'make stdke action 
impossible , meaning that with the 1949 strikes such a recent nightmare, the 
TGWU did not dare to start any strike for fear of losing control of it. The Belgians 
and the Dutch were also concerned that their communist elements might take 
advantage of any solidarlity actions to cause mischief. The German OeTV was 
under legal restraints on solidarity actions and had a general concern that any 
industrial action might harm economic recovery. But the OeTV nevertheless took 
action to turn away Argentinian ships and the employers promptly sued them. 
One ship, turned away unworked by the Hamburg dockers and diverted to 
Antwerp, was boycotted there. 190 But the strike was already fading fast and was 
ended on 4 August 1950 after seventy-eight days. The CGGMA's members 
were drafted into a new organization 'set up on a luxurious scale by the 
[Argentinian] CGT and the Government'. The ITF's verdict was that 
'totalitarianism has won another victory' 191 and it did not win back any 
Argentinian affiliates until Peron was deposed in 1955. 
Frmco 8nd Peron were of a familiar fascist type, Greece presented different and 
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less straightforward challenges. 192 The vicious civil war, which began with the 
end of the German occupation, reached a new intensity with attacks by 
Communist guerrillas on the right-wing government which had been elected in 
August 1946. First the Bdtish and then the Amedcan governments intervened to 
support the government side, which set to work to suppress communists and 
communist influences wherever they were found or suspected. Mass arrests of 
communist trades unionists early in July 1947 swept up leaders of the Federation 
of Greek Madtime Unions (FGMU) and resulted in the imposition of an anti- 
communist leadership on the railwaymen's federation. The ITF was moved to 
write to the Greek Ambassador in London on 17 July 'voicing our suspicion that 
the political troubles served as a cloak ... to destroy the trade unions' and it 
cabled the Greek Pdme Minister soon afterwards 'protesting against this flagrant 
attack on the freedom of association'. in September 1947 the government 
withdrew official recognition from the FGMU and gave exclusive recognition, over 
the ITF's 'fruitless' protest, to the anti-communist Panhellenic Seafarers' 
Federation (PNO). Neither the FGMU nor the PNO was affiliated to the ITF at 
the time, though both were seeking its recognition. The FGMU had, however, 
been founded in Great Briitain dudng the war by Greek refugee seafarers and its 
communist leader, Tony Ambatielos, who commanded great respect, was 
arrested in 1947 and put on trial for aiding the 'rebels'. The ITF's cautious 
response was to insist on his being given a fair trial 193but he was tded with one 
of his FGMU colleagues, Bekakos, before a military court. Both were found guilty 
[291] 
in November 1948 of high treason and sentenced to death. The ITF, 'knowing 
something of Greek methods', had already warned that death sentences would 
mean that the ITF 'could not entertain ... any relations with non-Communist 
unions in Greece'. 194 The executions were deferred and in May 1951 the ITF 
learned that the sentences had been commuted to life imprisonment. 195The 
PNO eventually became the most active of the Greek affiliates, especially in the 
Seafarers' Section where it had big and sometimes questionable interests to 
protect. The Greek affiliates had few allies within the ITF mainstream. There 
was a lingering suspicion that their leaderships depended more on the trust their 
government placed in them than on their members' support. 
xii. Summa 
The ITFs affiliates are, or aspire to become, unions of the kind variously 
characterized as 'conventional' or'traditional' or, as they increasingly liked to be 
known from the late 1940s, 'free. The defining belief of this kind of union is one 
of trade union autonomy, that a 'free' trade union is ultimately accountable to its 
membership, not to other institutions or agencies, and particularly not to 
governments or political parties. In the real world, that autonomy must of course 
compete with other autonomies, public and private, always contending with them 
and sometimes clashing. Agreements, alliances and accommodations therefore 
have to be made, typically with political parties and governments, but'free' 
unions make them of their own volition, within their own rules. 'Free' 
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trade unionism can only exist at all, however, in a compatible political 
environment which, at the very least, tolerates and protects what the ILO came in 
1948 to describe as 'freedom of association' and 'the right to organize and 
bargain collectively'. 196 
The ITIF had never published anything approaching a political manifesto, but 
building inductively and inferentially on the concept and corollaries of 'autonomy', 
the ITF's 'politics' arrive unsurprisingly at something more or less left-of-centre, 
home ground for, say, the British Labour Party (of that period), European 'Social 
Democrats' and many American Democrats (particularly, in the period, former 
'New Dealers'). It was therefore inevitable that the ITIF should first resist the 
attempt to smother it within a WFTU 'Trade Department' and should then 
enthusiastically support the western stand in the Cold War, emphasizing 
constantly the inherent incompatibility of communism and 'free' trades unionism. 
Its cause was not helped along the way, however, by a number of weaknesses 
and failings: its rhetodc was often overwrought; some of its affiliates were very 
flawed representatives of free trade union strength and virtue; and some of its 
actions, for example during the Vigilance Committee enterprise, had distinctly 
disreputable moments. 
13ý the earty f 950s, and particularly after Stalin's death in March 1953, the WFTU 
, bbc knew that whatever mischief its supporters made, it could not do serious and 
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lasting damage either to the 'free' unions or the capitalist world. The 'free' 
international movement, for its part, knew that the workers in the communist bloc 
had similarly scant chance of asserting themselves in the face of the communist 
regimes' overwhelming firepower, witness the suppression of the uprisings in 
East Germany, Poland and, above all, Hungary. And so, after a relatively short 
period of fierce confrontation the two sides settled down to a stalemate, 
unacknowledged to the extent that neither conceded any ideological ground, but 
evident in their mutual impotence when it came to making substantial inroads into 
the other's territory. Virgin territory looked more promising and by the end of the 
period the developing world had become the main ideological arena, in a bid to 
win the allegiance of the new or revitalized unions which appeared with the great 
waves of decolonization. 
By the end of the period and within its own sphere of influence and operations, 
the ITF was working in a congenial political climate. The new post-war political 
order had accepted the two fundamental principles which underpinned the ITF's 
raison d6tre: that trade unions were, or should be, an essential feature of 
modern civil society; and that the brave new world would look more and more to 
international cooperation and government. One consequence of what, on both 
aecounts, was a transformation of the prle-war world was the creation of a 
host of 
international governmental and industrial organizations dealing with transport 
matters, in which the ITF's active partidpation was never refused and was often 
positively solicited. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusions 
i. Coming to terms with the newcomers 
The Introduction promised at the outset that this final chapter would offer'some 
reflections' on 'why and how the ITF changed as it did over the period, on what 
arguments and forces drove the changes and on the successes and setbacks of 
the process. ' Perhaps the first reflection should be that despite Oldenbroek's 
urgent appeals for the ITF to extend its reach beyond its traditional European 
heartland, the first post-war Congress decided in 1946 on a 'new' constitutional 
structure which was much the same as the old, pre-war model. The Congress 
itself would have looked much like those of the inter-war years before the 
disruptions of fascist depredations and a world war brought normal ITF business 
to a halt, with many familiar faces representing long-standing affiliates (the 
Italians were already back and even the Germans were poised to return). 
Starting up again from where they had left off might have looked no more than 
sensible to an assembly drawn from that same, very tight comer of the world. All 
but five of the 151 representatives from affiliated unions could comfortably have 
come to the 1946 Congress venue of ZOrich by train. i 
Yet, as Chapter IV has shown, the European hold on the ITIF was soon to be 
loosened with the first tentative, but soon massive, entry of the American 
railwaymen, the RLEA, followed soon afterwards by reinforcements from other 
American unions. Anxious to reel the RLEA in on almost any terms, the EC was 
ready, at Oldenbroek's urging, to cut some constitutional comers. The 
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RLEA was welcomed for a very 'token' payment and the ITF was rewarded 
before long with a growing flow of RLEA dollars. That kind of return was never in 
prospect when it came to offering concessions on affiliation fees to the transport 
unions of the 'undeveloped' world, an altogether more problematic exercise, as 
the passages in Chapter III on the introduction of the concept of 'paid-up' 
membership make uncomfortably clear. By way of illustration of the outcome in 
brutal practice at the 1952 Congress, the Swedish Railwaymen's Union could 
claim the 67,913 votes it had bought at the'standard rate', whereas the All India 
Railwaymen's Federation (AIRF) - absent anyway because it could not raise the 
fare - would have disposed of a nett 30,000 votes, being ten per cent of the 
300,000 of its (at least) one million members on which it could afford to pay fees 
at all - and those at ten per cent of the standard rate. On that reckoning, one 
Swede would have been valued at about fifteen Indians. 2 
The Swedes, every one of them most likely decent and progressive, would have 
been mortified if it had been put that way and the Indians were not there to say 
howtheysawit. But that is what the arithmetic of 'paid-up membership' meant. 
Deakin's claims, on the EC's behalf, that'paid-up membership'was a way of 
defining 'effective' affiliation and was essentially democratic (see Chapter 111) 
were too meaningless even to qualify as euphemisms. How was it, then, that 
the 
affiliates, when gathered at an ITIF Congress, could commit themselves, without 
one word of dissent, to a measure they would never have dared to suggest at 
home? 
[308] 
It was commonplace in the European and North Amedcan trade union 
movements to relate union dues to earnings without any consequences for voting 
rights. A range from fifteen to one in the level of earnings was probably unusual 
within a national union, but an international organization ought to have been able 
to cope with it between developed and Third World countries. In terms of real 
money, the AIRF's contiribution to the ITF, even at ten percent of the standard 
rate and on only one third or so of its actual membership, would have meant a far 
greater effort than was asked of any of the Europeans. 
The basic illogicality and plain inequity of the ITF's rule could hardly have 
escaped anyone who gave it a thought and Chapter III mentions a troubled 
conscience or two. But paid-up membership endured nonetheless, betraying a 
deep ambivalence in the ITF's management of its progress towards a truly 
international status. On the one hand, there was an apparently genuine and 
strong wish of the 'old' affiliates to embrace the wider and largely underprivileged 
world; on the other, they were clearly, if largely implicitly, concerned that the 
newcomers could not be relied on to share their traditional values and scruples. 
Past practice had been to accept whatever membership an affiliate declared. 
Some would give a number precise to the last member and others would round it 
up to the nearest hundred or even thousand, but, however arrived at, the number 
was what the affiliates said it was. Yet that trust was not to be extended to 
concessionary payers for fear of 'repercussions', that is, getting votes on the 
cheap. 
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What was it about the poorer affiliates that might tempt them to do such a thing? 
Quick and harsh judgments are perhaps too easily made almost sixty years on. 
Very few of the ITF's old guard in those early post-war years will have been more 
than vaguely aware that anything like trade unions were to be found outside 
Europe, North America and the British white or white-dominated dominions. 
Fewer still would have any real knowledge or first-hand experience of them. 3 
The doubts, the defensiveness, the wariness implicit in the ITF's very qualified 
welcome to the regional arrivals were certainly founded to some degree on that 
generalized ignorance and inexperience. But there was also, clearly, a 
disjunction between principles and practice. The concepts of universality, of self- 
determination, of the rejection of racial and all other prejudices, of equality in 
every sense - these were readily written into the Preamble of the Constitution, 
but when it came to their specific application in the operative rules, they were 
diluted in their definition and hedged about with qualifications. 
There was, it has been noted (Chapter 111), a not very sustained effort to find a 
formula which would produce a fee structure that had some regard to an 
affiliate's ability to pay, a recognition that for an African union the ITF affiliation 
fee at standard rate might easiý come to more than its total income, whilst for 
many of the ITF's European and North American affiliates it was petty cash. 4 
But the search was abandoned and so it followed that even if a typical regional 
affiliate could pay its delegation's way to Congress, it would have only 
devalued 
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votes at its disposal when it got there, certainly not enough to make any impact 
on the governing body elections. That much was acknowledged by the decision 
in 1956 to introduce regional EC members by way of co-option (Chapter 111). The 
good intentions are not in doubt, but the ambivalence persisted. The 
appointments were a matter entirely for the EC: whether to make them and, if so, 
who should have them. In the event, the EC consulted the regional affiliates 
before making its choices but the integrity of the process was not enhanced by 
exploitng it as an opportunity to give the Americans an extra seat. And it said 
little for the confidence the EC had in its choices that they were not allowed even 
to attend meetings of the EC's Regional Affairs Committee (RAC) until November 
1960, some four years after the RAC's establishment. 5 
It has to be said, nevertheless, that in terms of their affiliated membership (see 
Tables 1 and 3), the regional unions did well out of the decision of the 1962 
Congress to allow for the election of six regional members - two each from the 
three regions - onto the new-style Executive Board. Africa was treated very 
generously and Latin America, too, did well. The exceptionally heavy Japanese 
affiliation, over half the region's total, gave Asia at least a case for one seat more 
(see Tables 3 and 6), but there were no complaints from the Japanese 
themselves. The size and complexion of the 1962 EB were certainly a very far 
cry from those of the EC of 1946, when six of the seven members (the exited 
Spaniard, Trif6n G6mez, the exception) came from central and northern 
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Europe. It was also a significant and welcome departure from the patronising 
resort to co-option that the regional members of the EB (like the Europeans and 
North Americans) were effectively elected by their own electoral groups. On 
reflection, however, it is disappointing that the 1962 Congress did not seize an 
obvious opportunity to look again at the concept of 'paid-up' membership. Nor 
was it raised at the last Congress of the period, in 1965.6 
The measures taken on fees and votes were essentially discriminatory from the 
outset, punishing the Third World affiliates for their inevitably frail financial 
situation by depriving them of full and unconditional membership. The most 
disturbing aspect of the whole episode is the absence of any authoritative and 
convincing attempt to justify these penalties and that failure invites speculation 
about how deeply the ITF's commitment to fight racial discrimination really ran. 
Was it really no more than lip service? There was none of the overt racist 
paranoia of an earlier ITF generation when faced with the 'Yellow Peril' (see 
below), and if there was what would today be described as 'racism' at work in the 
post-war ITF, there is no evidence of it. There is certainly, however, a sense in 
those few discussions that are on record of an underlying and nervous 
apprehension about the kind of people and organizations that the drive into the 
regions would bring into the ITF. There is also on the part of the established 
affiliates an undoubted if implicit assumption of superiority. It was never 
expressed - and almost certainly was never seen - as 
that of a master over a 
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servant, but as that of master's relationship to his apprentice. It was an 
assumption which, it should be noted, the regional affiliates themselves often 
connived at or positively induced with their tendency to stress how much they 
looked to, indeed depended on, the support of their elders and mentors in the 
ITF. (The incremental mutation of the relationship from that of master and 
apprentice to one of donor and client a long story, was barely under way by the 
end of the period. ) 
What part, if any, racial prejudices may have played, consciously or not in the 
development of the 'paid-up membership' issue could best be left to social 
historians, not to say psychologists. They might or might not find this final point 
instructive. Most of the French and all the Italian affiliates, established out of the 
post-war splits in their national movements (see Chapter IV), were as weak, 
relatively, as any in the Third World. They paid their ITF fees at very low rates 
and were penalized for it. Yet the European affiliates always ensured that the 
French had a seat on the EC, at the ITF's top table. Was this in recognition of 
the historical contribution its French affiliates had made to the ITF (the Italians 
could not claim anything like it) or simply a matter of European solidarity? On 
either or any other count it was a helping hand that none of the non-European 
affiliates of comparable indigence could have expected. 
ii. The dfive to the regions. 'seff-interesf and PoRical necess 
There was something of the same kind of hierarchical cast of mind that informed 
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the early debates within the ITF on regional activities, with repeated appeals to 
'enlightened self-interest: that is, it served the interests of the strong affiliates to 
look after the poor and the weak of the world's transport workers. Here was an 
'enlightened' version of the proposition that had driven the ITF's efforts to tackle 
the perceived problem of the Yellow Peril, the introduction of 'Asiatic' seamen on 
European ships before and immediately after the First World War. 7 By 1948, the 
offensive language and overt prejudices of the pre-war days had long been 
abandoned, but in his address to the 1948 Congress on'Regional Organization', 
Tofahm still put great stress on the 'strategic reasons' for the ITF's vigorous 
engagement with the wider world, that is the need for'world scale' action to 
ensure that there were no 'unfavourable repercussions' from the exploitation of 
workers'in any country with which we have economic relations'. Only then did 
he add that'noblesse ob/ige! '(sic), and that the ITF had also to 'teach ... the 
weak trade unions in the backward countries' how to 'emancipate their members 
from ignorance and servitude'. 8 (No-one seems ever to have envisaged the 
possibility that at some times and in some circumstances it might not seem to be 
in an affiliate's interests, or in the ITF's, to help a regional affiliate. They were no 
more guaranteed to be virtuous than their European brothers and sisters. ) 
The Americans also had self-interest in mind, but not at all of the kind that 
Tofahm was expounding. The RLEA's priority was, as always, political, that is 
the strategic necessity to counter communist influence wherever and whenever 
R 
was to be found. When the main theatre of the Cold War moved in the 
1950s 
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from Europe to the developing, decolonized world, the Americans pressed the 
ITF to strengthen and accelerate what had until then been a patchy and largely 
sectoral effort. In those early days, the Americans probably saw the main aim as 
being to get to the virgin territory first, claiming it ahead of the enemy. By the end 
of the period, in the brief 'hearts and minds' years of the Kennedy era, their aim 
was more positive and coherent: to help regional transport workers to organize 
free trade unions, through which they could win a better life for themselves and 
so resist communist temptation. These aims were in themselves unobjectionable 
to the European mainstream and to the ITF leadership which had long seen it as 
a moral imperative to take the ITF beyond its fight traditional boundaries. Where 
the Americans made a crucial difference was in easing greatly the old constraints 
of money (see Table 9) and people (see Chapter 111). They wrote the cheques 
and found the help - Laflamme and Townsend in Africa, Houke and Otero in 
Latin America - but the ITF was left free enough to keep its distance, after some 
early collaboration, from the American movement's own regional operations such 
as the American Institute for Free Labor Development (Al FLD), set up in 1961 as 
a joint enterprise of the AFL-CIO and American multinationals to further the 
cause of tee trades unionism in Latin America. 9 Indeed, the Monroe Doctrine 
was relaxed to allow the Spanish Azaha to direct the ITF's Latin American 
operation and he made it a point of principle to have as little as possible to do 
with the ICFTU's'lnter-American' regional organization, ORIT, which the AFL- 
CIO dominated and largely paid for. 
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iii. Changing and challenging structures 
All these anxieties and assumptions surely explain, to some degree, the EC's, 
and later the EB's, concern over the status of the Asian Advisory Committee 
(AAC), the ITF's first and very cautious venture into the building of regional 
structures. As Chapter III makes clear, what pleased the EC most about the 
AAC was what it did not ask for, that is the power to take decisions of any kind. 
The EC's almost indecent relief that the AAC seemed to renounce any ambition 
to do more than discuss and recommend comes off the page. Perhaps the EB's 
subsequent action in asking the Asians to pay towards the AAC's cost was a pre- 
emptive move, making it clear that any second thoughts would come 
at a cost. 
There were, of course, sedous structural and constitutional issues to be faced as 
the ITF went through what for any international organization was a very rapid 
transformation. There had been no call in 1945 for anything more than the 
London headquarters. Even the one-man New York office was unnecessary once 
the war ended and the merchant seamen were again free to contact their own 
unions. A handful of Europeans composed a perfectly adequate Executive 
Commiftee. Within twenty years, almost half the members-unions came from 
beyond Europe, the EC had become an Executive Board and tripled in size, and 
any thought that the ITF membership could be serviced from London alone 
had 
long been abandoned. 
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But though the ITF's regional offices, however modest, provided an 
administrative regional network, the AAC was the only regional organization that 
was up and running, with a similar 'advisory body for Latin America in prospect. 
The'fully-fledged' regional organizations once briefly envisaged (see Chapter 111) 
were put on hold until two critical questions of competence and of finance could 
be settled: who was to have the final say on what the ITIF should do in the 
regions and who would be answerable for the money spent on it? The 
Constitution had always been unambiguous: the General Secretary was to keep 
the ITF's books and administer the ITFs finances under the control of the 
ExecutiveCommiftee/Board. 10 How could 'fully-fledged' regional organizations 
be accommodated within such a centralized financial regime? If the regional 
affiliates funded the operations themselves, would that settle the issue of 
competence, namely that they could do what they liked in their region if they paid 
for it? Almost certainly not, by any reading of the Constitution, but it was a purely 
hypothetical question because only the Asians could aspire to self-sufficiency, 
and then only if the Japanese picked up almost all the bill. The Africans and the 
Latin Americans had no money to speak of. (An 'Inter-American', rather than 
Latin American structure might have brought in extra American money, but even 
that incentive would not have been enough to win the ITF's Latin Americans over 
to replicating the lCFTU-ORIT experience. ) 
But if regional organizations were to depend on the ITF for their funds, as 
seemed inevitable for the foreseeable future, how much freedom could they 
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reasonably expect to be given? In its general sense, the question was 
very familiar at national trade union level: just another example of the on-going 
tussle between the centre and the branches, commonly expressed in terms of 
pipers and tunes, or of 'bureaucracy versus 'democracy. In the particular sense 
of the ITF's situation, however, fundamental questions of purpose and principle 
were in play. Was the ITIF out simply to build an empire or were the regions to 
have the self-determination which the ITF had endorsed in its constitution? Must 
self-determination within the regions (but still within the terms of the ITIF 
Constitution) be self-sufficient? If so, for as long as self-sufficiency remained 
beyond the bounds of possibility, the whole regional exercise was no more than 
cynical window-dressing. Yet without control from the centre, what assurance 
could there be for the affiliates who put up the money that it would be used to 
proper and good effect? The Azaha embarrassment had developed under the 
nose of headquarters. How much bigger would it have been and how much 
longer would it have lasted if he had not had London to account to? If the better- 
off affiliates were to be expected to pay extra contributions or, towards the end of 
the period, to agree that a large slice of their fees should be ring-fenced for the 
regions, they were likely to expect assurances that the governing bodies could 
apply financial controls whenever they needed to. 
All these questions loomed by the end of the period, as they were bound to once 
the ITF began to grow out of its traditional boundaries, but they were never 
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confronted, then or later, as presenting a strategic choice, to be decided in terms 
of principle and applied consistently in the course of the ITF's regional 
development. The ITF rarely approached problems in the abstract. The question 
was treated as being specific to the AAC and there was neither the time nor the 
call to think beyond that. As has been noted, the EC and, subsequently, the EB, 
decided effectively to re-affirm their constitutional prerogatives and there the 
matter rested to the end of the period. This typically ad hoc approach had its 
advantages, above all of flexibility in that every decision could be changed if 
circumstances seemed to demand it. And at no time in the period (or since) was 
there anyone (other than Tofahrn? ) in a leading role who saw much value or 
point in anything but'practical' questions and answers. Any structural strains 
produced by the ITF's regional expansion would be fixed once they became a 
problem and if the result was inconsistency from one region to the other, then 
that simply and aptly reflected the difference between them. The weakness of 
that approach was its failure to make any kind of statement about the kind of 
organization the ITF wished to be when its global aspirations were finally 
achieved. As it was, the regions continued to be thrown the occasional bone of 
competence or responsibility when they made enough of a nuisance of 
themselves to need some comfort. There was never the slightest inclination 
within the Secretariat or the governing bodies to promote a consensual and 
principled settlement which would strike a balance of rights and responsibilities 
between the centre and the regions. 
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The Secretariat and those playing any kind of leading role in the ITF would have 
regarded any such effort as an airy-fairy indulgence, but in its absence the ad 
hoc approach left no transparent criteria of fair dealing and equity. Well before 
the end of the period, the Japanese were privately musing" whether the 
Executive Board and the General Secretary might not have found the whole 
issue of regional organization much easier if it involved only Europeans. They 
had noticed that in 1958 Becu and the EC had stitched together an arrangement 
with the ITF affiliates in the European Economic Community (EEC) to service 
their particular needs and that the ITF was paying a substantial contribution 
towards the costs. 12 
iv. General Secretaries and the Dersona& factor 
A large part of Chapter III is given over to the General Secretaries of the period. 
A former ITS General Secretary, 13 reducing Weber and Michels to their 
essentials, was given to describing himself and his job as'the guy with the files'. 
If 'files' stands for the headquarters apparatus and the secretariat, then the ITF's 
General Secretary met the job description as the full-time head of a very 
centralized bureaucracy (regional offices at the time were rarely more than two 
persons strong). He had constitutional authority over the ITF's officers and staff 
and was ultimately responsible for what they produced. By contrast, the 
members of the governing bodies, most importantly of the EC/EB, had no 
ITF 
'files' other than those the General Secretary provided and most of them 
had to 
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make a real effort to find enough time for the ITF in their overcrowded diaries. 
This relationship of full-time professionals and 'lay governing bodies was the 
norm at national trade union level, but there was an extra exotic dimension to 
international activities: places, situations, issues well beyond the acquaintance 
and experience of national leaders, however eminent, and often presented in 
languages which they did not understand until the Secretariat translated them. In 
the best of ITF General Secretary-governing body relationships, the General 
Secretarys superiority in these respects was not only acknowledged but was 
positively expected of him as essential to a high quality of judgment and advice. 
It was what he was paid for. But if he had advantages, they did not mean that he 
could ever be sure of having his own way. His lay members and ultimate 
masters, certainly at EC/EB level, were usually themselves General Secretaries 
or something of the kind, well practised in the tricks of the General Secretary 
trade, quick both to see where they were being steered and to decide whether 
they wished to go there. International issues might often be very far removed 
from their daily experience and concerns, but coming cold to situations or 
problems, making sense of them and then reaching reasonable judgments was 
part of any competent union leaders repertoire. Furthermore, most of the ITF's 
leading lights were never solely dependent on the ITF's General Secretary for 
information and advice on international affairs. They would most likely have 
access to international specialists in their national centres and could exchange 
international experiences wfth other national unions. 
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Above all, governing body members were not to be taken lightlyý and never for 
granted, not because of tender egos (though these were not unknown), but 
because the relationship depended almost totally on the trust that they felt they 
could place in a General Secretary whom they would encounter face to face 
perhaps no more than twice a year. They needed to be sure that he always dealt 
with them truthfully and frankly and would consult them on anything that they 
really needed to know and decide on. All being well, they were happy, indeed 
expected, that he should do his chief executive job without troubling them 
unnecessarily. If all was not well, and the trust and confidence were not there, 
his job would become impossible. Once the governing bodies called in the 
myriad reserve powers they had under the Constitution, demanding prior 
consultation and approval for everything that they would otherwise happily have 
left to the General Secretary against endorsement some time later, questioning 
everything they were told and every penny spent he - and the ITF with him - 
would cease effectively to function. Oldenbroek, Becu and De Vries had their 
critics and their crises but they never lost the governing bodies' trust and respect. 
Imhof was to squander both in his one and only term and was voted out of office 
at the 1968 Congress. 14 
The General Secretaries were chief executive officers and at the same time 
members of the GC, the EC/EB and the MC. Their position was inherently 
strengthened by their having been elected by Congress and Becu therefore had 
reason to argue that the General Secretary alone should have that distinction 
if 
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his primacy was to be, and be seen to be, beyond all question, But the issue 
seems never to have crossed Oldenbroek's mind, nor Becu's when he was first 
elected General Secretary 'amid a burst of applause' and 'in agreement with our 
friend Tofahm' at the 1950 Congress. Tofahm was re-elected as Assistant 
General Secretary'amid applause' (no 'burst'! ) soon afterwards. 15 When it came 
to Tofahm (or anything else), Oldenbroel(s hide was as thick as Becu's was ultra 
sensitive. Oldenbroek would never dignify Tofahm's standing by acknowledging 
him as a problem. But within two years of his election, Becu had made Tofahm 
the problem and if he could not dismiss him he was determined to diminish him 
to the point of humiliabon or drive him to resignation. The more honest of the 
speakers on both sides at the 1952 Congress acknowledged as much. The 
argument was not about the ITF's rules, any more than the Belgian railwaymen's 
attempt in 1962 to introduce a compulsory retirement age of sixty-five for the 
General Secretary was entirely unrelated to that fact that De Vries had just 
reached it. 
There is enough evidence in Chapter III of how very different the three General 
Secretaries of the period were in character and temperament (Imhof s four 
months hardly qualify), but they also had much in common. They were born 
within five years of each other - De Vries in 1897, Oldenbroek in 1898 and 
Becu 
in 1902 - and had all come under Fimmen's spell (though 
De Vries at more of a 
distance), forming incidentally a Dutch/Fleming linguistic and cultural quartet. 
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Another link came through the Seafarers' Section, for which Fimmen had given 
Oldenbroek responsibilities, though he (like Fimmen) had never gone to sea 
professionally; Becu and De Vries had both been merchant marine officers by 
trade. Most relevantly of all, they knew almost everything there was to know 
about each other's strengths and weaknesses, convictions and aversions, 
personal traits and foibles. The line of succession within the ITF ran a fortuitous 
and even bitter course - Oldenbroek was head-hunted away, Becu was first his 
successor and then his nemesis, De Vries was first elected because he was not 
someone else (Imhof) - but still they made up a dynasty of sorts. Imhof s arrival 
marked its end, and to the extent that the heavy brigade of European railwaymen 
would have thought the General Secretaryship was no more than their belated 
due, the break was calculated. Yet if De Vries had been ten years younger, or N 
(by no means too fanciful a speculation) AzAna had not meanwhile disgraced 
himself, it might have been a very different outcome. 
It is impossible to estimate precisely how much of an influence the personalities 
of the three General Secretaries had on the ITF's activities and policies over the 
period, beyond that it would have been less than decisive but much more than 
incidental. Their pivotal position within both the Secretariat and the governing 
bodies, proposing and - to the extent of their having a vote - 
disposing, and their 
functions as treasurers, spokesmen, defenders, initiators gave them a privileged 
prominence in the ITF's life and each exploited it in his own way. Of the three, 
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Oldenbroek was surely the most formidable and accomplished - The Proceedings 
of the 1946 and 1948 Congresses are summaries in the third person, yet give a 
taste of his debating skills, of the way his arguments were organized so that one 
thing just had to follow from another, and they even allow a glimpse of the 
patronizing, sometimes wounding, way he had of handling those who were 
foolish enough not to agree with him. (No-one was so big as to escape, as 
Deakin could have confirmed. ) In the end, his aloof ways cost him dear. When 
he needed powerful friends most in order to resist the outrageous Meany and his 
bully-boys, he found he had none. But as to the main question here, his part in 
the shaping of the ITF in the post-war era, there is no doubt that his leadership in 
resisting the ITF's assimilation within the WFTU was by far his most important 
and enduring contribution. 
Ironically, it was the contribution which ensured his departure to the ICFTU and 
Becu's succession. Becu was so different in almost every way. Marshalling 
arguments was not his biggest strength and running an office ranked very low 
among his interests. What he had (and Oldenbroek would have been happy to 
disown) was an entirely genuine emotional commitment, fuelled by his gut 
reactions. This was what charged his drive for an international boycott in support 
of the Hungarian resistance in 1956 and so embittered him when the ICFTU 
affiliates failed to respond. It was also the kind of fervour that Oldenbroek so 
distrusted and Meany was so desperately looking for. And so Becu too left 
for 
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the ICFTU, the second General Secretary of the ITF to be seen as the answer to 
the ICFTU's prayer, summoned to save it from the first. Becu's ten years as ITF 
General Secretary began as the Cold War intensified and much of the ITF's 
Vigilance Committee operation, which takes up much of Chapter V, was his 
responsibility. If he had not been aware before the Strauss memo how deeply 
Brown and the CIA were involved and how much Ferri-Pisani was their man, he 
certainly knew after it. The guess (it cannot be more than that) is that he had had 
throughout a very good idea of their involvement (he was very experienced by 
then in the ways of intelligence services) and was ready to turn a blind eye to ft. 
A man of action himself, he would have approved of a tough, if necessary violent, 
confrontation with the CGT in Marseilles and probably believed much of Ferý- 
Pisani's claim to have won the port for the democratic cause. But the Strauss 
memo is also important for revealing how angry Brown was that Becu could not 
deliver the wholesale, unconditional co-operation that Brown thought he had 
initially offered. (Had Brown recalled that disenchantment and impressed it upon 
Meany some nine years later, he might have saved Becu for the ITF and Becu 
himself from a wretched end at the ICFTU. ) If Becu had personal doubts about 
the controversial turn the Vigilance Committee project had taken and about Ferri- 
Pisani personally, he never made any real concessions to their critics in the EC 
or at Congress. What would have disturbed him (and any General Secretary), 
however, was his realization that the Mediterranean operation was entirely out of 
his control. When the CIA cut off the Mediterranean RVC's funding, part of him 
at least must have been very relieved. 
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Towards the end of the 1950s, post-Hungary and post-Suez, Becu promoted the 
expansion of the ITF's regional activities vigorously and imaginatively. The 
mission to Africa (Chapter 111) took the ITF for the first time to the frontline of the 
struggle against racism and gave an overdue urgency to the ITF's perception of 
its corrosive effect on trade union rights and practices. This personal 
commitment to regional activities, his fiery defence of what he saw as free trade 
union principles and his strong leadership in the ITF's most spectacular sectional 
success, the flag-of-convenience campaign, had helped make him unassailable 
as General Secretary by 1960. Barring major catastrophes, he could be sure of 
re-election through to retirement in some seven years. It was entirely his choice, 
certainly not the ITFs, that he went to the ICFTU in 1960 with inconsiderate 
haste, as many affiliates saw it, leaving them no time before the 1960 Congress 
to think about the succession. 
As Chapter III seeks to convey, there was much more to Pieter de Vries than the 
rather desperate stop-gap and stop-Imhof choice that even his supporters tended 
to see. Constitutions develop more and more barnacles over time and by 1962 
the structure and functions of the governing bodies in particular were becoming 
less and less serviceable for an organization which was changing rapidly and 
profoundly in almost every way. Never free throughout his first term from the 
great pressures of the SIU affair (see Chapter IV), he did the ITF a real service 
by persuading the 1962 Congress to change fundamentally the way the 
[327] 
organization was governed and administered. He could never, however, carry 
the weight vAthin the EB of a Becu, and even less of an Oldenbroek. The self- 
effacing manner which disarmed his detractors, at least to the point where they 
sat out his second term without apparent resentment, was hardly inspirational 
and there was absolutely nothing to be done about his age. If the issue here is 
the ability and personality of the General Secretary as factors in the ITF's 
organizational and political development, then the conclusion has to be that De 
Vries must have an honourable but distant third place. 
v. The American factor 
The arrival and subsequent experience of a heavy American presence accounts 
for much of Chapter IV. The beginning seemed auspicious with the prize capture 
of the solid citizens of the RLEA, personified by the puritanically upright Art Lyon. 
The last years of the period brought the worst of the American experience, the 
long confrontation which began with Hal Banks and his Canadian SIU mobsters 
and then took in their American godfather, Paul Hall. It was Hall, with his great 
network of union and political intimates, many owing him favours for past 
services or fat cheques, who was the greater threat. He had the attentive ear of 
Meany and access to the very top of government, to such as Secretary for Labor 
Willard Wirtz and even Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 16 It was Hall who enlisted 
the aid of the CIA and so advanced the career of its tyro agent, Ed Wilson, out to 
make a name and a fortune for himself and already out of control. The ITF had 
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been deeply embarrassed to have to live for some time in the reflected ignominy 
of the ILA and Teamsters scandals, but both cases were essentially domestic. 
Neither of those delinquents had set out, as Hall had, to challenge the ITF to the 
point of setting up an alternative international and then encouraging ITF affiliates 
to defect toit. 17There was no chance that it would do the ITF fatal damage, and 
Hall would have known it, but it served to remind the ITF that he had the money 
and the contacts to give the ITF serious problems. 
There were several reasons why Hall eventually decided to make peace, not 
least that the fugitive Banks had become a total liability, but one pressing reason 
was certainly that the SIU's suspension left its detested rival, the NMU, as the 
only ITF affiliate to speak for American seafarer ratings within the maritime 
sections. The SlU could not afford to give the NMU exclusive influence over the 
development and application of ITF flag-of-convenience policy at a time when 
droves of American shipowners were'flagging out'. 
The SIU's recognition of the value, indeed the necessity, of its active involvement 
in sectional activities was matched by that of the American civil aviation affiliates. 
The airline pilots (ALPA), as Chapter IV has shown, were thrown out for their 
pains, losing a bitter fight with the American flight engineers -a battle between 
two American affiliates with international consequences for cockpit job security 
throughout the industry. The intensity of the American involvement in this 
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sectional issue was in striking contrast with Lyon's view (the only RLEA view that 
mattered for most of the period), that the American railwaymen belonged to the 
ITF purely as a matter of political and patriotic necessity. The RLEA's first 
dealings with the ITF had been solicited by the American intelligence services 
and its formal affiliation had been at the strenuous bidding of the AFL, egged on 
by the American government. The whole point of its affiliation had been to 
bolster the ITF's resistance to the WFTU's embrace and subsequently, and more 
broadly, to back the ITF's promotion of the 'free' trade union cause. 
Anything else, including the ITF Railwaymen's Section activities, was of very 
marginal account. The RLEA could'seldom'be prevailed on to provide a 
presence at section conferences because, wrote Lyon, 'we found little on the 
agendas ... which we considered 
important to us'. He blamed the'bureaucratic' 
Tofahrn for not giving them more interesting topics, but in truth he believed the 
American railwaymen's working and living conditions were in every respect so 
much in advance of those anywhere else that they had nothing to learn or to gain 
from the ITF. 18 Their own industrial world was a very safe and benign place to be 
and if they had problems, the RLEA unions could handle them. It was the rest of 
the world, and far more than the railwaymen's part of it, which was dangerous 
and required their engagement. 
vi. The membership and polifics nexus 
The American factor was far from the only ingredient in the interplay between the 
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development of the ITF's membership and the shaping of its politcal stance and 
policies. It was bound, however, to make itself felt by its sheer weiýght of 
numbers, that is in votes, seats on important committees and affiliation fees. 
Tables I and 3 give the measure of the significant realiignment of regional 
influence over the period, with the Europeans declining from their near monopoly 
in 1946 to something under one-half of the membership by 1964 and the North 
Americans (of which the 'nabonal' Canadian tendency was a very small part) 
going, over the same pedod, from next to nothing tD almost one-quarter. 
But the numbers need qualification. The configuration of the new EB in 1962 
came very close to the regional complexion of the ITF, departing most in its 
generosity to the regions but departing also to the extent that the Europeans got 
slightly more than one half of the seats - twelve of twenty-two - for slightly less 
than one half of the membership. The North Americans doubled their 
representation from two seats (one elected and one co-opted) to four, which was 
very near what they were due on their membership. The European monopoly at 
Executive Committee/Board level, which was total in 1946, had thus been 
reduced to a two-seat majority of elected members sixteen years later, with the 
independent ex officid vote of the General Secretary to be reckoned with. 
Moreover, the chance that the Europeans would act en bloc on anything was 
never better than remote. 
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Such a sea change must surely have meant something significant in terms of 
relative influence but how it was exercised and in what directions would need 
much more consideration and space than is possible here, certainly not in the 
intdguing but very demanding forms proposed by Cox and Jacobson. 19 There is 
room here only to bear them in mind in offering some comments and conjectures 
on the American affiliates' contdbubon to the ITFs 'politics', the area where, 
given the Cold War ambience of the times, they might be expected to have made 
the most mark. 
Placing them on the American political spectrum would have put most of the 
RLEA's member-unions firmly in the 'liberal' Democrat camp, typically latter-day 
New Dealers, with Hubert Humphrey a special favourite towards the end of the 
period. Any Western European trade unionists who happened on, say, a railway 
'clerks' (BRAC) convention would have found most of the slogans and posters 
politically agreeable, for example supporting public health schemes, championing 
civil rights, and denouncing anti-union legislation in the 'right to work' 
(predominantly Dixiecrat) states. The SIU, perhaps surprisingly, was a very big 
donor to the Democrat Party and endorsed enough good 'liberal' causes, despite 
Hall's Southern roots, for the unquestionably progressive Vice President Mondale 
to attend his funeral in 1980.20 Furthermore, both the BRAC and the SIU came 
from the more conservative AFL wing of the AFL-CIO, whereas another of the 
ITF's affiliates, the National Maritime Union (NMU), of much more radical 
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ongins, was unashamedly and provocatively left-wing. The only affiliates which 
could really be placed to the dght of centre were the two ITIF miscreants, the 
super-patriotic ILA ('I Love Amedca') and the Teamsters, who had been stalked 
and finally cornered by Robert Kennedy on his way up the Democrat ladder. The 
Americans were not, therefore, so ideologically alien that they could not be 
accommodated in the polftical range occupied by the ITF's Europeans, in which 
'moderates' of the social democrat kind predominated. 
The differences lay more in their mindsets and historical experiences. Very few 
of the ITF's Americans gave a thought to international affairs and when they did 
the natural reaction was to take their governments side. Almost all the 
Americans who were active in the ITF had a deeply patriotic attachment to their 
country and its way of life and were instinctively resolved to confound America's 
enemies. If their government identified the Soviet Union and communism 
generally as clear and present threats to the USA and to democracy everywhere, 
then these became enemies to be resisted and defeated. That was all they 
needed to know and all that they needed to say in defence of their case. 
In what they might have thought was their more worldly and sophisticated way, 
the European affiliates tended to dissociate themselves from the Americans' 
approach as uncomfortably crude and fundamentalist. Few Americans, they 
would note, had ever met a real-Iffe communist or were ever likely to, a chastity 
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the AFL-CIO sought to enforce by proscribing any contact with communists or 
communist-controlled organizations. 21 Unlike the Americans, all of the European 
affiliates would have had communists or their sympathisers among their 
members and many of them would have had communist officials, especially at 
branch or shop steward levels. With the unlikely exception, however, of Max 
Arnold, President of the Swiss public service workers, none of the affiliates was 
led by an avowed communist (though his ideological enemies were convinced 
that Jim Figgins of the British NUR was a communist in every way short of 
carrying a party card). As for contacts and visits, the Austrian and Finnish unions, 
conscious of their countries' delicately structured 'neutrality, had practical and 
necessary reasons to be on speaking terms with their Eastern Bloc counterparts. 
The ITF's Scandinavians had influential co-ordinating bodies of their own where 
they could decide policy on such matters and by and large took a pragmatic view 
of contacts, making them as close or as distant as served their own interests 
best. For the French FO and Italian CISL and UIL affiliates, their existence itself 
was a political statement and they took a consistently hard line against 
fraternization of any kind with communists. 
But whatever the differences between the Americans and the variegated 
Europeans, and however different the tone, from the frothing stridency of 
Ferri- 
Pisani to Oldenbroek's clinical calm, they all agreed that the ITF and they 
themselves would not survive as autonomous organizations under communist 
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rule or domination. It was literally seen as a life-or-death option and the 
Europeans would have come to that conclusion with or without the American 
presence. As Chapter V makes clear, the big debates within the ITF on the great 
political issues of the 1940s and 1950s - the Korean War, the Marshall Plan, 
German re-armament - were fought out overwhelmingly by Europeans (with a 
British civil war as a side-show). The American affiliates' contributions were 
relatively few and, in terms of the outcome, superfluous. 
Similarly, the American transport unions - the RLEA above all - might have been 
persuaded or cajoled into affiliation by their government and the AFL so as to 
save the ITF from failing into the WFTU's trap, but in truth there never was any 
danger that the ITF would do so, once the WFTU laid down the rules it wished to 
see imposed on its Trade Departments. Everyone of any influence in the ITF 
(including, in his heart of hearts and despite his special pleading, Deakin himself) 
recognized that, as they stood, those rules amounted to an ITS suicide note and 
there was never any prospect of the ITSs' being able to negotiate them away. 
For what the WFTU demanded was a total surrender of the ITF's autonomy and 
acceptance of a (literally) Stalinist dirigisme, derived from another polifical world 
altogether from one in which the ITF's kind of trade unionism could survive, let 
alone flourish. 
As for the more sinister aspect of the American experience, Chapter 
V has 
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attempted to put the Mediterranean Vigilance Committee adventure and the 
tragicomic tale of Ferý-Pisani into its true, much diminished proportions. 
It was a very short and totally unproductive episode which is not to the ITFs 
credit. Some general comments on Becu's likely complicity have already been 
made but, whatever those general considerations, he must surely have realized 
from very early in the enterprise that FerrWisani was a highly unstable and 
unpredictable fanatic, almost certainly scarred by his Buchenwald experience 
and embittered by what he would have seen as the SFIO's treachery in 
Marseilles. As the ITF's flag-bearer he was at best a standing embarrassment 
and at worst a disaster, given to almost deranged rants. But having endorsed 
him unreservedly at Congress and made excuses for him in the EC, Becu could 
hardly have closed the circus down without calling his own judgment into serious 
question. If anyone knows what happened to Ferri-Pisani between his sudden 
disappearance from the scene and his suicide, the story seems never to have 
been written and the writers efforts to enlist the help of the FO in his researches 
have gone unanswered and unacknowledged. If anyone in the FO has heard of 
him, it is probably as someone best forgotten. 
vii. The theorefical wasteland 
Gu mbrell- McCormick has devoted some very productive pages to 'Theoretical 
perspectives on international trade unionism', 22 laying out the areas that call 
for 
attention; defining and specifying the different types and characteristics of 
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international trade union organizations; and pointing to some potential empirical 
and theoretical pitfalls. Her contribution is particularý noteworthy, however, for 
what is not there. Having described the basic ingredients, she has clearly found 
very few writers - and it would certainly not have been for her want of trying 
who have attempted the recipe. 
Fimmen, for example, would probably have regarded his Laboues Alternawe as 
the most practical and untheoretical of works and his basic prescription still has 
its supporters almost eighty years later. His belief that the chance of a better 
world rested largely in the hands of the international trade union movement is 
argued with such urgency and conviction that it is easy for any reader 
predisposed to agree with him to forget that it was wriften an age and a world 
away from modem economic and political realities. Lorwin's Labor and 
Internationalism came only five year later. Of course both might well have 
revealed any number of durable truths, but it was for others to move the 
theorizing on into the post-war era and beyond. But by 1999, Harvie Ramsay, 
was still In Search of Intemationai Union Theory and no nearer one than a table 
of 'schools of thought' (on which a little more below). 11 
Nothing, however, conveys better how poverty-stricken the theoretical offerings 
are than the long run enjoyed by John Logue's 'extremely influential' 24Towards a 
theory of trade union intemationalism. If you are at the bottom of the barrel, then 
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there is no choice but to scrape it. With not much more than 20,000 words to 
spend, Logue first cuts the dialectcal comers with a dogmatic definition - 
'democratic' trade unions 'will pursue the short-term economic interest of their 
members' 25-from which he moves to the dogmatic'basic hypothesis'that 
unions will only be active internationally if it is cost-effective, that is'a more 
rational means to members' goals than national activity. 26 If unions persist in 
international activities, in defiance of Logue's idea of rationality, it is because 
such activities are'BY THE ELITE, FOR THE ELITE'(his upper case) and, 
applying his second 'hypothesis', the union leaders see them as an opportunity 
for'elite junketeering'. 27 
Olson is the inspiration for Logue's big idea, that economics, not ideology, drives 
'labor internationalism' 28but he lacks his masters sleight of argumentation. His 
crude, unsupported and unsupportable premise that unions are bound by their 
very 'democratic' nature to opt for'short-term' benefits is probably good reason to 
stop at page ten, but many commentators have ploughed on to no good purpose 
that this miter can recognize. Logue actually concedes on that page that'short- 
term' is his own 'possible excepton' to what'most people' would say a trade 
union was interested in, but everything that follows is built on his 'exception'. 
Furthermore, his 'junketeering' thesis is very crude stuff, not in the same class as 
Olson's slippery and sinister concept of 'coercion' (small wonder Olson could 
thank Hayek for a German translation and foreword -29). 
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Kelly concludes thatif most people behaved as Olson suggests then the world of 
industrial relations would bear no resemblance to the one that actually exists' 30 
but whatever Olson's failings, Logue's world is less worldly still. His almost 
perverse irrelevance is most strikingly illustrated when he laboriously devises a 
theoretical example to support an Olsonian argument involving the 'collective 
good', the cost of providing it and of carrying along 'free riders'. The example 
concerns a group of shipowners plagued by pirates and the exercise is to 
calculate at what point it would pay the biggest of the shipowners to put an end to 
thepiracy. Having done the sum, Logue finds an example of'intemational trade 
union activity where a union did something of the kind (the Copenhagen Glove 
Makers in the 19th century! ) because the 'benefits' justifiedit. 31 Why did he not 
stay at sea, substituting seafarers' unions for shipowners and tell us whether they 
would have gone through the same cost-benefit analysis? If he really thought 
they would have done so, and his example had no point otherwise, what value 
did he think the unions would have put on the 'benefits'? How much for a 
member's life, for example? The conclusion, as with Kelly on Olson, is that 
Logue is 'radically wrong on fundamentals ... has no concept of group 
identity as 
a way of understanding the regulation of people's behaviour in group and inter- 
group contexts ... [and 
inhabits a] ... strange and 
impoverished social world'. 32 
Perhaps Logue himself is as much at a loss to explain his 'influence' as this 
writer. (No-one ever seems to have thought it worth turning 
his typescript into 
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print. ) Perhaps his tone as much as his substance makes his essay especially 
attractive to those theorists who have little or no time for conventional trade 
unionism. The 'junketeering' argument would go down very well, fitting neatly 
into the conviction that any shopfloor activists progression from overalls to the 
union official's suit and tie is always downhill, a slippery slope to betrayal and, 
more than likely, to moral disintegration, of which junketeering is a symptom. 
The narrower problem that Logue has set them (or ought to have) is to know 
what was so special about junketeering in the course of international trade union 
activity as to elevate it to a motivation. Junkets are, after all, commonplace 
almost everywhere. Governments and businesses often see them as essential 
tools. They are certainly to be found in academia, possibly even at the University 
of Gothenburg. The one 'international' junketeer that Logue put a name to, Hans 
Ericsson of the Swedish Transport Workers' Union, 33was indeed a member of 
the ITIF Executive Board, though it is doubtful if Logue knew that and the 
reference had nothing to do with the ITF. More relevantly, Ericsson's most 
sustained and notorious junketing was concentrated on Stockholm. If the issue 
were worth the effort, which it is not, it would be easy to demonstrate that 
belonging to an international trade union organization such as the ITF in fact 
seriously reduces the scope and excuses for free-lance international junketing. 
The most routine ITIF section conference would provide more international 
connections than any number of overseas tips. 
The writer has a distinct sense, however, that there is something more at 
play 
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in Logue's thesis (and in Olson's? ) than the rationality on which he claims to rely. 
There is a revealing vehemence, for example, to his condemnation of what he 
terms'parasitic elite internationalism', exemplified contemptibly by'taking your 
pretty secretary (or for that matter, your plain wife)' on expenses-paid trips. 34 
Was the very evident repugnance moral or political? Did Logue (who will be left 
to rest at the end of this paragraph) have some cause, consciously or not to hold 
trade union representatives in such very low regard? Whatever the reason, it 
does not seem to extend to any antipathy to trade unionism as such and he 
accepts, for all his 'short-term' nonsense, that the purpose of trade unions is to 
look after members' material interests and that they are fitted and entftled to 
do so. 
Of course that view begs a great number of questions, which have preoccupied a 
host of theorists for well over a century. The writer came very late to just a tiny 
portion of their vast output, having spent most of his working life as a 
professional trade union bureaucrat unaware that the very idea of trade 
unionism, as he knew it, was challenged in so many ways, often root-and-branch, 
and most persuasively of all by Marxists of various kinds. 35 The discovery of 
these sometimes head-on assaults on his idea of conventional wisdom (broadly 
that trade unions are a good and progressive thing) has certainly been 
stimulating and every practising trade unionist would gain from periodically 
looking afresh at what he or she is doing, and asking to what purpose. 
But 
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almost all the general theodes on trade unions, approving or not, are based on 
national examples and experiences. They have a vicarious application to 
international trade unionism to the extent that the ITSs and the 1CFTU are 
composed of national unions and centres, but the international trade union 
movement is more than the sum of its parts and has something of a life of its own 
(a thought that might be enough to fuel another thesis altogether, built 
indispensably on Cox's The Anatomy of Influence and his theoretical 
beneficiaries-36) These distinctions between the national and the international 
varieties of trade union organization will be developed in the following section but 
the concluding reflections will generally be of a broader nature in the hope that 
they help others to secure a defensible theoretical foothold on what seems so far 
to have been a very elusive field. The confines of the thesis period will be 
breached in the process and the reflections are inevitably very summary and 
exploratory, but they start from the relatively unusual and pdvileged vantage- 
point of a former (and unashamed) full-time practitioner in the international trade 
union movement, who can still see the issues from the inside. 
viii. Defining and assessinq the intemational trade union movement fis 
limitations, critics and the ideologLcal divide 
A theory of international trade unionism must be exactly that: it must be about 
trade unions. For this writer, 'trade unions' are what common usage and at 
least 
one century and a half of existence make them, namely groups of workers who 
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combine in an organization to promote and defend the interests that they have in 
common as workers for the same employer, or within the same industry or 
service. It is a definition of the kind offered by Colin Crouch and, like his, it does 
not need 'a mass of ifs and buts and qualifications'. 37 The taxonomy really must 
be rigorous if an international trade union theory is to have any point. Trade 
unions are a discrete species. There is nothing to gain and everything to confuse 
by bundling them together with other organizations and then theorizing 
generically about 'workers' organ izations' or 'working-class movements'or, worst 
of all, 'social movements'. Some of the things that unions do for some of their 
time are bound to conform to any or all of those characterizations but trade 
unions are ultimately defined by their industrial r6le and purpose. Everything 
else about them, politically or socially or culturally, has to be subordinate and 
relevant to their industrial priorities. 
Born and for the most part living within national boundaries, most trade unions in 
the developed countries and many in the Third World have felt the need for a 
means by which they can express and assert themselves at intemational level. 
Over time, they have created international trade union organizations like the ITF 
in order to meet that need. There are certainly some special features of the 
international trade union organizations which differentiate them from their 
national counterparts and G umbre 11- McCormick is right to wam against taking 
analogies with national structures too far. 38 But the differences are not so great 
[3431 
as to deracinate the internationals. They are in all essentials international 
manifestations of the trade unions or centres which make up their memberships. 
Dan Gallin, an international trade union practitioner of the writer's vintage, would 
like the ICFTU to 'reinvent itself as an 'organization of the world working cJass' 
and is sorry that'there is no indication so far that this is about to happen'. 391-le 
seems not to have recognized that the ICFTU's affiliates, all of them trade union 
organizations, will have to reinvent themselves first, so his disappointment is 
likely to endure. 
There is, however, a strong and committed school of writers, who would not 
dispute so much the definition of trade unions as their adequacy or even 
relevance in the contemporary world. Robin Cohen, for example, would not 
waste his efforts on theorizing international trade unions when the real demand is 
to theorize 'international labour' 40 and Peter Waterman, more broad-brush still, 
sweeps up 'internationalisms' of all kinds ('Socialist and Proletarian', 'New 
Labour', 'Waterfront') and then goes 'beyond' them to envisage 'New' brands. M 
The stimulus for much of the new thinking (though no longer so new, as the self- 
deprecatory Waterman would no doubt ruefully concede) has come very much 
from globalization and the ever-widening and varying sources of labour exploited 
by international capital, above all in the developing world. 
Cohen argues passionately that globalization is creating and shaping a new 
working class of which the traditional industrial relations concepts take no 
VIAA ] 
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account and its problems and needs therefore require an entirely fresh approach. 
He sees the recognition by Sturmthal and Scoville that collective bargaining has 
its limits in the Third World as'an extraordinary display of self-immolation'. 'Why, ' 
he asks, is the 'naked emperor' of the 'industrial relations tradition' of trade 
unionism 'still wheeled out for display'? That is a'wodd where "labour normally 
means a middle-aged, male trade union bureaucrat. A'politically inert attitude 
to industrial relations would no longer do and workers had to 'transcend a 
defensive economistic posture'. 4201le and Schoeller, often called up by fellow 
radical spirits to bring some heavy theoretical artillery to bear, never fail to deliver 
it: the choice for trade union 'internationalisation' is either to accept 'conscious 
competitioni - after all, 'trade unionism always contains the germs of nationalistic 
and racialist behaviour' - or to pursue 'the politicisation of trade union activity ... 
with the perspective of developing the power of the proletariat. 43 Peter 
Waterman is just as convinced that the working class will never achieve its 
salvation through traditional trade unionism, but tries to look on the brighter side. 
After a thoroughly disillusioning spell in the service of the Stalinist WFTU, he has 
spent almost all his academic life searching for effective alternatives to the trade 
union internationalism of the ICFTU and the ITSs. In the late stages of that 
largely disappointing quest, he was gratified by ITF support for victimized 
Liverpool dockers in the mid-1990s and found it'reassuring'to see 
'internationalist potential in the old trade unions', but he was still not sure that the 
ITF had indeed 'turned some kind of international comer'. 44 
r'14 51 L%r-r 
It is not always clear to someone (say, the writer) coming relatively innocently to 
the theoretical cockpit, whether the 'new` factor of globalization is central to the 
critique of conventional trade unionism or whether it simply goes to confirm what 
the critics have always known. But common sense says that if Cohen's'middle, - 
aged, male trade union bureaucrat was certain to fail the 'new' working class, he 
was unlikely to have done any better for the 'old' one. Those who think that trade 
unions, as defined here, are by their ideological nature doomed to disappoint the 
aspirations of the world's workers have long written them off as at best marginal 
and, more likely, entirely negative forces. As has already been noted, none of 
the many Marxist tendencies has ever expected very much from them: the 
broader-minded might see them as transitionally useful, whilst keepers of the true 
and only faith see them as virtual, at best unwitting, traitors. What the special 
challenges of globalization seem to have done is to put new life into the search 
by every vadety of trade union sceptic for ways to mobilize the working class 
effectively, and in the Third World particularly, something they are convinced the 
conventional trade unions could never do. 
It is in many ways a very old debate with very new dimensions. The key 
coordinates for anyone looking to locate sceptical theorists on the ideological 
map without too much of a slog through their works are 'elite' and 
'bureauGracy/bureaucrate. The first stands for union officials and governing 
bodies; the second for rules and due process and is commonly contrasted with 
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'democracy/democratic'. Few sceptics can get by for very long without these 
passwords and they are usually presented as being self-explanatory, that is that 
whatever the ran k-and-file or shop stewards do is 'democratic' and whatever full- 
time officials do is'bureauGratic'and so, by definition, 'undemocratic'. Those 
axioms are among a number of related assumptions which Kelly - no member of 
the trade union establishment - shows to be far from safe. 45 Butsuch 
prejudices, if that is what they are, have long and strong roots and the sceptical 
case for the prosecution certainly seems currently to hold the academic field. 
Perhaps the international trade union movement itself thinks it has more useful 
things to do than to mount a theoretical defence and is happy to leave the facts 
on the ground to speak for themselves: the ITSs and the ICFTU survive (with the 
ITF, for one, stronger than ever) and the sceptics are still unable to point to 
anything remotely like an effective 'new' workers' international movement of the 
all-purpose, class-conscious kind which Cohen so eloquently hoped for. 46 The 
relative states of the old and would-be new orders are (unconsciously) 
epitomized by two chores which Waterman had still to do when he wrote a 
Preface to the paperback version of one of his recent books. Firstly, he 
confessed that he was in a state of shock at having received a 'serious and 
courteous' letter from Bill Jordan, then General Secretary of the lCFTU, and had 
still to work out his reply. Waterman believes that the lCFTU is'still profoundly 
fixated on a set of institutions, procedures and principles ... 
from a capitalist era 
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now passing'. His other task was to respond to a statement from the Zapatistas, 
the Mexican revolutionary movement. His difficulty with the Zapatistas was that 
he was not at all sure who had written the statement and on whose authority - 
and did they mean it anyway? 47 
Is any constructive dialogue between the sceptics and the traditionalists at all 
possible? Waterman would clearly like to think so, but if his judgment of the 
ICFTU (above) is any guide, his'maximum pessimism of the intellect' will always 
win over his'maximum optimism of the will'. 48Cohen's vehement scom for the 
'industrial relations tradition' seems brutally to rule out any compromise with 
those operating in 'the largely phoney world of work-place collective 
bargaining', 49 but he is only saying in his honestly robust way what many 
sceptics of the same mind would put more abstractly. They write off trade unions 
and, with them, the collective bargaining which has been the trade union 
movements prime raison dWre these many past decades. 
On the other side of the ideological divide, within the international trade union 
movement itself, there is nowadays a widespread recognition of the sort of 
shortcomings which Sturmtahl and Scoville identified and of which Cohen made 
so much, namely that there are areas beyond the traditional movements reach 
and r6le. If anything, the weaknesses are more serious than Sturmtahl and 
Scoville or even Cohen seems to think, and go to the very structure of the 
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international movement and to its internal dynamics. To that extent, they long 
predate 'globalization' and have been at least latent since the ITSs and the 
ICFTU first took an interest in the Third World. The problem can be illustrated by 
the case of the political upheaval in the former British East Africa early in 1964 
when the ITF backed its Tanganyikan railwaymen's union in a wage dispute. 
The outcome was the arrest of the union's leader, the suppression of the union 
and a train of events involving an abortive military coup (to which the 
railwaymen's and other unions' leaders were alleged to be party); the imposition 
of a national centre under the control of the government party; and finally the 
merging of Tanganyika with Zanzibar to create Tanzania. The point is not that 
the railwaymen's action caused the whole process or that the ITF's support was 
instrumental in it. There were obviously much greater forces at work. It is 
certainly not that the President Nyerere's government was justified in eliminating 
a vigorous and largely independent trade union movement. What does strike the 
writer in retrospect is that the ITIF was constitutionally unable to respond at all to 
Nyerere's position that of Tanganyika's twelve million people, the 12,000 
railwaymen amounted to a tiny, affluent and privileged special interest which 
should count its blessings and accept that the government had far more needy 
citizens to which it should devote its sparse resources. Nowhere in the ITF's 
account of these events, 50 is the governments case as much as mentioned. The 
story was simply one of Nyerere's determination to eliminate any opposition and 
of the ITIF's principled if unavailing support for its affiliate. The attention here, 
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however, is not directed to the merits of the case but to the ITF's obligation to 
back its affiliates, which, short of corruption, crime or breach of the ITF 
Constitution, is assumed to be more or less total. It is what the affiliates regard 
as'internabonal solidarity, a reciprocal obligation between the ITF and its 
affiliates to rally round in the time of need, without any great finesse or 
qualification. In the 'old' world, where the social, political and economic 
parameters were familiar but often unfriendly, that kind of solidarity was to be 
valued. In the 'new' Third World it could often be -and in Tanganyika certainly 
was - disastrously insensitive and counter-productive. It could well be that the 
government had no interest in a dialogue and was set on its course regardless, 
but the ITF was really no less unbending. Its perceived and unconditional 
commitment to its affiliate meant it could not take, and would not think of taking, 
even the smallest step towards an understanding of the other side. 
How the ITF and the rest of the international movement can overcome these 
inhibitions so as to adapt more flexibly to the special conditions and needs of the 
Third World should be high among its priorities (see below). In other respects, 
the movement is much more ready nowadays to collaborate with social 
movements of all kinds for common causes, as visits to the ITF's website 51 will 
confirm. But like the rest of the international trade union movement, the ITF 
remains stubbornly attached to the notion that workers need to be colletý. Iy 
represented and their interests have to be collectively defended and advanced at 
P501 
their workplaces. Waterman may see (above) 'a capitalist era now passing' but 
where exactly has the employer-worker relationship been so changed in the 
'new' era that workers can now do without the kind of services trade unions 
provide? Do any of the sceptics have a clear idea where the new kind of 
working-class representation is to come from and in what form? Trade unions, 
be they ever so 'bureaucratic' and their leaderships ever so 'elitist, are an open 
book: the rules are the members' property and theirs to change, the leaderships 
have to justify themselves or give way to others. And if, from time to time, the 
rules are abused and the leaderships are corrupted, then it is for the members to 
find the remedies. An idealistic view of their virtues? Of course, but not so 
unrealistic as to invalidate the trade union movement, nationally or 
internationally, as a positive force in the pursuit of social justice and even less to 
ditch the model that works, however imperfectly, before anything better is even in 
prospect. 
ix. Intemational trade union theoT., a practffion&s ideas for an agenda 
If the international trade union movement is ever to be seriously theorized then 
the academics have to put in the empirical effort. The Introduction has drawn 
attention to the threadbare state of academic literature on the ITSs in particular 
(the ITF perhaps the only exception). Given the dominant part played by ITSs in 
anything passing for international trade union activity, the neglect is bad enough, 
but it is aggravated by the very poor quality of much of the little there 
is. Wrong 
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names, wrong times, wrong places - the practitioner soon loses count and 
respect. Some of the howlers are quite depressing. How could Ramsay write of 
'the affiliation of ITSs to [the] ICFTU'? 52 Just a slip of the keyboard, or had he 
really so misunderstood over all those years the relationship between the ITSs 
and the ICFTU? Did he not know that Charles Levinson, about whose views he 
had just written at length, had always set his face, and the ICEF's, against any 
collaboration with the ICFTU and consistently took his boycott to the literally 
physical lengths of refusing to attend any meeting where the ICFTU was 
represented? The ITF never went nearly so far but when it needed to assert 
itself, it did so, for example over the state of emergency declared in India 
during a railwaymen's strike in the 1970s and in fraternally advising the ICFTU to 
mind its own business when its Singapore affiliate attacked the ITF's 
flag-of-convenience campaign in the 1980s. To the writer's knowledge, the IUF's 
relations with the ICFTU were often fraught and the IMF refused for years to 
have anything to do with the ICFTU's efforts to co-ordinate ICFTU and ITS 
activities in South Africa. For so long as the ITSs remain in every sense 
autonomous and notwithstanding their 'blood' ties to the ICFTU, any theory that 
fails to have regard to their discrete form and functions - and to the ITSs' 
predominance in terms of activities at ground level - will serve no purpose. 
The next step would be to look critically at what the ITSs do and how they do 
it. 
First must come the unexciting but what Gu mbrell- McCormick rightly terms 
the 
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'all-important' functions of 'information and representafion,. 53The sceptical 
literature, with more momentous tasks in mind, hardly mentions them, yet for 
many ITF affiliates they are justification enough for the affiliabon fee. They are 
the basic ingredients of the ITF's sectional activities, the issues of coilect: ive 
bargaining, working practices or health and safety which are of immediate, 
practical importance to their members. That side of intemabonai trade union life 
is too important to go unnoticed, but it is uncontroversial, mundane raw material 
for the potenfial theorebcian who will find it more promising to examine how ITSs 
cope with the less congenial occasions when affiliates' interests clash. Inthe 
international transport industry, long globalized, work is constantly transferred 
from one affiliate's jurisdiction to another's, setting the gain of one union against 
another's loss. Winners and losers often look to the ITF to broker some kind of 
agreed settlement, both sides looking over their shoulders at how the outcome 
will be seen at home. Other ITSs must sometimes be placed in a similar firing 
line and there is a need for some sustained research into how these situations 
are dealt with within the internationai movement. 
Perhaps the next question would be to ask what are the effects and implications 
of the way the ITSs are structured? They are made up of national unions which 
have chosen to join an international organization, in a few cases as a matter of 
international solidarity and in a few cases in the expectation of some tangible 
return for their members, but in most cases, and in varying degrees, 
for both 
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ideological and material reasons. The affiliates of the ITF on the one hand and 
the ITF itself on the other are parties to a contract of which the central and 
essential principle is mutual support. The Tangayikan experience was an 
example of the lengths to which that principle can be taken and, subject to the 
usual exclusions (corruption, crime etc. ), it is traditionally unconditional. 
Affiliation and its cost have to be justified to the membership and the international 
engagement cannot be seen to stray too far from the membership's domestic 
concerns nor seriously damage their interests. But international organizations 
cannot operate to any purpose without having delegated rights to take a view and 
to act in their own name. Where do the ITSs and their affiliates set the limits to 
those rights? Could they be extended, for instance, so as to make it possible for 
the ITSs to operate more productively in the Third World? 
Finally, and most importantly, is the issue of the 'capacity to act', as Gumbrelk 
McCormick's subtitle has it, a quality which has been put to the test countless 
times in the ITF from its foundation, whether in specific industrial circumstances, 
for example in its flag-of-convenience campaign, or more generally, as when 
Becu demanded an international boycott in protest against the Russian invasion 
of Hungary in 1956. Within the international movement, the ideal form of 
'international solidarity' is widely represented by intemational boycott action of 
the kind carried out periodically by the ITF. The most impressive example, 
during the period was a four-day boycott, from 30 November to 4 December 
1958 of flag-of-convenience vessels which were not covered by colleL%ve 
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agreements acceptable to the ITF. Well over two hundred vessels were caught 
around the world and many more forced to delay their arrival until the action 
ended. 54 It was the kind of pressure which many other ITSs and the ICFTU 
would have liked very much to have in their armoury, but the ITF alone had the 
capability to carry out boycotts of its own instigation and by its own direct actions. 
Understandably and excusably, the rest of the international movement would 
often call on the ITF to apply its muscle to their causes. What they often failed to 
understand, never having been obliged to, was that every ITF boycott action 
required a real-life transport worker, usually a docker, to tell his employer that he 
was going to break hisGontract of employment by refusing to do his job and, 
furthermore, would break it in the course of a dispute or for a cause which, most 
likely, his employer could do nothing to resolve or even influence. InGases 
where the law was very benign on industrial action (as in Great Britain during the 
period) and where the union was strong enough to have the employees 
indulgence, such actions could be taken with near impunity and at no cost. 
Where the law was very restrictive on industrial action, particularly in 'secondary' 
actions (as in the Republic of Germany), the worker's union could be at risk of 
heavy punitive damages and in many other countries the worker's job, his career 
and his family's welfare could be at stake. The ITF carried out many international 
boycotts of greater or lesser significance during and after the period, but none of 
them was a simple matter of stopping ships or aircraft simply by sending a 
circular or making a telephone call. Practical international solidarity is the 
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sternest test of how much the affiliates and their members are prepared to 
contribute to the international cause and anyone able to theorize effecbvely on 
how to structure the movement and shape the actions themselves so as to 
extract the strongest possible response would do the international trade 
movement the greatest of all services. 
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